United States v. Sanchez-Jara
Citation | 889 F.3d 418 |
Decision Date | 03 May 2018 |
Docket Number | No. 17-2593,17-2593 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Juan Manuel SANCHEZ-JARA, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit) |
Paul H. Tzur, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff–Appellee.
John T. Kennedy, Attorney, Evanston, IL, for Defendant–Appellant.
Before Easterbrook, Ripple, and Hamilton, Circuit Judges.
Like United States v. Patrick, 842 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2016), this appeal concerns the use of a cell-site simulator to locate someone. And like Patrick it does not require us to determine when, if ever, the use of this device must be authorized by a warrant supported by probable cause, for in this case such a warrant was obtained.
The warrant, issued by a federal district judge in July 2015, authorizes federal agents to use pen registers, trap-and-trace devices, historical cell-call records, and "electronic investigative techniques ... to capture and analyze signals emitted by the Subject Phones, including in response to signals sent by law enforcement officers" (boldface in original) to find two cell phones and understand the nature of their owners' apparently criminal activity. The warrant's reference to "electronic investigative techniques" is a description of a cell-site simulator, a device that pretends to be a cell tower and harvests identifying information, including location data, about every phone that responds to its signals. The Department of Justice contends that it discards information about all phones other than those it has been programmed to look for and does not obtain the contents of any call. Here is the Department's description:
Department of Justice Policy Guidance: Use of Cell-Site Simulator Technology (Sept. 3, 2015) at 2. See also the Wikipedia entry at .
Whether the simulator works this way is potentially important, because the warrant did not authorize the investigators to obtain the contents of any calls, to plumb any phone's address book or instant messages, or otherwise to get anything except location and certain metadata, the sorts of things available from pen registers and trap-and-trace devices. To get the contents of calls and messages, the agents would have needed a warrant under the wiretap statutes. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 – 22. The agents did not obtain a warrant of that kind or satisfy the conditions, such as the attempted use of other investigatory means and the minimization of intrusion, that are essential to wiretap warrants.
The warrant issued in 2015 was based not on the wiretap statutes but on 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 41. Subsection (d) provides that "reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation" permit a judge to issue a warrant for the production of information described in ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
United States v. Thorne
...harvests identifying information, including location data, about every phone that responds to its signals." United States v. Sanchez-Jara , 889 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2018). Cell phones cannot authenticate cell sites and therefore "have no way to differentiate between" a cell tower "owned ......
-
In re Info. Stored at Premises Controlled by Google
...requirement does not allow the government to rummage through information in search of other information. See United States v. Sanchez-Jara , 889 F.3d 418, 421 (7th Cir. 2018). In Sanchez-Jara , a pre- Carpenter decision in which authorities obtained a search warrant to use a cell-site simul......
-
United States v. Gibson
...41 satisfies the Fourth Amendment even if it also recites the lower standard of the Stored Communications Act. United States v. Sanchez-Jara , 889 F.3d 418, 421 (7th Cir. 2018).The court orders in this case satisfy the requirements for a search warrant. First, the defendants do not contend,......
-
United States v. Barnett
...it finds “a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” Gibson, 996 F.3d at 461 (quoting United States v. Sanchez-Jara, 889 F.3d 418, 421 (7th Cir. 2018) and then Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39). Applying the Gates standard, the factual record here shows probable cause for iss......