" THE BENEDICTS" v. United States

Decision Date17 September 1964
Docket NumberCiv. No. 1643.
Citation234 F. Supp. 1
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina
Parties"THE BENEDICTS", an unincorporated association, Plaintiff, v. The UNITED STATES of America, Defendant.

Robert W. King, Jr., Charlotte, N. C., for plaintiff.

Louis F. Oberdorfer, Asst. Atty. Gen., C. Moxley Featherston, Myron C. Baum and Norman W. Goldin, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., William Medford, U. S. Atty., Asheville, N. C., and Joseph R. Cruciani, Asst. U. S. Atty., Charlotte, N. C., for defendant.

CRAVEN, Chief Judge.

Does the $29.00 per member "advanced" to taxpayer social club to cover expenses of the Christmas and Spring dances of the club constitute "dues" under Section 4242(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954? This is the only question for decision.

A summary statement of the detailed stipulations of fact is sufficient to afford an understanding of the problem.

Taxpayer is an unincorporated association and social club consisting of approximately 110 members. There are three meetings annually, two of which are dinner dances and the third is referred to as a business meeting in the stipulations; however, the stipulations also include a financial exhibit which indicates that dinner and "corkage" and other refreshment charges are incurred at the "business" meeting.
These three meetings constitute the club's complete function: there are no other activities of any sort whatsoever.
A bill is mailed to each member once a year. It reflects regular dues of $30.00 plus $6.00 excise tax thereon, plus $29.00 representing the "advance" paid on the expenses of the Christmas and Spring dances. The total individual payment is $65.00. All such payments are received by the Treasurer and deposited in the club's single bank account, and all payments and disbursements are made from the same account. No separate accounting is kept in reference to the $29.00 "advance" payment.

Taxpayer insists that the excise tax imposed by Section 4241 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 applies only to the $30.00 annual dues, and not to the $29.00 "advance" paid by each member to cover the expenses of the Christmas and Spring dances. On demand from the Bureau of Internal Revenue, taxpayer collected the excise tax ($5.80) on the $29.00 item from each of its members and paid it under protest. Claim for refund has been disallowed by the District Director.

Section 4242 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C.A. § 4242, may sensibly be separated into at least two parts as follows:

"Dues. As used in this part the term `dues' includes:
"(1). Any assessment, irrespective of the purpose for which made, and
"(2). any charges for social privileges or facilities, or for golf, tennis, polo, swimming, or other athletic or sporting privileges or facilities, for any period of more than six days;"

The Commissioner interprets Section 4242 as establishing possibly four1 separate but overlapping categories:

"Definition; dues or membership fees. In general.
"(1) The term `dues or membership fees,' as used in the regulations in this part, means all charges made by a social, athletic, or sporting club or organization which are commonly understood to constitute dues or membership fees;
"(2) as well as all other charges required to be paid to such a club or organization for the privilege of being a member of the club or organization or a member of a particular membership class.
"The term also includes —
"(3) Any assessment made by a social, athletic, or sporting club or organization, irrespective of the purpose for which made, and
"(4) All charges made by a social, athletic, or sporting club or organization for (i) social privileges or facilities for any period of more than 6 days (whether or not consecutive), or (ii) golf, tennis, polo, swimming, or other athletic or sporting privileges or facilities for any period of more than 6 days (whether or not consecutive)." 2 Treas.Reg. Section 49.4242-1 (1964).

The regulation is not an unreasonable interpretation of the statute, and is supported by the language of the taxing statute itself (26 U.S.C.A. § 4241) with respect to "dues and membership fees" to any "social club."

Categories (2) and (3) of the regulations appear to cover the $29.00 "advance." Since by statute (Section 4242) "dues" now includes "any assessment", the language of the Supreme Court in White v. Winchester Country Club, 315 U.S. 32, 62 S.Ct. 425 at 430, 86 L.Ed. 619 at 625 (1942), may therefore be paraphrased to read: Consideration of the nature of club activity is a necessary preliminary to the formulation of a test of what constitutes an "assessment." This is not a case of multifarious club activities, some of which may be participated in by a member and some omitted, with consequent adjustment of fees, dues, or assessments to bring about some equivalence between the proportion of an individual's contributions and the benefits he receives. Taxpayer's only activity is to put on three dinner parties each year — two of which are followed by dancing and the other by club business. Membership in the club accorded one no other privilege than to attend these functions. If a member chose not to pay the $29.00 (which none did) then he apparently forfeited his privilege of attending at least two and probably all three functions of the club. It is therefore clear that such charges were "required to be paid * * * for the privilege of being a member of the club." 2 Treas.Reg. Section 49.4242-1 (1964).

There is no by-laws provision or other evidence to show that a member would be justified in withholding the $29.00 from his remittance to the club. That the "advance" may not have been legally enforceable or that the by-laws specified no sanction to compel payment, such as suspension of membership...

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2 cases
  • Freeport Country Club v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • 9 juillet 1970
    ...membership. Whether or not an excise tax is imposed in any case depends upon its own peculiar facts, "The Benedicts" v. United States, 234 F.Supp. 1 (W.D.N.C., 1964); Fleming v. Reinecke, 52 F.2d 449 (7th Cir., 1931). The facts in the case at bar show that even though various members were n......
  • Cohen v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Claims Court
    • 20 juillet 1967
    ...equivalence between the payment and the benefit received. Boots and Saddles, Inc. v. United States, supra; "The Benedicts" v. United States, 234 F.Supp. 1 (W.D. N.C.1964); Boyden v. United States, supra. In the former instance — where the payment had to be made whether or not the member eve......

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