Gomez v. H&M Int'l Transp., Inc.
| Decision Date | 25 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil No.: 17-cv-231 (KSH) (CLW) |
| Parties | CARMEN ROSA GOMEZ, individually and as Administrator Ad Prosequendum of the Estate of Jorge L. Gomez, deceased, Plaintiff, v. H&M INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION, INC.; NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORPORATION; CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION; TECHNICAL SERVICES INTERNATIONAL; MI-JACK PRODUCTS, INC.; HOIST LIFTRUCK MANUFACTURING, INC.; FEDEX FREIGHT, INC.; GENERAL CABLE INDUSTRIES, INC.; PMX INDUSTRIES, INC.; BRADY MARINE REPAIR CO., INC.; and NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Plaintiff Carmen Rosa Gomez ("plaintiff") has brought this lawsuit individually and as the administrator of the estate of Jorge L. Gomez ("Gomez"), her late husband, who was fatally injured in 2016 while working at the Croxton Intermodal Terminal in Jersey City, New Jersey. Plaintiff has asserted a claim under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.; a negligence claim under New Jersey common law; claims for design defect and failure to warn under the New Jersey Products Liability Act (NJPLA), N.J.S.A. § 2A:58C-2 et seq.; and derivative claims for wrongful death, survival, and loss of consortium. The operative complaint names as defendants 11 companies with varying roles in relation to the incident, including Gomez's employer, the terminal's owners, the owner of the intermodal shipping container Gomez was moving, the owner of the cargo in the container, and companies that designed, manufactured, or maintained the lift truck he was operating.
Four defendants have now moved for summary judgment, three of them on threshold legal issues relating to whether they are properly the subject of plaintiff's FELA claim. Defendant H&M International Transportation, Inc. ("H&M"), Gomez's employer, contends it is not a common carrier and therefore not subject to FELA liability. (D.E. 208 (motion), D.E. 234 (reply).) H&M's motion is opposed by plaintiff (D.E. 218) and by co-defendant Hoist Liftruck Manufacturing, Inc. ("Hoist") (D.E. 214-216), which designed and manufactured the lift truck.
Defendants Norfolk Southern Corporation and Norfolk Southern Railway Company (together, "Norfolk Southern"), the owners of the terminal and the lift truck, seek summary judgment on the FELA claim, arguing that they were not Gomez's employer. (D.E. 210 (motion); D.E. 235-237 (replies).) Plaintiff (D.E. 219) and Hoist (D.E. 220-222) oppose the motion.
Defendant Brady Marine Repair Co. ("Brady") seeks summary judgment on all claims and crossclaims against it, contending that plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to breach and causation and therefore cannot prove Brady was negligent. (D.E. 241 (motion); 248-250 (replies).) The motion is opposed by plaintiff (D.E. 244), Hoist (D.E. 243), and co-defendants FedEx Freight, Inc. and General Cable Industries, Inc. ("FedEx") (D.E. 246).
Gomez was employed by H&M as a lift truck operator at the Croxton IntermodalTerminal,1 which was owned by Norfolk Southern and at which H&M provided services pursuant to an August 1, 2016 operating agreement between it and Norfolk Southern (the "operating agreement"). .)2 On August 15, 2016, he was using a Hoist lift truck to unload shipping containers from railcars. (Id. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff alleges that the truck collapsed under the weight of the container, crushing Gomez. (SAC ¶¶ 19, 29, 48, 68.) The cause of the collapse and the specific components involved are sharply disputed and are the subject of ongoing discovery.
