United States v. Brooks

Decision Date02 May 2018
Docket NumberAugust Term 2017,Docket No. 16-4063-cr
Citation889 F.3d 95
Parties UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jamaal BROOKS, also known as Marley, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Timothy V. Capozzi, Sarah Kathleen Eddy, Anna Skotko, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Geoffrey S. Berman, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, New York, for Appellee.

Kafahni Nkrumah, Nkrumah Law PLLC, New York, New York, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before: Parker, Lynch, and Chin, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:

In this case, defendant-appellant Jamaal Brooks pleaded guilty to distributing and possessing with intent to distribute cocaine and heroin. He was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment and three years' supervised release.

After he completed his prison sentence and began serving his term of supervised release, Brooks repeatedly tested positive for drugs and failed to report for scheduled drug testing. He eventually pleaded guilty to violating the terms of his supervised release and was sentenced to one year in prison followed by a life term of supervised release.

Brooks now appeals, challenging the district court's imposition of lifetime supervised release as substantively and procedurally unreasonable. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate the sentence in part and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND
A. Original Offense

On June 3, 2013, Brooks pleaded guilty to distributing and possessing with intent to distribute cocaine and heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841(a)(1), and 18 U.S.C. § 2, a Class C felony. Brooks faced a statutory maximum of 20 years' imprisonment and a mandatory minimum of three years' supervised release. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).

Brooks was sentenced on January 16, 2014. He had a Total Offense Level of 13 and criminal history category of IV. In the presentence report ("PSR"), the Probation Office calculated a Guidelines range of imprisonment of 24 to 30 months, and recommended that Brooks receive a Guidelines sentence of 30 months' imprisonment. The Probation Office also recommended that Brooks receive three years' supervised release.

The district court sentenced Brooks to 30 months' imprisonment and three years' supervised release. Judgment was entered February 20, 2014.

B. Violations of Supervised Release

Brooks was discharged from custody on January 24, 2015. He began to test positive for marijuana approximately two weeks later. After three positive test results, the Probation Office referred Brooks to an outpatient drug treatment program. On May 13, 2015, however, Brooks was arrested and charged in state court with possessing marijuana and a scale bearing cocaine residue. On July 8, 2015, he was arrested again and charged with aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle.

On June 29, 2016, the Probation Office filed a violation report with the district court alleging that Brooks had violated the terms of his supervised release on at least ten occasions. Following Brooks's arraignment on July 19, 2016, the district court granted adjournments at defense counsel's request, in part to allow for the resolution of the state case underlying certain specifications, and also to provide Brooks with additional time to participate in treatment for his drug addiction.

On October 19, 2016, Brooks pleaded guilty to three of ten specifications of Grade C violations of the terms of his supervised release—Specifications 5, 6, and 7—which consisted of the use of a controlled substance, marijuana, on 14 specified dates; the use of a controlled substance, cocaine, on one specified date; and the failure to report for scheduled drug testing on six specified dates.

At the final revocation hearing, defense counsel noted Brooks's "serious drug problem" as a "huge underlying factor and contributing factor" to his repeated violations of supervised release, for which counsel acknowledged Brooks still needed "some assistance." App. 19-20.

Upon revocation, Brooks faced a maximum statutory sentence of two years' imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Although Brooks's original offense was subject to a Guidelines range, his revocation sentence was not. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, Ch. 7, Pt. A. The Guidelines policy statements for revocation, however, recommended a range of 6 to 12 months' imprisonment for defendants like Brooks with a criminal history category of IV and Grade C violations of supervised release. U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a) (2012). As for an additional term of supervised release, the violation report explained that:

Pursuant to 18 USC 3583(h), if a term of supervised release is revoked and the term of imprisonment is imposed, supervised release not to exceed life can be reimposed as authorized under the original offense, 21 USC 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), less any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised release.

Violation Report at 6.

The Probation Office recommended a revocation sentence of 12 months' imprisonment, but did not recommend a specific term of supervised release. At sentencing, the Government asked the court to impose a "guidelines range sentence in the upper end" as "appropriate and no more than necessary." App. 25. The Government did not request a specific term of supervised release.

On November 10, 2015, the district court sentenced Brooks to 12 months' imprisonment and a life term of supervised release. In imposing its sentence, the district court stated that the court, the Probation Office, and the Government had given Brooks "chance after chance after chance," and Brooks had not "been able to muster the strength of character ... to take advantage of the opportunities." App. 26. The district court acknowledged Brooks's addiction as "beyond [his] control" but credited the Probation Office's exceptional efforts to assist him with that problem, noting that the court "ha[d] not seen anything like it in any other case." App. 25-26.

Additionally, as Brooks had expressed at sentencing his hope to "really get some help for [him]self," the district court advised Brooks that the life term of supervised release was meant to provide him with ongoing access to services and the Probation Office, "for as long as it is useful," to assist with his transition to the community and treat his addiction. App. 21, 27.

This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION
A. Supervised Release

Section 3553 provides the framework for sentencing decisions, including the imposition of supervised release. United States v. Burden , 860 F.3d 45, 56 (2d Cir. 2017). Section 3553(a) requires the district court, in imposing a sentence, to consider, inter alia , "the need for the sentence imposed ... to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). Section 3583(c) governs the imposition of supervised release and "specifically does not require the district court to consider the factors listed in § 3553(a)(2)(A), all of which go to the seriousness of the defendant's offense." Burden , 860 F.3d at 56. Because "supervised release is not, fundamentally, part of the punishment," United States v. Aldeen , 792 F.3d 247, 252 (2d Cir. 2015), the omission of the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors accords with the purpose of supervised release, which is to "fulfill[ ] rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by incarceration," United States v. Johnson , 529 U.S. 53, 59, 120 S.Ct. 1114, 146 L.Ed.2d 39 (2000) ; see also United States v. Granderson , 511 U.S. 39, 50, 114 S.Ct. 1259, 127 L.Ed.2d 611 (1994) ("Supervised release ... is not a punishment in lieu of incarceration.").

In imposing a term of supervised release, the district court is required to consider, among other factors, "the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant," 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) ; the need for the sentence imposed to "protect the public from further crimes of the defendant" and "provide the defendant with needed ... training, medical care, or other correctional treatment," 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C)-(D) ; "the applicable guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission," 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(B) ; and "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct," 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).

Section 3583(b) sets forth the maximum terms of supervised release a court may impose, unless a statute "otherwise provide[s]" a different term. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2) ; see United States v. Mora , 22 F.3d 409, 412 (2d Cir. 1994). For a Class C felony, the statutory maximum term of supervised release is three years. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b). As discussed above, however, Brooks's offense statute provided a mandatory minimum of three years' supervised release. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). We have interpreted the presence of a mandatory minimum term in 18 U.S.C. § 841(b), without a maximum, to allow the district court to impose up to lifetime supervised release notwithstanding the limits of section 3583(b). See United States v. Cassesse , 685 F.3d 186, 189 (2d Cir. 2012) ; Mora , 22 F.3d at 412.

The Sentencing Commission has promulgated Guidelines for supervised release. See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2. For a Class C felony, the Guidelines recommend a term of at least one year but no more than three years. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(a)(2). Brooks's applicable Guidelines range was also three years' supervised release, the mandatory minimum for his offense. See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2, cmt. 6 (explaining how a statutorily required minimum term of supervised release affects the term of supervised release provided by the guidelines).

B. Revocation of Supervised Release

Sentencing for violations of supervised release is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3583. When a defendant violates the terms of his supervised release, the district court may revoke a term of supervised release, and require the...

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