Crescent City Cabinets & Flooring, L.L.C. v. Grace Tama Dev. Co.

• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana
• Writing for the Court: Judge Rosemary Ledet
• Citation: Crescent City Cabinets & Flooring, L.L.C. v. Grace Tama Dev. Co., 203 So.3d 408 (La. App. 2016)
• Decision Date: 19 October 2016
• Docket Number: NO. 2016-CA-0359,2016-CA-0359
• Parties: Crescent City Cabinets & Flooring, L.L.C. v. Grace Tama Development Company, L.L.C., et al

203 So.3d 408

Crescent City Cabinets & Flooring, L.L.C.

v.Grace Tama Development Company, L.L.C., et al

NO. 2016-CA-0359

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

OCTOBER 19, 2016

Marc L. Frischhertz, FRISCHHERTZ POULLIARD, FRISCHHERTZ & IMPASTATO, L.L.C., 1130 St. Charles Avenue, New Orleans, LA 70130, COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE.

Stephen M. Smith, 1425 North Broad Street, Suite 201, New Orleans, LA 70119, COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT.

(Court composed of Judge Dennis R. Bagneris, Sr., Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge Rosemary Ledet )

Judge Rosemary Ledet

This is a suit for payment on a construction contract. Crescent City Cabinets & Flooring, L.L.C. ("Crescent City"), filed suit seeking payment from Grace Tama Development Company, L.L.C. ("Grace Tama") and Wade T. Verges (collectively "Defendants") for the purchase and installation of cabinets and countertops. From the trial court's judgment in Crescent City's favor, Defendants appeal. For the reasons that follow, we amend the judgment and affirm the amended judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2008, Mr. Verges contracted with Crescent City for the purchase and installation of kitchen and bathroom cabinets and countertops throughout a forty-unit apartment complex owned by Grace Tama located at 4848 Pontchartrain Drive in Slidell, Louisiana. On June 13, 2008, the contract ("Purchase Agreement") was signed by Mr. Verges, the manager of Grace Tama, and Paul Verhoeven, the president and owner of Crescent City.¹ The total price of the Purchase Agreement was $114,971.44—$92,171.44 for the cabinets and countertops and $22,800.00 for the installation. The terms of the Purchase Agreement were as follows:

40% Deposit ($36,868.58) required for the material order. The remain [sic] balance ($78,102.86) in the installment of 3 payments ($26,034.29/per) including the material and the installation. First payment due upon completion of 13 units, second payment due upon completion of additional 13 units. Final payment due upon delivery of the remaining 14 units. Invoices not paid in 30 days of delivery accrue interest at 1½% per month until paid.

Mr. Verges paid Crescent City the forty percent deposit for materials as required under the Purchase Agreement. After performing the work under the contract, Crescent City submitted an invoice ("the Invoice") to Mr. Verges. Although Mr. Verges made partial payments totaling $35,500.00, he failed, despite repeated amicable demand, to make full payment.

On December 10, 2008, Crescent City filed a Contractor/Materialmen's Affidavit seeking to preserve the lien and privilege on Grace Tama's property located at 4848 Pontchartrain Drive. The Affidavit further claimed that labor and materials were last provided on November 20, 2008. On February 13, 2009, Crescent filed a petition to enforce the contract and to enforce the lien.

In response, Defendants filed an answer and reconventional demand. Defendants claimed that any money owed was offset by damages suffered because Crescent City was unlicensed, uninsured, and unqualified to perform the job. Defendants also reconvened seeking costs incurred from correcting problems and repairing damage to the property caused by Crescent City.²

On June 16, 2015, the parties filed a joint pretrial memorandum, which included a listing of all witnesses and exhibits to be introduced at trial. On June 22, 2015, a bench trial was held. At trial, Mr. Verhoeven testified that he was hired by Mr. Verges to install cabinets and countertops in the apartment complex and that each apartment unit contained two bathrooms and one kitchen. He further testified that when Mr. Verges stopped paying and became nonresponsive to inquiries, he started recording videos of the completed units. On cross examination, Mr. Verhoeven admitted that neither he nor Crescent City had a contractor's license. He testified that the actual cost of the materials was "about $70,000," with the remaining $22,171.44 representing overhead and profit on the sale of the materials. Mr. Verhoeven further testified that the $22,800.00 labor charge represented the actual cost of the labor without profit or overhead.

At trial, Mr. Verges admitted that he did not pay the remaining balance of $42,602.86 to Crescent City. He explained that he withheld payment because Crescent City possessed neither a contractor's license nor insurance as required by law. He further testified that payment was withheld due to the corrective work and repairs to damage on the property caused by Crescent City.³ Jason Kinler testified that he was one of the four cabinet installers hired by Crescent City. He testified that he did not recall how much he was paid per unit; however, he testified that he was still owed $2,200.00 for his work installing the cabinets and countertops.

