Lenfest v. Boston & Maine Corp.

Decision Date07 May 1982
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 80-2240-C.
Citation537 F. Supp. 324
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
PartiesRoger LENFEST, Jr., et al, Plaintiffs, v. BOSTON & MAINE CORPORATION, Debtor, et al, Defendants.

Ann M. Gilmore, Gilmore & Iamdoli, Elizabeth A. Rodgers, Doyle, Playter, Novick & Berkin, Boston, Mass., for plaintiffs.

Ralph Moore, Jr., Shea & Gardner, Washington, D. C., Charles W. Mulcahy, Boston, Mass., for Boston & Maine Corp.

Norton N. Newborn, Cleveland, Ohio, Gaines & Stern Co., LPA, and Thomas L. Crotty, Jr., Robert Malone, Malone, McCarthy & Hunt, Boston, Mass., for United Transp. Union and Peter Carbone.

MEMORANDUM

CAFFREY, Chief Judge.

This civil action has been brought against the United Transportation Union (UTU), the Boston & Maine Corporation (B&M), and its trustees-in-bankruptcy by 61 members of the UTU who challenge the validity of Arbitration Award 387. This Award, which was handed down on September 20, 1980, resolved a longstanding labor dispute between the B&M and about 650 of their train service employees, for whom the UTU is the exclusive bargaining agent. Plaintiffs' complaint consists of six counts, three against both the union and the railroad, two against the union alone, and one against the railroad alone.

Plaintiffs' basic complaint is that officials of the union who were not authorized to do so agreed to submit the union members' dispute with the railroad to binding arbitration; they also claim that the B&M had notice that the union's action was not authorized. Plaintiffs claim that as a result, the Arbitration Award is invalid under the Federal Railway Labor Act and state contract law. They ask this Court to enter a declaratory judgment to that effect, to enjoin the further implementation of Award 387, to order the restoration of the terms and conditions of their employment contract that existed prior to the announcement of the Award, and to award the individual plaintiffs monetary damages suffered as a result of the defendants having entered into the Agreement to Arbitrate. The defendants' position in short is that the Award is valid because the union officials who entered into the Agreement to Arbitrate acted completely within their powers as established by the UTU Constitution.

Plaintiffs' claim of a right to a jury trial on all counts was opposed prior to the start of trial by the railroad. The Court did not render a decision on this issue, but instead impaneled a jury and proceeded to trial. At the close of the plaintiffs' case, both the union and the railroad moved for directed verdicts. The Court reserved judgment on these motions, and the defendants proceeded with their cases. At the close of the railroad's case, which was presented after the union's case, plaintiffs presented one rebuttal witness, after which both defendants renewed their motions for directed verdicts.

After considering all of the evidence as I must in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and applying the applicable standard of this circuit,1 I rule that the defendants' motions should be granted, and that judgment should be entered in their favor. For the purpose of deciding these motions, I have assumed without ruling that the plaintiffs have a right to a jury trial on all counts, and thus find it unnecessary to rule on the jury trial question.

The Facts

The relevant and uncontested facts of this dispute are as follows:

The defendant UTU — an unincorporated association and an international labor union whose headquarters is in Cleveland, Ohio — is the exclusive collective bargaining representative for about 650 train service employees of the Boston & Maine Corporation who were affected by Award 387. The UTU is governed by a Unification Agreement and Constitution (the Constitution) which was introduced into evidence on the first day of trial as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1. Article 82 of this Constitution provides for the creation of General Committees of Adjustment. Each General Committee is comprised of the chairmen of all local committees of adjustment (created under Article 81) within the jurisdiction of each General Committee of Adjustment. The relevant General Committee for purposes of this law suit is the Boston & Maine Corporation General Committee of Adjustment (hereinafter referred to as the General Committee).

