Sali v. Corona Reg'l Med. Ctr.

• Citation: 889 F.3d 623
• Decision Date: 03 May 2018
• Docket Number: No. 15-56460,15-56460
• Parties: Marlyn SALI and Deborah Spriggs, on behalf of themselves, all others similarly situated and the general public, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CORONA REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER; Uhs of Delaware Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

889 F.3d 623

Marlyn SALI and Deborah Spriggs, on behalf of themselves, all others similarly situated and the general public, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.CORONA REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER; Uhs of Delaware Inc., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-56460

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted February 16, 2018—Pasadena, California

Filed May 3, 2018

Jerusalem F. Beligan (argued) and Brian D. Chase, Bisnar Chase LLP, Newport Beach, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Christina H. Hayes (argued), Khatereh Sage Fahimi, and Stacey E. James, Littler Mendelson P.C., San Diego, California, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: M. Margaret McKeown and Kim McLane Wardlaw, Circuit Judges, and Salvador Mendoza, Jr.,^* District Judge.

OPINION

MENDOZA, District Judge

Marlyn Sali and Deborah Spriggs ("Sali and Spriggs") appeal the district court's denial of class certification in this putative class action alleging employment claims against Corona Regional Medical Center and UHS of Delaware, Inc. (collectively "Corona").¹ Sali and Spriggs moved for certification of seven classes of Registered Nurses ("RNs") they allege were underpaid by Corona as a result of certain employment policies and practices. The district court denied certification on the basis that (1) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)'s typicality requirement is not satisfied for any of the proposed classes because Sali and Spriggs failed to submit admissible evidence of their injuries; (2) Plaintiff Spriggs and proposed class counsel have not demonstrated they will adequately represent the proposed classes; and (3) several proposed classes fail to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement. Because the district court abused its discretion by relying on each of these reasons to deny class certification, we reverse.

BACKGROUND

Corona operates a hospital in Southern California that employs hourly-wage RNs. Sali and Spriggs are RNs formerly employed by Corona. They assert that a number of Corona's employment policies and practices with respect to RNs violate California law and have resulted in underpayment of wages. They filed this putative class action in California State Court on behalf of "all RNs employed by Defendants in California at any time during the Proposed Class Period who (a) were not paid all wages at their regular rate of pay; (b) not paid time and a-half and/or double time for all overtime hours worked; and (c) denied uninterrupted, 'off-duty' meal-and-rest periods." They allege Corona violated California law by (1) failing to pay all regular hourly wages; (2) failing to pay time-and-a-half for all overtime; (3) failing to pay double time for all hours worked in excess of twelve hours in a day; (4) not providing compliant meal and rest breaks; (5) failing to timely pay all wages due to separated former employees within seventy-two hours of separation; and (6) failing to provide accurate itemized wage statements. Corona removed the case to the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Sali and Spriggs moved for certification of the following seven classes:

1. Rounding Time Class:

All current and former nurses who work or worked for Defendants during the Proposed Class Period who were not paid all wages due them, including straight time, overtime, double time, meal premiums, and rest premiums due to Defendants' rounding time policy.

2. Short Shift Class:

All current and former nurses of Defendants who work or worked pursuant to an Alternative Workweek Schedule ("AWS") during the Proposed Class Period who were "flexed" between the 8th and 12th hour of work due to low patient census and not paid daily overtime.

3. Meal Period Class:

All current and former nurses of Defendants who work or worked pursuant to an AWS during the Proposed Class Period who signed an invalid meal period waiver, and (1) not provided a second meal break after 10 hours of work; (2) not provided meal periods before 5 and 10 hours of work; and/or, (3) not provided a second meal period after 12 hours of work.

4. Rest Break Class:

All current and former nurses who work or worked for Defendants during the Proposed Class Period who were not relieved of all duty and therefore not authorized and permitted to take 10-minute, uninterrupted rest breaks for every four hours worked.

5. Regular Rate Class:

All current and former nurses who work or worked for Defendants during the Proposed Class Period who were not paid at the correct regular rate for overtime, double time, meal premiums, and rest premiums.