On January 12, 2017, plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit. (D.E. 1.) After the Court granted Hoist's motion to dismiss the original complaint as against it (D.E. 39, 40), plaintiff filed an amended complaint (D.E. 47). Following the Court's ruling on motion practice directed to theamended complaint (D.E. 71, 72), plaintiff filed the operative second amended complaint (D.E. 107, SAC). In it, plaintiff has asserted claims pursuant to FELA, 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., against H&M, Norfolk Southern, and Consolidated Rail Corporation ("Conrail") (count 1); design defect and failure to warn under the NJPLA, N.J.S.A. § 2A:58C-2 et seq., against Hoist (counts 2 and 3); negligence against all defendants (count 4); and wrongful death, survival, and loss of consortium against all defendants (counts 5-7). Defendants individually answered the complaint and filed crossclaims against each other. Plaintiff later dismissed count 4 against Hoist (D.E. 132), and dismissed her claims against defendant PMX Industries, Inc. entirely (D.E. 260). More recently, plaintiff dismissed count 1 against Conrail. (D.E. 292.)
As indicated earlier, the summary judgment motions filed by H&M and Norfolk Southern relate solely to whether those defendants are properly the subject of the FELA claim in count 1. Brady Marine's motion, however, seeks summary judgment in its favor on all counts against it.
Summary judgment is proper where the movant demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "[A] failure of proof on one of the essential elements of a claim renders both of these requirements met." Pyfer v. Am. Mgmt. Servs. (In re Nat'l Pool Constr., Inc.), 598 F. App'x 841, 844 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)).
In reviewing the motion, the Court "view[s] the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Ass'n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1995)). A factual dispute is "material" if it bears upon an essential element of the plaintiff's claim, and is "genuine" if the evidence would allow a reasonable juryto find in favor of the non-movant. Id. (quoting Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 580 (3d Cir. 2003)). "[W]here a non-moving party fails sufficiently to establish the existence of an essential element of its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, there is not a genuine dispute with respect to a material fact and thus the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (citing Lauren W. v. Deflaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 266 (3d Cir. 2007)). Mere allegations do not suffice, id., and neither do "'bare assertions, conclusory allegations, or suspicions,'" Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 288 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting D.E. v. Central Dauphin School Dist., 765 F.3d 260, 268-69 (3d Cir. 2014)). At this stage, the Court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Burton v. Teleflex, Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 428-29 (3d Cir. 2013).
H&M, Gomez's employer, seeks summary judgment in its favor on plaintiff's FELA claim in count 1, contending that it is not a common carrier by railroad, an essential element of the claim.3 Plaintiff and Hoist each oppose H&M's motion and, in separate briefs, argue that at a minimum there are triable issues of fact about whether the services H&M performs at the Croxton terminal, together with its contract with Norfolk Southern, qualify it as a common carrier by railroad. Although the parties generally agree on the tasks H&M performs at theterminal, they disagree on the test the Court should use to determine whether H&M is a "common carrier by railroad" under FELA as a matter of law.
FELA was enacted in 1908 against the backdrop of "exceptionally hazardous" working conditions for railroad employees that resulted in the "'death or maiming of thousands of workers every year.'" CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 691 (2011) (quoting CONRAIL v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 542 (1994)). The statute aims to "'shif[t] part of the human overhead of doing business from employees to their employers,'" id. (quoting Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 542), and to "provide a federal remedy for railroad workers who suffer personal injuries as a result of the negligence of their employer or their fellow employees," Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 561 (1987). These purposes find expression through the statute's "eliminat[ion] of a number of traditional defenses to tort liability," id., and its relaxed standard of causation, see McBride, 564 U.S. at 688. See also Monheim v. Union R.R. Co., 996 F. Supp. 2d 354, 361 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (). It has been described as a "broad remedial statute" that is to be liberally construed to accomplish Congress's objectives in passing it. Buell, 480 U.S. at 561 (citing Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 180 (1949)).
The statutory language relevant to resolution of H&M's motion (and that of Norfolk Southern, discussed infra), is as follows:
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in [interstate] commerce . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, or, in case of the death of such employee, to his or her personal representative . . . for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment. . . .
45 U.S.C. § 51. The Third Circuit applies a four-part test to determine liability: a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant is a common carrier by railroad engaged in interstate commerce, (2) the plaintiff was employed by the defendant and was assigned to...
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