Farrell v. Johnson & Johnson

• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: BISHOP, J.
• Citation: Farrell v. Johnson & Johnson, 184 Conn.App. 685, 195 A.3d 1152 (Conn. App. 2018)
• Decision Date: 18 September 2018
• Docket Number: AC 39472
• Parties: Mary Beth FARRELL, et al. v. JOHNSON AND JOHNSON, et al.

184 Conn.App. 685

195 A.3d 1152

Mary Beth FARRELL, et al.

v.JOHNSON AND JOHNSON, et al.

AC 39472

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 16, 2018

Officially released September 18, 2018

Brenden P. Leydon, with whom, on the brief, was Jacqueline E. Fusco, Stamford, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

David J. Robertson, with whom, on the brief, were Madonna A. Sacco, Heidi M. Cilano, Nancy M. Marini, and Christopher H. Blau, Bridgeport, for the appellees (defendants).

Lavine, Keller and Bishop, Js.

BISHOP, J.

The plaintiffs, Mary Beth Farrell and Vincent Farrell,¹ appeal from the judgment of the trial court, rendered following a jury trial, in favor of the defendants Brian J. Hines, M.D., and Urogynecology and Pelvic Surgery, LLC (Urogynecology).² On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court (1) abused its discretion by allowing the defendants to refer during trial to prior defendants, the claims against whom had been withdrawn; (2) abused its discretion by excluding from evidence as hearsay two journal articles; (3) improperly directed a verdict in favor of the defendants on the plaintiffs' claim of innocent misrepresentation; and (4) improperly failed to instruct the jury on the concept of misrepresentation due to Hines' lack of sufficient knowledge.³ We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history are relevant to our consideration of this appeal. At some point in 2007, Mary Beth's gynecologist diagnosed her with pelvic organ prolapse.⁴ As her condition worsened, her gynecologist recommended that she see Hines, a surgeon, with whom she consulted in late October, 2008. Hines explained that implanting a mesh product into Mary Beth would be the best surgery to treat her condition. Mary Beth agreed to the surgery, and Hines performed the procedure on November 19, 2008.

Approximately four days after Mary Beth had returned home from the surgery, she experienced excessive bleeding and abdominal pain. Hines initially diagnosed her with two large pelvic hematomas. Mary Beth continued to follow up with Hines; however, she continued experiencing pain. In February, 2009, Mary Beth underwent another surgery during which Hines attempted to remove the mesh product that he had implanted in her. Hines removed as much of the mesh as possible; however, some of the mesh could not be removed because it was embedded in tissue. After a second surgery to remove the mesh in the summer of 2009, Mary Beth still experienced pain and was diagnosed with damage to the pudendal and obturator nerves.

Mary Beth underwent several additional procedures, such as nerve blocks and mesh removal, but these procedures did not eliminate the pain. The pain that she experienced eventually caused her to resign her position as a teacher so she could focus on her health. At the time of trial in January, 2016, Mary Beth was considering additional surgery, which she described as "major."

The plaintiffs served their original complaint on November 15, 2011. The plaintiffs filed the operative, third amended complaint on December 4, 2015, alleging the following claims against the defendants: (1) lack of informed consent; (2) innocent misrepresentation; (3) negligent misrepresentation; (4) intentional misrepresentation; and (5) loss of consortium.

The plaintiffs' case was tried to a jury in January, 2016. On January 19, 2016, the court directed a verdict in favor of the defendants on the plaintiffs' innocent misrepresentation claim. On January 20, 2016, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants on the remaining counts, and the court entered judgment on July 13, 2016. The plaintiffs' motion to reargue was denied and this appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

I

The plaintiffs' first claim is that the court abused its discretion by allowing the defendants to refer to parties that had been removed from the case. The plaintiffs argue that reference to the former defendants was "extremely prejudicial and served solely to seek to improperly inform the jury [that the] [p]laintiff[s] received money from a former defendant." In response, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs opened the door to the admission of this evidence and, alternatively, that any error was harmless.