6. Wage Statement Class:

All current and former nurses who work or worked for Defendants during the Proposed Class Period who were not provided pay stubs that complied with Labor Code § 226.

7. Waiting Time Class:

All former nurses who worked for Defendants from August 23, 2010 who were not paid all wages due at the time of separation from their employment with Defendants.

The district court denied certification of each of the proposed classes on multiple grounds. First, the district court concluded that Sali and Spriggs's proposed rounding-time, short-shift, rest-break, and wage-statement classes failed to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement. Second, the district court held that Rule 23(a)'s typicality requirement was not satisfied for any of the proposed classes because Sali and Spriggs failed to submit admissible evidence of their injuries. Third, the district court concluded that Spriggs was not an adequate class representative because she is not a member of the proposed class she is attempting to represent. Finally, the district court held the attorneys from the law firm Bisnar Chase had not demonstrated they will adequately serve as class counsel.

Sali and Spriggs appealed the district court's denial of class certification. Upon Sali and Spriggs's motion, we stayed proceedings in this appeal pending resolution in the California State Courts of Gerard v. Orange Coast Memorial Medical Center , a case involving issues related to certain of the proposed classes. See 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 381 P.3d 219 (2016) ; 9 Cal.App.5th 1204, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 778 (2017). In light of the Gerard decision, Sali and Spriggs chose to appeal only the district court's denial of class certification with respect to the proposed rounding-time, regular-rate, wage-statement, and waiting-time classes.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court's class certification decision for abuse of discretion. Parra v. Bashas', Inc. , 536 F.3d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 2008). "[A]n error of law is a per se abuse of discretion." Abdullah v. U.S. Sec. Assocs., Inc. , 731 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Yokoyama v. Midland Nat. Life Ins. Co. , 594 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010) ). Accordingly, we first review a class certification determination for legal error under a de novo standard, and "if no legal error occurred, we will proceed to review the ... decision for abuse of discretion." Yokoyama , 594 F.3d at 1091. A district court applying the correct legal standard abuses its discretion only if "it (1) relies on an improper factor, (2) omits a substantial factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in weighing the correct mix of factors." Abdullah , 731 F.3d at 956. Additionally, "we review the district court's findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard, meaning we will reverse them only if they are (1) illogical, (2) implausible, or (3) without 'support in inferences that may be drawn from the record.' " Id. (quoting United States v. Hinkson , 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009) ).

DISCUSSION

A representative plaintiff may sue on behalf of a class when the plaintiff affirmatively demonstrates the proposed class meets the four threshold requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) : numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. In re Hyundai and Kia Fuel Econ. Litig. , 881 F.3d 679, 690 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Comcast Corp. v. Behrend , 569 U.S. 27, 33, 133 S.Ct. 1426, 185 L.Ed.2d 515 (2013) ); Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc. , 716 F.3d 510, 512 (9th Cir. 2016). Additionally, a plaintiff seeking certification under Rule 23(b)(3) must demonstrate that "questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy." In re Hyundai , 881 F.3d at 690–91 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) ).

The issues on appeal here concern only Rule 23's typicality, adequacy, and predominance requirements: Sali and Spriggs appeal the district court's determinations that (1) Sali and Spriggs failed to demonstrate their injuries were typical of the proposed classes; (2) plaintiff Spriggs is not an adequate class representative; (3) attorneys from the firm Bisnar Chase have not demonstrated they will adequately serve as class counsel; and (4) the proposed rounding-time, wage-statement, and waiting-time classes fail Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement. We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in each of these determinations, excluding its finding that Spriggs was not an adequate class representative. And because plaintiff Sali remains as a representative plaintiff, Spriggs's inadequacy alone is not a basis to deny class certification. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion by denying certification of the proposed rounding-time, regular-rate, waiting-time, and wage-statement classes.

A. The district court's typicality determination was premised on an error of law.

The district court concluded that Sali and Spriggs "have not carried their burden of demonstrating that the injuries allegedly inflicted by Defendants on Plaintiffs are similar to the injuries of the putative class members because [they] do not offer any admissible evidence of [their] injuries in their motion for class certification." The district court further noted that the "motion does not contain sworn testimony...