Alton v. Texas A&M University
| Decision Date | 22 February 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-40338,98-40338 |
| Parties | 132 Ed. Law Rep. 656 Travis ALTON; et al., Plaintiffs, Travis Alton, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY; et al., Defendants, Thomas Darling; Malon Southerland; Robert H. Dalton; M.T. "Ted" Hopgood, Major General, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Reid W. Martin, Sammons and Parker, Tyler, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
James C. Todd, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, TX, for Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BENAVIDES and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment to officials of Texas A & M University, based on qualified immunity to a claim for money damages for a deprivation of constitutional rights, arising out of the hazing of a student member of its Corps of Cadets. The Corps is a voluntary student military training organization with over 2100 members. Its chain of command runs from student cadet leaders to the Commandant of the Corps, a retired U.S. Marine Corps General. Travis Alton is a former member of the Corps of Cadets and filed this suit against certain cadets, "student defendants"; the present Commandant of the Corps, Major General Ted Hopgood; the former Commandant of the Corps, Major General Thomas Darling; the Vice-President for Student Affairs, Dr. Malon Southerland; and the faculty advisor to the Fish Drill Team, 1 Captain Robert Dalton, collectively, "defendant officials". Alton asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 stemming from the injuries inflicted by the student defendants. We address Alton's claims against only the defendant officials in this appeal.
Alton alleges that during the week of January 6 through January 13, "hell week" for the Fish Drill Team, upperclassmen drill team cadet advisors known as hounds beat him nightly and once taped his head like a mummy, twisting and jerking his chapped lips. Alton's treatment during hell week was not reported to school authorities.
Alton alleges that about three weeks later, while the drill team was preparing for a competition, the student defendants beat Alton for botching a drill movement and instructed him to tell the other members of the drill team the penalty for miscues. The drill team later finished second at the meet and the student defendants punished the team for that "failure" during practice on February 12, 1997. Alton asserts that, as part of his punishment, he was knocked down, kicked in the ribs, and made to run until exhaustion. These incidents were not reported. However, Alton did confide in his brother, who told their parents. Alton's parents then asked Colonel Joe Hoffman, an administrator of the Corps of Cadets, to investigate.
Meanwhile, before the parents called, former cadet Hanson, the senior cadet advisor to the drill team, told Captain Dalton, the team's faculty advisor, of a rumor that upperclassmen beat an unidentified freshman. On March 21, Captain Dalton met with Alton. Alton, however, denied that the incidents had occurred. Alton now explains that he did so because of pressure from former Cadet Hanson.
After this meeting, Captain Dalton asked Colonel McClesky, the Chief of Operations and Training and overseer of cadet misconduct investigations, whether any investigation was underway regarding the beating rumor. Colonel McClesky told Dalton that he thought Colonel Ruiz, head of the Army ROTC, might know something about it, but Ruiz would not be available until Monday, March 24, 1997. Alton alleges that Captain Dalton tried to schedule a meeting that day, Friday, March 21, 1997, with General Hopgood and the others in the chain of command to discuss the situation, but Colonel Ruiz was not available and the meeting was postponed until the 24th. Alton claims that he had no protection over the weekend and that the officials did nothing to prevent further hazing.
On Saturday night, Alton faced a "hound interview," part of a selection process for cadet advisors to the drill team. According to Alton, at the interview, cadets poked him in the eye, punched him, and then told him to sit down on a stool and relax. Then, after turning out the lights, the cadets punched him. When the lights were turned on again, the cadets handed a knife to Alton and told him to cut himself, which he did. The cadets then told Alton that "this never happened."
At 8:15 a.m. on Monday, March 24, Captain Dalton and Colonel Ruiz discussed the rumored beating incident. Captain Dalton was instructed to set up a meeting for that day with the student defendants. After Captain Dalton left, Alton and his parents met with General Hopgood and the colonels. According to General Hopgood, it was apparent that Travis Alton recently had been hazed and abused. The General then acted swiftly and dramatically: He suspended all nine cadets implicated and ordered them out of the Corps residential facilities. After hearings held by Student Conflict Resolution Services, the nine cadets were expelled or suspended for hazing. They were later indicted, and criminal proceedings were pending at the time summary judgment was granted in this case.
Despite General Hopgood's action, on July 8, 1997, Alton filed his complaint in the United States District Court. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant officials on qualified-immunity grounds. This ruling alone is before this court.
This court reviews summary judgment rulings de novo, applying the same standards as did the lower courts. See In re Hudson, 107 F.3d 355, 356 (5th Cir.1997). Summary judgment is proper only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Where critical evidence is so weak or tenuous on an essential fact that it could not support a judgment in favor of the nonmovant, or where it is so overwhelming that it mandates judgment in favor of the movant, summary judgment is appropriate. See Armstrong v. City of Dallas, 997 F.2d 62, 67 (5th Cir.1993).
To state a claim under § 1983 for violation of the Due Process Clause, as Alton attempts to do in this case, plaintiffs "must show that they have asserted a recognized 'liberty or property' interest within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that they were intentionally or recklessly deprived of that interest, even temporarily, under color of state law." Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1435 (5th Cir.1990) (citations omitted).
Alton's § 1983 substantive due process claim is grounded upon a right to bodily integrity. Of course, "[t]he right to be free of state-occasioned damage to a person's bodily integrity is protected by the fourteenth amendment guarantee of due process." Doe v. Taylor, 15 F.3d 443, 450-51 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc). Alton makes two arguments for imposing § 1983 liability upon the defendant officials: (1) the state-actor cadets violated Alton's constitutional right to bodily integrity by subjecting him to physical abuse, and the defendant officials are liable because the cadets' conduct can be imputed to them; and (2) Alton's injuries were the result of the officials' implementing and condoning the Corps' custom and policy of hazing.
Neither side disputes that the defendant officials are state actors. The student cadet leaders of the Corps are vested with authority over the less senior cadets and serve as a link in the chain of command between a freshman, like Alton, and the officials who oversee the Corps. Considering this authority and the unique paramilitary structure of the A & M Corps of Cadets, the student cadet leaders in this particular situation were arguably acting under color of state law. We will assume so, although we need not pause to decide this point, given our ready disposition of the appeal on grounds we will explain.
Even if we assume arguendo that the student cadet leaders acted under color...
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