Quiñones v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth.
Decision Date | 27 July 2016 |
Docket Number | Civil No. 13-1901 (PG) |
Citation | 199 F.Supp.3d 474 |
Parties | Nydia Enid Soto QUIÑONES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC POWER AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Roque Uriel Rivera-Lago, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.
Margarita M. Frontera-Munoz, Guzman & Rodriguez-Lopez Law Offices, Guaynabo, PR, Luis M. Rodriguez-Lopez, Guzman & Rodriguez-Lopez Law Offices, Aurea Yadira Rivera-Alvarado, Rivera-Munich & Hernandez Law Offices PSC, Idza Diaz-Rivera, P. R. Department of Justice, Jose A. Morales-Boscio, Harry Anduze-Montano, Harry Anduze Montano Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.
OMNIBUS OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Nydia E. Soto Quiñones ("Soto") and Jose Luis Torres Perez ("Torres")(collectively, "Plaintiffs") filed the instant action against their former employer, the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA"), and its employees Juan Alicea Flores, Victor Oppenheimer Soto, Maria Mendez, Jorge Hernandez Perez, and Alfonso Villafañe (the "PREPA Defendants"), and two members of the Unión de Trabajadores de la Industria Eléctrica y de Riesgo ("UTIER"), Angel Figueroa Jaramillo and Manuel Perez Soler (the "UTIER Defendants")(all of whom will be collectively referred to as the "Defendants"),1 alleging violations of the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and of Puerto Rico law. See Docket No. 5. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants conspired among themselves to remove Plaintiffs from their employment at PREPA solely because of their political affiliation to the New Progressive Party ("NPP"). Id. at p. 2 Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief, as well as compensatory damages pursuant to Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Puerto Rico law.2 Id.
Before the Court is PREPA Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 59), which the PREPA Defendants in their individual capacities joined (Docket Nos. 61 & 67), the UTIER Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 63), and Plaintiffs' Opposition thereto (Docket Nos. 80 & 81).3 After a close examination of all of the evidence on record and a careful review of the applicable statutory and case law, the Court GRANTS the Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment for the reasons explained below.
A motion for summary judgment is governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which entitles a party to judgment if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "When the party who bears the burden of proof at trial is faced with a properly constituted summary judgment motion, defeating the motion depends on her ability to show that such a dispute exists." Geshke v. Crocs, Inc., 740 F.3d 74, 77 (1st Cir.2014) (citing Borges ex rel. S.M.B.W. v. Serrano – Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2010) ).
If the non-movant generates uncertainty as to the true state of any material fact, the movant's efforts should be deemed unavailing. See Suarez v. Pueblo Int'l, 229 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir.2000). Nonetheless, the mere existence of "some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not affect an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Summary judgment may be appropriate if the nonmoving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation." Medina–Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990).
At the summary judgment juncture, the court must examine the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant, indulging that party with all possible inferences to be derived from the facts. See Rochester Ford Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 287 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir.2002). The court reviews the record "as a whole," and "may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 135, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). This is so, because credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge. Id.
In order to provide some context, the Court gleans the following facts from Plaintiffs' amended complaint. See Docket No. 5.
At the time of the events alleged therein, Alicea-Flores was PREPA's Executive Director, Oppenheimer was PREPA's Labor Relations Director, and Mendez served as PREPA's Human Resources Director, in addition to occupying a seat as secretary of PREPA's Board of Directors. Id. at pp. 4-5. The complaint alleges that these Defendants were active members of the Popular Democratic Party ("PDP"). Id. In February of 2013, Hernandez-Perez, an affiliate of the PPD, was appointed to the position of Regional Administrator at PREPA's Regional Office in Arecibo, Puerto Rico, after the change in administration following the 2012 General Elections. Id. at p. 8.5 Also at that time, Figueroa-Jaramillo was the President of the UTIER, while Perez-Soler acted as a union representative. Plaintiffs, who identify themselves as active members of the NPP, allege that the PREPA Defendants conspired among themselves and with the UTIER Defendants to terminate their employment in violation of their constitutional rights.
1. Plaintiff Soto began working for PREPA in 1994, and by 2013 she occupied the position of District Manager of the Commercial Office in Isabela, Puerto Rico (the "Isabela office"). See SUMF at ¶ 1; Docket No. 60-22 at p. 7.