The following additional facts and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of this claim. The plaintiffs commenced this action against several entities, in addition to Hines and Urogynecology, alleging products liability claims and violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. See footnote 2 of this opinion. Before trial commenced, the plaintiffs withdrew their claims against all defendants except Hines and Urogynecology. Prior to the start of evidence, the plaintiffs filed a motion in limine in which they sought to exclude from evidence any testimony regarding the resolution of the claims against the former defendants. The court granted the motion and, prior to the start of evidence, instructed the jury not to consider the absence of the former defendants. ⁵

During the direct examination of Mary Beth, the following exchange occurred:

"[The Plaintiffs' Counsel]: [Mary Beth], do you have an agreement with my firm for the attorney's fees in this case?

"[The Witness]: Yes, we do.

"[The Plaintiffs' Counsel]: What is that agreement?

"[The Witness]: To pay you a third of any fees that occurred in the case.

"[The Plaintiffs' Counsel]: One third of any recovery?

"[The Witness]: Yes. One third of any recovery that we receive."

Subsequently, on cross-examination, the following exchange occurred:

"[The Defendants' Counsel]: You're paying your attorneys one third of any recovery you receive from any defendant, correct?

"[The Witness]: Correct.

"[The Defendants' Counsel]: That would include any prior defendants, correct?

"[The Plaintiffs' Counsel]: Objection. Relevance, your Honor?

"The Court: No. You've managed to open the door with regard to this. No further evidence will be received on that particular point. You may inquire.

"[The Defendants' Counsel]: I can ask my last question?

"The Court: You can ask.

"[The Defendants' Counsel]: And that is one third of any recovery that you receive from any defendant, whether it be Stamford Hospital, Ethicon, Johnson & Johnson?

"[The Plaintiffs' Counsel]: Objection. Your Honor just said no further evidence on that subject.

"The Court: ... I'm going to allow that question. There will be no evidence as to whether the previous defendants, who are now removed from the case, have been removed from the case for any reason at all other than that they are no longer parties to the case, whether there were settlements, what the amount, if any, or whether there were other reasons that they were removed from the case, whether they be legal or tactical or otherwise is not for this jury. As we started, [the former defendants] were here when we picked this jury. So [the jury is] well aware other parties were once participants in this case, and they are no longer participants in this case. And the reason and the nature of their exit is none of [the jury's] concern. We are only concerned with the case that we have at hand."

At the close of evidence, the plaintiffs requested that the court again issue the instruction that it issued at the beginning of the case, in which it instructed the jury not to consider the absence of the former defendants. The court denied this request.

General Statutes § 52-216a provides in relevant part: "An agreement with any tortfeasor not to bring legal action or a release of a tortfeasor in any cause of action shall not be read to a jury or in any other way introduced in evidence by either party at any time during the trial of the cause of action against any other joint tortfeasors, nor shall any other agreement not to sue or release of claim among any plaintiffs or defendants in the action be read or in any other way introduced to a jury." "It is readily apparent from a common sense reading of § 52-216a that its legislative objective was to prohibit in a trial to a jury [the jury's] knowledge of any agreement or release involving a tortfeasor at any time during the trial of the cause of action ... against another tortfeasor." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Peck v. Jacquemin , 196 Conn. 53, 58–59, 491 A.2d 1043 (1985).

"Generally, a party who delves into a particular subject during the examination of a witness cannot object if the opposing party later questions the witness on the same subject.... The party who initiates discussion on the issue is said to have opened the door to rebuttal by the opposing party. Even though the rebuttal evidence would ordinarily be inadmissible on other grounds, the court may, in its discretion, allow it where the party initiating the inquiry has made unfair use of the evidence.... This rule operates to prevent a [party] from successfully excluding inadmissible ... evidence and then selectively introducing pieces of this evidence for his own advantage, without allowing the [other party] to place the evidence in its proper context.... The doctrine of opening the door cannot, of course, be subverted into a rule for injection of prejudice.... The trial court must carefully consider whether the circumstances of the case warrant further inquiry into the subject matter, and should permit it only to the extent necessary to remove any unfair prejudice which might otherwise have ensued from the original evidence.... Thus, in making this determination, the trial court should balance the harm to [one party] in restricting the inquiry with the prejudice suffered by the [other party] in allowing the rebuttal.... We review for [an] abuse of discretion the trial court's determination that a party has opened the door to otherwise inadmissible rebuttal evidence." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown , 309 Conn. 469, 479–80, 72 A.3d 48 (2013).

As previously set forth, the plaintiffs...