Sueiro Vázquez v. Torregrosa De La Rosa

• Decision Date: 19 July 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06-1499.,06-1499.
• Citation: 494 F.3d 227
• Parties: Berenice R. SUEIRO VÁZQUEZ; Wilfredo Aponte Pagán, Plaintiffs, Appellants, Astrid A. Cappas Pérez; Delma Rosa Colón Rodríguez, Plaintiffs, v. Enid TORREGROSA DE LA ROSA, in her personal and official capacity as Executive Director of the State Historic Preservation Office; Elizabeth Sola; Verónica Álvarez; John Doe; Richard Roe, Defendants, Appellees, Francisco Cátala, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

494 F.3d 227

Berenice R. SUEIRO VÁZQUEZ; Wilfredo Aponte Pagán, Plaintiffs, Appellants Astrid A. Cappas Pérez; Delma Rosa Colón Rodríguez, Plaintiffs, v. Enid TORREGROSA DE LA ROSA, in her personal and official capacity as Executive Director of the State Historic Preservation Office; Elizabeth Sola; Verónica Álvarez; John Doe; Richard Roe, Defendants, Appellees Francisco Cátala, Defendant.

No. 06-1499.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard May 7, 2007.

Decided July 19, 2007.

John F. Neváres, with whom Carlos R. Ramírez and John F. Neváres & Associates, P.S.C. were on brief, for appellants.

Leticia Casalduc-Rabell, Assistant Solicitor General, with whom Salvador J. Antonetti-Stutts, Solicitor General, Mariana Negrón-Vargas, Deputy Solicitor General, and Maite D. Oronoz-Rodríguez, Deputy Solicitor General, were on brief, for appellees.

Before LYNCH, LIPEZ, and HOWARD, Circuit Judges.

LYNCH, Circuit Judge.

A jury found that a new Popular Democratic Party ("PDP") administration in Puerto Rico had violated the First Amendment political affiliation and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights of New Progressive Party ("NPP") members Berenice Sueiro Vázquez and Wilfredo Aponte Pagán when they were fired from their positions as employees in Puerto Rico's State Historic Preservation Office ("SHPO"). The jury also found that the firings violated Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141. The jury awarded substantial compensatory and punitive damages: $380,000 in total for Sueiro, and $210,000 in total for Aponte.

After return of the jury verdict, the district court found that the defendant public officials were entitled to qualified immunity, and vacated the damages award. Sueiro Vázquez v. Torregrosa de la Rosa, 414 F.Supp.2d 124, 134 (D.P.R. 2006). The court also ordered the SHPO to reinstate Sueiro and Aponte to their former jobs, holding that the defendants had failed to show that the plaintiffs' appointments to their positions were null and void under Puerto Rico law. Id. The plaintiffs appeal the immunity order which defeated their damages claims; the defendants purport to appeal the reinstatement order.

On plaintiffs' appeal, we affirm the grant of immunity. The defendants acted, as they were required to do by law, on the advice of the Secretary of Justice that Sueiro's employment was null and void under Puerto Rico law, and on the Secretary's instruction to evaluate the legality of other personnel transactions. On defendants' purported appeal, we hold that the mere submission of a check for a filing fee to the district court clerk, without a notice of appeal or any other filing (electronic or hard copy), is insufficient to notice an appeal under Fed. R.App. P. 3.

A general description of the case suffices for both issues.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Sueiro and Aponte were employees of the SHPO. On September 1, 2000, pursuant to Puerto Rico Act No 183,¹ Sueiro was transferred from a trust position as Assistant Advisor III to a career position as Historic Conservation Manager. On or about the same date, Aponte's position as Information Systems Specialist was reclassified from a trust position to a career position. Sueiro was terminated from her career position on February 8, 2002; Aponte's employment was terminated on September 17, 2002.

Sueiro and Aponte sued, alleging violations of their political affiliation and due process rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution and Sections 1, 6, and 7 of Article II of the Puerto Rico Constitution. They also brought a tort action under Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code. After eleven days of trial, the jury found in plaintiffs' favor. In its verdict forms, the jury rejected defendants' claims that they had not discriminated, as well as defendants' defense under Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977).