2. Plaintiff Torres began working for PREPA in 1994, and in December of 2011, he was assigned to the position of Supervisor of Technical Services at the Isabela office. SUMF at ¶ 1; Docket No. 60-23 at pp. 11-12.
3. Plaintiff Torres affiliated himself to the group "Energéticos Estadistas" five to ten years after he first began working for PREPA. SUMF at ¶ 37.
4. Plaintiffs acknowledge that political affiliation to a political party is not an employment requisite at PREPA. SUMF at ¶ 36; Docket No. 81 at ¶ 36.
5. On or around July 11, 2013, Hernandez received an anonymous phone call urging him to investigate alleged irregularities found in the payroll records of employees working at the Isabela office who were reporting more work hours than was the case. SUMF at ¶ 2.
6. After noticing the forewarned inconsistencies, Hernandez requested PREPA's Internal Audit Office to verify the times reported in the employees' Bi-weekly Attendance Reports (payroll records) against the Entrance and Exit Records (Security time logs) of the Isabela office SUMF at ¶¶ 3-5; Docket No. 60-2.
7. On August 5, 2013, Pedro Rodriguez-Cintron, Administrator at PREPA's Internal Audit Office, issued an Audit Report setting forth the results of the investigation. See Docket No. 60-2. The Audit Report confirmed inconsistencies in the payroll records and the Security time logs of 38 employees. SUMF at ¶¶ 5 & 7. It also identified the relevant payroll entries for the months of March, April and May of 2013. See Docket No. 60-2.
8. On August 19, 2013, Plaintiffs were summarily suspended from employment with pay pending the results of an informal investigation hearing. To that end, both Soto and Torres received suspension letters with PREPA's allegations against them, which they refused to sign. SUMF at ¶¶ 18 & 21; Docket Nos. 70-3 & 70-9.
9. The letter received by Soto informed her that she was suspended for (a) falsely reporting overtime work (compensatory time) in her Biweekly Attendance Report on March 28, April 16, 24, 25, 26, and 30, and May 1, 2, 3, and 6 of 2013; and (b) allowing employees to use PREPA's official vehicles for personal use. The letter also noted the inconsistencies found when verifying the employees' Biweekly Attendance Reports (payroll records) against the Security time logs that recorded the entry and exit times of employees and the mileage authorization documents in Soto's custody. See Docket No. 70-3 at p. 1.
10. The information available to PREPA at that time revealed that Soto had authorized her employees to report more work hours than was the case. SUMF at ¶ 10.
11. Torres, on the other hand, was suspended for (a) falsely reporting regular work hours and overtime (compensatory time) in his Biweekly Attendance Report on March 21, 25, 26, 27 and 28, April 1, 5, 10, 12, 13, 19, 22 and 25, and May 4, 8, 13, 16 and 18 of 2013; (b) allowing employees under his supervision to report regular work hours and overtime hours that were not worked; and (c) failing to provide the corresponding mileage authorization documentation for the use of PREPA's official vehicles by employees under his supervision. See Docket No. 70-9 at p. 1.
12. The suspension letters further warned Plaintiffs that they could face disciplinary charges for violating PREPA's Rules of Conduct 1, 17, 24, 27 and 31, and Notes 1 and 3, which sanction: (1) repeated tardiness or negligence in the performance of job duties; (2) misuse of PREPA's property or funds; (3) falsification of documents; (4) obstruction or interruption of PREPA's normal operations; and (5) abandonment of duties during business hours. SUMF at ¶ 19; Docket No. 70-3 at pp. 1-4; Docket No. 70-9 at pp. 1-4.
13. In addition, Plaintiff Torres' suspension letter alleged a first-time violation to Rule of Conduct 3, which prohibits leaving the work place during the workday without prior authorization. SUMF at ¶ 20; Docket No. 70-9 at p. 2.
14. The suspension letters noted that first-time violations to Rules of Conduct 17, 24, 27 and 31 could result in the employees' permanent separation from employment and salary. Docket No. 70-3 at p. 4; Docket No. 70-9 at p. 4.
15. PREPA also suspended those employees whose payroll...
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