United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Hardin Cnty.

• Decision Date: 03 February 2016
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:15-cv-66-DJH
• Citation: 160 F.Supp.3d 1004
• Parties: United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Hardin County, Kentucky, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky

160 F.Supp.3d 1004

United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Hardin County, Kentucky, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:15-cv-66-DJH

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division.

Signed February 3, 2016

Benjamin S. Basil, David L. Leightty, Irwin H. Cutler, Jr., Priddy Cutler Naake & Meade, PLLC, Robert M. Colone, IBT Local, Louisville, KY, for Plaintiffs.

Jason M. Nemes, Fultz, Maddox, Hovious & Dickens PLC, John T. Lovett, Frost Brown Todd LLC, Louisville, KY, Jennifer B. Oldham, Elizabethtown, KY, Steven T. McDevitt, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

David J. Hale

, Judge, United States District Court

The National Labor Relations Act is a broad federal law that regulates the relationships between employers and unions. The NLRA permits agreements between employers and unions that require employees to join or pay dues to the union, known as union-security agreements. But the NLRA also permits “State or Territorial” laws that prohibit such agreements, commonly referred to as right-to-work laws. The primary question presented by this lawsuit is whether a right-to-work law may be enacted solely by a state or territorial government, or whether a local government—in this case a county—may pass a law prohibiting union-security agreements. Because the Court finds that local regulation of union-security agreements is preempted by the NLRA, the right-to-work ordinance at issue here is invalid.

I. BACKGROUND

The Fiscal Court of Hardin County is the legislative body for Hardin County, a political subdivision of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. See Ky. Const. § 144

; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. IX (West 2015). In the absence of a Kentucky state law prohibiting union-security agreements, the Hardin Fiscal Court passed a county ordinance on January 13, 2015, Ordinance 300, which purports to ensure that no employee is required to join or pay dues to a union.¹ (Docket No. 5, PageID # 75) The right-to- work provision is found in Section 4 of Ordinance 300, which states that

no person covered by the National Labor Relations Act shall be required as a condition of employment or continuation of employment:

...

(B) to become or remain a member of a labor organization;

(C) to pay any dues, fees, assessments, or other charges of any kind or amount to a labor organization; [or]

(D) to pay to any charity or other third party, in lieu of such payments, any amount equivalent to or a pro-rata portion of dues, fees, assessments, or other charges regularly required of members of a labor organization[.]

(D.N. 5-1, PageID # 96) Section 6 of the ordinance declares any such agreements “unlawful, and void, and of no legal effect.” (Id ., PageID # 97)

The plaintiff labor organizations assert that Sections 4 and 6 of the ordinance violate the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. (See D.N. 1) According to the plaintiffs, the NLRA preempts right-to-work laws not specifically authorized in § 14(b) of the Act, including the Hardin County ordinance. (See D.N. 7-1, 31) Also preempted, they argue, is Ordinance 300's regulation of “hiring-hall” agreements—which require prospective employees to be recommended, approved, referred, or cleared by or through a labor organization—and “dues-checkoff” provisions—which require employers to automatically deduct union dues, fees, assessments, or other charges from employees' paychecks and transfer them to the union. (D.N. 7-1, PageID # 116-18) The defendants, various Hardin County officials, contend that the ordinance constitutes state law within the meaning of § 14(b) and thus is not preempted by the NLRA. (See D.N. 14, 16-1, 34)

As the case presents exclusively legal issues, the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the validity of Ordinance 300.² (D.N. 7, 16) In deciding whether Ordinance 300 is preempted, the Court considers only the legal challenges to the ordinance and makes no finding as to the efficacy of right-to-work laws.

II. DISCUSSION

In 1935, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act, which established federal labor relations standards and the National Labor Relations Board. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq .

In response to abuses of closed-shop agreements, which mandated that only union members be hired, Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Act banning such agreements. See

Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, AFL

–

CIO v. Mobil Oil Corp. , 426 U.S. 407, 414–17, 96 S.Ct. 2140, 48 L.Ed.2d 736 (1976). Congress still allowed for union-shop agreements, which require employees to join the union soon after they are hired, and agency-shop agreements, which require employees to pay union dues whether or not they are members of the union. Id. at 409 & n. 1, 96 S.Ct. 2140. In § 14(b) of the NLRA, however, Congress gave any State or Territory the option to exempt itself from that policy. Id . at 409 & n. 2, 96 S.Ct. 2140.

Section 14(b), entitled “Construction of Provisions,” provides:

Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law.

29 U.S.C. § 164(b)

. Union-security agreements are also addressed in § 8(a)(3). Pursuant to that section, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer

by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this Act, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization ... to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later[.]

29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)

. Thus, § 8(a)(3) provides that no federal statute shall preclude union-security agreements, while § 14(b) provides that state and territorial laws prohibiting such agreements shall take precedence over the NLRA. In other words, if Ordinance 300 constitutes state law within the meaning of § 14(b), it is valid and enforceable. If not, then the question is whether the NLRA preempts a regulation that falls outside of that section. The Court thus begins with the language of § 14(b).

A. State Law Within the Meaning of § 14(b)

Section 14(b) provides that nothing in the NLRA shall be read to authorize the execution or application of union-security agreements “in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law.” 29 U.S.C. § 164(b)

. As the plaintiffs observe, it makes little sense to read “State or Territorial law” as encompassing local law in light of the statute's previous reference to “any State or Territory”—if “State or Territorial law” includes the laws of political subdivisions, then the statute must be read “in any State or Territory [or political subdivision thereof]” to avoid assigning two different meanings to “State” in the same sentence. This is not a logical reading; “[a] standard principle of statutory construction provides that identical words and phrases within the same statute should normally be given the same meaning.” Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc. , 551 U.S. 224, 232, 127 S.Ct. 2411, 168 L.Ed.2d 112 (2007) (citing IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez , 546 U.S. 21, 34, 126 S.Ct. 514, 163 L.Ed.2d 288 (2005) ); see also

Day v. James Marine, Inc. , 518 F.3d 411, 416 (6th Cir.2008) (“It is not often that Congress gives the same term two different meanings in adjacent subsections of a statute, much less in the same sentence of one of those subsections. If words are known by the surrounding company they keep, they are surely known by how they are used in the surrounding sections of the same statute.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

In their arguments, the defendants skip past the statute's reference to “any State or Territory.” Instead, they rely on carefully selected quotations from two Supreme Court cases unrelated to the NLRA, Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier , 501 U.S. 597, 111 S.Ct. 2476, 115 L.Ed.2d 532 (1991)

, and City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc. , 536 U.S. 424, 122 S.Ct. 2226, 153 L.Ed.2d 430 (2002). Each of those cases, however, turned on the specific language of the statute at issue.

In Mortier

, the plaintiff challenged a local ordinance regulating the use of pesticides, arguing that it was preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). The Mortier

Court examined the relevant language of FIFRA in detail and ultimately concluded that the statute's express grant of regulatory authority to “a State” did not preempt local regulations. See 501 U.S. at 606–14, 111 S.Ct. 2476. The Court found that “[t]he exclusion of political subdivisions cannot be inferred from the express authorization to the “State[s]” because political subdivisions are components of the very entity the statute empowers.” Id. at 608, 111 S.Ct. 2476 (alteration in original).

While the defendants quote this passage as black-letter law, the Mortier

Court's conclusion was that “the express authorization to the “State[s]” in FIFRA could not be read to exclude political subdivisions. The paragraph begins, “Properly read, the statutory language tilts in favor of local regulation.” 501 U.S. at 607, 111 S.Ct. 2476. The next paragraph starts, “Certainly no other textual basis for pre-emption exists.” Id. at 608, 111 S.Ct. 2476. Taken in context, it is clear that the Court's conclusion was based on the specific statutory language at issue and thus was not a broad pronouncement regarding Congress' use of the term “State” in federal statutes.

The defendants also insist that the Mortier

Court “addressed how political subdivisions of the States are to be treated for preemption purposes.”...