The defendants had raised the defense of qualified immunity for the first time at trial. The district court had reserved the issue until after the return of a verdict, Sueiro Vázquez, 414 F.Supp.2d at 128-29 & n. 4, and ultimately found that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, id. at 133. On the first question of whether a constitutional right had been violated, the court found that the jury verdict was supported by evidence that the defendants had violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Id. at 131. The court largely bypassed the next question of whether such rights were clearly established. Id. at 132-33. The court held, on the final prong, that qualified immunity must be granted because the defendants reasonably had asked the Secretary of Justice for an opinion regarding the legality of personnel transfers within the SHPO, and then reasonably relied on that opinion. Id.

The Secretary's February 1, 2002 opinion stated that Sueiro's appointment to a career position was "null" because the prior administration's actions had violated P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, § 1351(7) (2000 & Supp.2004). The opinion also directed the SHPO to evaluate all personnel transfers from trust positions to career positions as a result of Act No. 183, to ensure that such transfers were made in accordance with section 1351. As a result of the review ordered by the Secretary of Justice, Aponte's reclassification into a career position likewise was found to be null. Citing a Puerto Rico Supreme Court case, the district court stated that the Secretary's opinion was binding on defendants, whether or not the opinion was correct. Sueiro Vázquez, 414 F.Supp.2d at 133. The court held that the defendants acted in an objectively reasonable manner by relying on the Secretary's opinion in terminating Sueiro and Aponte. Id. at 132-33.

On the question of injunctive relief, the district court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that the plaintiffs had a property interest in their employment, and so the court ordered reinstatement of Sueiro and Aponte to their former positions. Id. at 134.

Defendants moved for reconsideration of the reinstatement order. The district court denied the motion and entered the order denying reconsideration on March 28, 2006. This started the running of the 30-day appeal period. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(A); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a).

II. NOTICE OF APPEAL

A. Absence of a Notice of Cross-Appeal from Defendants

On March 31, 2006, the plaintiffs timely appealed from the grant of qualified immunity and the vacatur of the damages awards. The plaintiffs' appeal was docketed in our court as No. 06-1499, and a briefing schedule issued.

The defendants did not file a notice of cross-appeal. However, on April 20, 2006 — that is, within the 30-day appeal period — they paid an appellate filing fee by check to the district court. The defendants at the time were represented by an outside attorney, Francisco Rios Rivera. The payment is reflected on the district court docket in this case as:

Appeal Fee Received $ 455.00, receipt number 162387 Fr: Francisco Rios Rivera (fg,) (Entered: 04/20/2006)

On August 23, 2006, the defendants, now represented by the Solicitor General of Puerto Rico, filed a motion in this court stating that they had only recently realized that attorney Rios Rivera had purported to file a cross-appeal.² The defendants asked this court to stay the briefing schedule to permit them to pursue a motion in the district court seeking leave to "correct the erroneous filing" of the notice of appeal. They represented that prior counsel had assured them that he had electronically filed the notice of appeal. They argued, based on that representation, (1) that the district court must have committed error in not docketing a notice of appeal, and (2) that the April 20 payment of the filing fee unambiguously demonstrated (a) their intent to appeal the reinstatement order, and (b) their belief that their electronic filing had been effective. They did not, however, file a copy of the purported notice of appeal as received by the district court.³ Indeed, the defendants admitted that they could not be certain, despite prior counsel's statement, that their notice of appeal was ever filed. Their basic argument was that the notice must have disappeared into the ether of electronic filing.

On August 22, 2006, the defendants had also filed a motion in the district court requesting leave to "refile" their notice of appeal. They proffered a copy of their purported notice of appeal. The certificate of service for the notice stated that the document was electronically filed on April 19. But the defendants offered no proof that the notice of appeal had ever actually been filed with the district court. The defendants also proffered an image of the check for the filing fee that was docketed as received by the district court on April 20. That check carried the notation "Notice of Appeal re: Berenice Sueiro." As they later did before this court, the defendants argued that the fee payment evidenced both their intent to file a notice of appeal as well as their belief that their electronic filing had been effective. The plaintiffs opposed the defendants' request, arguing that (1) the defendants could not prove that they had in fact filed a notice of appeal, (2) the payment of the appellate filing fee did not provide the notice that Fed. R.App. P. 3(c)(1) requires, and (3) to the extent that the defendants were seeking an enlargement of time to file a notice of appeal, they did not, and could not, establish excusable neglect or good cause.

On August 25, 2006, the district court concluded that since the defendants could not furnish material evidence to show that they had in fact filed the notice of cross-appeal, and since the docket did not reflect such a filing, no notice of appeal had been filed. It rejected the argument that the electronic case filing system had somehow eaten the...