GonzÁlez-PÉrez v. GÓmez-Águila, Civil No. 00-2602(HL)(JA).

• Decision Date: 20 November 2003
• Docket Number: Civil No. 00-2602(HL)(JA).
• Citation: 296 F.Supp.2d 110
• Parties: Evelyn GONZÁLEZ-PÉREZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Rafael GÓMEZ-ÁGUILA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

296 F.Supp.2d 110

Evelyn GONZÁLEZ-PÉREZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Rafael GÓMEZ-ÁGUILA, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 00-2602(HL)(JA).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

November 20, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Judith Berkan, Mary Jo Méndez-Vilella, G-11 O'Neill, Peter Berkowitz, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff or Petitioner.

Ricardo L. Rodríguez-Padilla, Andrés W. López, San Juan, PR, Eileen Landrón-Guardiola, Edardo A. Vera-Ramírez, Centro Internacional de Mercadeo, Guaynabo, PR, Nelson Robles-Díaz, Federico Lora-Lopez, Nancy Santiago-Otero, Legal Services —P.R. Police Dept., San Juan, PR, for Defendant or Respondent.

OPINION AND ORDER

ARENAS, United States Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the court on motion in limine filed by the defendants on November 6, 2003, requesting the exclusion from trial of plaintiffs' proposed expert witnesses. (Docket No. 216.) Plaintiffs' opposition was filed on November 12, 2003. (Docket No. 220.) After consideration of the arguments of the parties and for the reasons stated below, defendants motion will be DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

This case is set for trial starting on November 20, 2003. Specifically, the defendants move to exclude the testimony of Louis Reiter (hereinafter "Reiter"), plaintiffs' police administration expert, claiming that his opinion is unreliable and irrelevant to the issues in this case. Furthermore, the defendants argue that the testimony of David G. Townshend (hereinafter "Townshend"), plaintiffs' crime scene reconstruction expert, should be excluded because he has not performed an evaluation or reconstruction of the scene in this case, which in turn renders his methodology unreliable. In the alternative, the defendants contend that if the court deems Townshend testimony reliable, it should exclude his blood pattern analysis since he has admitted he is not an expert in that area.

The plaintiffs, as might be expected, disagree. They claim that the qualifications of their proposed experts are extensive and that their testimony is relevant to all of the issues to be tried in the case. Particularly, the plaintiffs contend that defendants' request for exclusion is principally based on a one-sided interpretation of the evidence and the assumption that the trier of fact will believe their version. In essence, the argument of the plaintiffs is that both experts possess considerable scientific, technical and other specialized knowledge and that their testimony will assist the trier of fact in the determination of the issues in this case.

II. STANDARD FOR ADMISSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs the admission of expert testimony at trial. It provides that:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.

Fed.R.Evid. 702. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), the Supreme Court assigned to trial judges the role of gatekeepers to screen expert testimony that although relevant, was based on unreliable scientific methodologies. Subsequently, the Court extended this gatekeeping function holding that it does not only apply to expert testimony which relies on scientific knowledge, but to testimony that is based on technical and other specialized knowledge as well. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999).

Three requirements must be met before expert testimony may be admitted: (1) the expert is qualified to testify by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education; (2) the testimony concerns scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge; and (3) the testimony is such that it will assist the trier of fact in understanding or determining a fact in issue. Correa v. Cruisers, A Division of KCS Int'l., Inc., 298 F.3d 13, 24 (1st Cir.2002). The gatekeeping function of the trial court is "`a flexible one' that depends upon the particular circumstances of the particular case at issue." Thorndike v. Daimler-Chrysler Corp., 266 F.Supp.2d 172, 175 (D.Me.2003)(quoting Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. at 150).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Testimony of Louis Reiter

Plaintiffs intend to present Reiter as their expert in police administration and practices. The report submitted by him addresses two issues. First, the manner in which Sergeant Juan Vargas (hereinafter "Vargas") supervised the Saturation Unit. Second, the actions of the defendant police officers in Monte Park. Specifically, Reiter's report addresses Vargas' complaint and disciplinary history. Vargas is alleged to be the supervisor most closely linked to the five agents directly involved with the shooting at Monte Park and the death of Anthony. It is alleged by plaintiffs that the five agents answered directly to Vargas on the night in question.

The defendants contend, however, that Vargas' record and complaint history as well as his supervision of the agents is irrelevant. They claim that Vargas was not involved in the events that gave rise to the complaint; that he was not present at the time of the shooting and that he arrived after the incident had occurred. Additionally, it is the defendants' contention that in the opinion submitted by Reiter regarding Vargas, there is no data regarding his role as a supervisor. There is no testimony, according to the defendants as to whether Vargas complied with the administrative orders addressed in the report and the report does not address the complaint and disciplinary record of any agent other than Vargas. Finally, the defendants assert that Vargas' complaint history will not help the trier of fact in determining whether his supervision of the Saturation Unit was inappropriate or aid the jury in determining any fact of consequence in the case. In the alternative, the defendants claim that if the court deems Reiter's testimony relevant, that it should be excluded because it is highly prejudicial and because its probative value is greatly outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

As to the second issue addressed in Reiter's report, namely the manner in which the agents intervened at Monte Park, the defendants claim that he offers no reliable basis for his opinion. Reiter opines that the agents should have waited a few hours to intervene until the celebratory shooting was over and that if they chose to intervene, they should have made a show of force by entering through the front gate with lights, sirens and a number of agents. Reiter admits, however, that celebratory shootings is not considered a problem, at least in the jurisdictions in which he has operated, and that he could not recall any state within the United States that had enacted a plan for dealing with celebratory shootings. He also states that he has never recommended a course of action to any police department with respect to celebratory shootings.

The defendants do not seem to challenge Reiter's qualifications. In any event I find them more than sufficient in terms of his technical and specialized knowledge. Mr. Reiter is a former Deputy Chief of Police of Los Angeles, California, with over 20 years of experience. He is widely recognized as an authority on police administration and has been a faculty member for national level police management and specialized training programs for law enforcement personnel. In addition, he has published numerous articles in that field. Mr. Reiter spends a considerable amount of time training police officers and auditing police departments, frequently working as a consultant for the United States Justice Department. He is also a researcher and author of the chapters on internal discipline, training and management/employee relations for the Police Task Force Report of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals.¹

Therefore, with said qualifications, there are only two issues before the court. First, whether Reiter's testimony regarding Vargas' complaint and disciplinary history is relevant and would assist the trier of fact in determining material issues in this case. Second, whether the basis for Reiter's opinion regarding celebratory shootings is flawed.

With respect to the first issue, I find that Reiter's testimony is relevant. His opinion regarding Vargas' complaint history is intrinsically connected to one of the main allegations in the complaint: supervisory liability. Specifically that of co-defendants Lieutenant Lilliam Rivera ("Rivera") and Colonel Agustín Cartagena ("Cartagena"). The crux of plaintiffs' allegation with respect to these co-defendants is that their failure to take into account Vargas' disciplinary record amounts to reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others, which in turn is the basis for the imposition of supervisory liability in a section 1983 action. See Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 562 (1st Cir.1989) (crediting and quoting extensively Reiter's testimony), specifically, by disregarding Vargas' complaint record that involves serious accusations of violations of civil rights, and by allowing Vargas to supervise the Saturation Unit which has frequent contact with citizens. Vargas was assigned by Rivera to supervise the agents that were out on preventive patrol on December 31, 1999, including the agents involved in the shooting at Monte Park. Reiter's testimony is relevant. I also find that its probative value is not in any way outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

With respect to the second issue, the defendants make a more...