The duties of these General Committees are spelled out in Article 85 of the Constitution, which states in relevant part:

General Committees of Adjustment shall have the authority to make and interpret agreements with representatives of transportation companies covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions — all in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.
* * * * * *
In the event that a matter cannot be satisfactorily adjusted, the General Chairman may request the assistance of the International President. Upon receipt of such a request, the International President or his representative shall meet with the General Chairman and renew efforts to obtain a satisfactory adjustment of the matter. He, or his representative, shall be vested with the same authority held by the General Committee to progress the matter to a conclusion.
* * * * * *
Between sessions of the General Committee of Adjustment, the Chairman of such Committee shall exercise all rights, privileges, and authority vested in the General Committee, except as otherwise directed by the General Committee while in session.
* * * * * *
The General Chairman must poll the entire General Committee prior to signing any system agreements and be governed by a majority of the votes cast.
* * * * * *
Actions or decisions of a General Committee shall be binding upon the members and locals under the jurisdiction of such General Committees unless reversed or modified upon appeal as provided in Article 75 of this Constitution.

Article 16 gives the International President the power to "interpret all laws of the organization, and to decide all questions arising therefrom. ..."

Plaintiffs in their first count seek to have the Arbitration Award set aside under Section 9 of the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. § 159) because of the Award's failure to substantially comply with Sections 7 and 8 of that Act. Specifically, plaintiffs claim in paragraph 45 of their complaint that the Agreement to Arbitrate which authorized the Award was never made by the General Committee, which they claim is one of the parties to the longstanding employment dispute due to the power granted it in the first sentence of Article 85 of the Constitution. Section 7 of the RLA requires that agreements to arbitrate be made by the "parties" to a dispute. 45 U.S.C. § 157. They also maintain in paragraph 46 that the Agreement to Arbitrate was not signed by the "duly accredited representatives" of the employees, as required by Section 8 of the RLA. 45 U.S.C. § 158. Plaintiffs admit that the Agreement to Arbitrate, which was submitted into evidence as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 39, was signed by both P.S. Carbone, the General Chairman of the General Committee, and E. F. Lyden, a UTU International Vice President. Plaintiffs claim, however, that neither of these men were authorized by the General Committee to submit the dispute to binding arbitration. Trial transcript at 37 (Plaintiffs' opening argument). As will be seen, no evidence has been presented which would justify such a finding or allow it to stand if made.

As succinctly stated by the Supreme Court, the Railway Labor Act provides a detailed framework to facilitate the voluntary settlement of major disputes. A party desiring to effect a change of rates of pay, rules, or working conditions must give advance written notice. § 6. The parties must confer, § 2 Second, and if conference fails to resolve the dispute, either or both may invoke the services of the National Mediation Board, which may also proffer its services sua sponte if it finds a labor emergency to exist. § 5 First. If mediation fails, the Board must endeavor to induce the parties to submit the controversy to binding arbitration, which can take place, however, only if both consent. §§ 5 First, 7. If arbitration is rejected and the dispute threatens `substantially to interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of the country of essential transportation service, the Mediation Board shall notify the President' who may create an emergency board to investigate and report on the dispute. § 10. While the dispute is working its way through these stages, neither party may unilaterally alter the status quo. §§ 2 Seventh, 5 First, 6, 10.

Railroad Trainmen v. Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 378, 89 S.Ct. 1109, 1115, 22 L.Ed.2d 344 (1969). If arbitration is not rejected and the National Mediation Board's proffer of arbitration is accepted by the parties, the dispute is heard and decided by an arbitration board under Sections 7-9 of the Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 157-159.

Evidence introduced at trial unequivocally shows that in January of 1977, John Scanlan, who was then General Chairman of the General Committee, first invoked the mechanism of the Railway Labor Act by serving a so-called Section 6 notice upon a representative of the railroad. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 41.) Subsequent Section 6 notices were served by the Chairman of the General Committee on the B&M on November 20, 1978 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 42); January 17, 1979 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 46); March 6, 1979, and March 23, 1979 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 45). Section 6 notices were served by the B&M on the union on October 3, 1978 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 43); and April 4, 1979 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 44).

On May 21, 1979, P. S. Carbone, who was then and is now the General Chairman of the General Committee, informed the members of that Committee that he had requested the President of the union, Al H. Chesser, to request the services of the National Mediation Board pursuant to Section 5 of the Railway Labor Act "as a result of negotiations on this property coming to an impasse." (Plaintiffs'...

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