After Crescent City presented its case, Defendants verbally moved for an involuntary dismissal. Defendants' position was that since Crescent City was not licensed, the Purchase Agreement was and void. Defendants further argued that in the absence of a contract, Crescent City was not entitled to recover damages. On the following day, the trial court rendered judgment, finding that Louisiana law required Crescent City to obtain a contractor's license in order to enter a commercial construction contract. Agreeing with Defendants, the trial court held that the Purchase Agreement was and void. The trial court, however, awarded Crescent City the cost of the materials and labor less the amount already paid by Defendants under the quantum meruit doctrine.⁴ The trial court subsequently entered judgment in favor of Crescent in the amount of $22,641.46.⁵ This appeal followed.

JURISDICTION

As an initial matter, we must examine whether this court has jurisdiction to review this case. The absence of decretal language results in a judgment being not final and appealable. See Zeigler v. Housing. Auth. of New Orleans (HANO) , 15–0626, p. 2 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/23/16), 192 So.3d 175, 177. "A final appealable judgment must ... name the party in favor of whom the ruling is ordered, the party against whom the ruling is ordered, and the relief that is granted or denied." Smith v. State, Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 15–0962, p. 1, n. 1 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/17/16, 1), 186 So.3d 1180 (quoting Delta Staff Leasing, LLC v. South Coast Solar, LLC , 14–1328 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/23/15), 176 So.3d 668 ; Board of Supervisors of La. State Univ. and Agric. and Mech. Coll. v. Mid City Holdings, L.L.C. , 14–0506, pp. 2–3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/15/14), 151 So.3d 908, 910 ).

The requirements for amending a judgment are set forth in La. C.C.P. art. 1951.⁶ This court has noted that " ‘[t]he jurisprudence is replete with numerous cases wherein Louisiana appellate courts have approved the use of amendments under this article (La.C.C.P. art. 1951 ) where the mistake or omission is evident from the record.’ " Habitat, Inc. v. Commons Condominiums, LLC , 11–1384, pp. 12–13 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/11/12), 97 So.3d 1126, 1134 (quoting Trahan v. City of Crowley , 08–1394, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/1/09), 7 So.3d 122, 124 ); Cross v. Timber Trails Apartments , 06–1037, pp. 8–10 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/7/07), 949 So.2d 616, 620–21 ) (collecting cases). The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that a trial court may make alterations to a judgment if the parties to that judgment consent to the alterations. Williams v. Bestcomp, Inc. , 15–761, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/3/16), 185 So.3d 269, 274,writ denied , 16–0385 (La. 4/15/16), 191 So.3d 1032 (citing Villaume v. Villaume , 363 So.2d 448, 451 (La. 1978) ).

On July 10, 2015, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Crescent City; and Defendants subsequently filed a motion for devolutive appeal. The judgment, however, failed to list the party against whom the ruling was ordered. Crescent City and Defendants subsequently consented to amending the July 10, 2015 judgment due to the lack of decretal language that would have rendered the judgment not final. On November 3, 2015, the trial court conducted a hearing to discuss deficiencies with the trial court's judgment. Defendants thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss Devolutive Appeal, which the trial court granted due to the lack of a final, appealable judgment. Crescent City subsequently filed an unopposed motion to amend the judgment. On December 1, 2015, the trial court entered an amended judgment "in favor of Plaintiff, Crescent City Cabinets & Flooring, L.L.C., and against Defendants, Wade T. Verges and Grace Tama Development Company, L.L.C." Given the judgment was amended with the parties' consent, the amended judgment is properly before us on appeal.⁷

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Defendants contend that the trial court erred in the following three respects: (i) awarding damages in response to a motion for involuntary dismissal; (ii) awarding quantum meruit damages based solely on testimonial estimates; and (iii) awarding interest from the date of judicial demand instead of the date of final judgment. We discuss each issue separately.

Involuntary Dismissal

Defendants contend that the trial court erred in awarding quantum meruit damages after they moved for involuntary dismissal. Because they had not yet presented their case, Defendants contend, citing La. C.C.P. art. 1962(B),⁸ that the trial court's ruling was premature. Leday v. Safeway Ins. Co. of La. , 04–610, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/17/04), 888 So.2d 1084, 1087 ("[t]he failure to address an issue in a judgment is deemed to be a denial of that issue.") (citing Gremillion v. Rapides Par. Police Jury , 430 So.2d 1362 (La. App. 3rd Cir.1983) ; Anthony's Auto Sales, Inc. v. Shephard , 600 So.2d 125 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1992) ). Defendants further contend that since the party opposing the motion for involuntary dismissal is not entitled to any special inferences in its favor, the trial court erred by accepting Crescent City's undocumented estimates of labor and material costs. We disagree.

Following a bench trial, a defendant may move for...