HOTEL & REST. EMP. UNION, LOCAL 25 v. Smith, Civ. A. No. 82-2203.

• Court: United States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia)
• Writing for the Court: CHARLES R. RICHEY
• Citation: 563 F. Supp. 157
• Decision Date: 28 April 1983
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 82-2203.
• Parties: HOTEL & RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES UNION, LOCAL 25, Plaintiff, v. William French SMITH, et al., Defendants.

563 F. Supp. 157

HOTEL & RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES UNION, LOCAL 25, Plaintiff,
v.
William French SMITH, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 82-2203.

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

April 28, 1983.

563 F. Supp. 158

Richard S. Bromberg, of Robert A. Ades & Associates, and Richard Stern—Boswell, of the Immigration Law Clinic, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff.

Lauri Steven Filppu, Allen W. Hausman, Eugene M. Thirolf, of the U.S. Dept. of Justice, Victor Rostow, of the Office of Gen. Counsel, I.N.S., and Andre Surena, of the Office of Legal Advisor, U.S. Dept. of State, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHARLES R. RICHEY, District Judge.

Before the Court are defendants' motion to dismiss, plaintiff's opposition thereto, defendants'

563 F. Supp. 159

reply memorandum, and the entire record herein. In this case, plaintiff seeks to challenge the State Department's practice of routinely recommending denial of asylum claims filed by Salvadoran nationals and the failure of the Attorney General and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to grant such nationals extended voluntary departure. Defendants have moved to dismiss on the grounds that (1) plaintiff lacks standing to maintain this action, (2) the grant or denial of extended voluntary departure is a nonjusticiable political question, and (3) the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. After careful consideration, the Court has decided to deny defendants' motion and to order that the case proceed to trial or to motions for summary judgment

I.

PLAINTIFF HAS STANDING TO MAINTAIN THIS ACTION

Defendants assert that plaintiff, a labor union, lacks standing to maintain this action on behalf of its Salvadoran members because the conduct in issue does not adversely affect plaintiff itself nor its members' associational ties. In support of this position, defendants cite the cases of Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977), and Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975).

However, plaintiff here has alleged injury both to itself and to its members' associational ties. Plaintiff alleges that defendants' actions injure it directly by hampering its ability to organize and retain Salvadoran members as well as its efforts to protect the rights of its existing Salvadoran members to be secure in their jobs. Plaintiff also alleges that defendants' actions affect its members' associational ties by causing their severance. These allegations are plainly sufficient to support standing by plaintiff here.

Defendants seek to controvert plaintiffs allegations of standing by challenging the interests plaintiff has asserted. Defendants contend that plaintiff's Salvadoran members "have no right even to remain in the United States, let alone have a right to a job." As plaintiffs point out, however, this argument assumes the major issue in this suit—it assumes that plaintiff's Salvadoran members should not be allowed to remain in the country. Moreover, even if some of plaintiff's Salvadoran members are in the country without defendants' authorization, that fact does not in any way diminish plaintiff's obligation to these members. It is well-settled that alien workers, regardless of their immigration status, fall under the definition of "employees" under the National Labor Relations Act. See NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 583 F.2d 355 (7th Cir.1978). The NLRA also specifically precludes unions from discriminating against any one group of employees. Bell & Howell Co. v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 942, 99 S.Ct. 2885, 61 L.Ed.2d 312 (1979). Thus, plaintiff is indeed legally bound to provide protection to its alien members, as it seeks to do here.

Any doubt about the appropriateness of plaintiff's standing here can be readily dispelled by reference to the Supreme Court's 1973 decision in United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973). In SCRAP, the Supreme Court upheld the standing of a public interest organization to challenge the ICC's failure to suspend a surcharge on certain railroad freight rates. Plaintiff alleged that its members would be harmed because the failure to suspend would result in increased freight rates, which in turn would cause increased use of nonrecyclable commodities, which in turn would necessitate the use of more natural resources to produce such goods, some of which resources might be taken from the Washington metropolitan area, resulting in more refuse in the national parks in the Washington area, in which plaintiff's members regularly camped and "breathed the air." Id. at 688, 93 S.Ct. at 2416. See also Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 45 n. 25, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1927 n. 25, 48

563 F. Supp. 160

L.Ed.2d 450 (1976) (explaining the appropriateness of SCRAP to a motion for dismissal). If the Supreme Court is willing to allow standing for such an indirect injury, surely standing must be allowed here, where plaintiff has alleged a direct injury to itself as well as to its members' associational ties. See Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)

II.

THE GRANT OR DENIAL OF EXTENDED VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE IS NOT A POLITICAL QUESTION

Defendants contend next that what is in issue here is the decision whether to grant or deny extended voluntary departure and that that decision is a political question not subject to judicial review. In support of their position, defendants rely on Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), and the concurring opinion of Justice Powell in Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998, 100 S.Ct. 533, 534, 62 L.Ed.2d 428 (1980), which set forth three inquiries in determining whether a political question is presented: (1) Does the issue presented involve the resolution of questions committed by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate branch of government? (2) Does resolution of the question turn on standards that defy judicial application or go beyond judicial resources? (3) Do prudential considerations, such as a need for the government to speak with a single voice, weigh against judicial intervention? Defendant contends that, under these three tests this case presents a nonjusticiable political question.

Even using defendants' tests, however, the Court finds that the grant or denial of extended voluntary departure is not a nonjusticiable political question.¹ As defendants admit, the control of immigration is not directly committed by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate federal branch. It is true that the political branches have been allowed broad leeway to regulate the flow of immigrants, but the Supreme Court has expressly left room for a "narrow standard of judicial...