Labuff v. Texas & New Orleans Railroad Company

• Decision Date: 20 December 1954
• Docket Number: No. 4376.,4376.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana
• Parties: Mr. and Mrs. Harold C. LABUFF, v. TEXAS & NEW ORLEANS RAILROAD COMPANY.

126 F. Supp. 759

Mr. and Mrs. Harold C. LABUFF, v. TEXAS & NEW ORLEANS RAILROAD COMPANY.

No. 4376.

United States District Court W. D. Louisiana, Lake Charles Division.

December 20, 1954.

Bass & Nichols, Lake Charles, La., for plaintiffs.

Porter & Stewart, Lake Charles, La., for defendant.

HUNTER, District Judge.

This is an action by Mr. and Mrs. Harold C. LaBuff of Kinder, Louisiana to recover damages against the defendant for the alleged wrongful death of their minor son, Franklin D. LaBuff.

On the morning of December 27, 1952 the boy was picked up at Kinder by Mr. and Mrs. Huey L. Francis. The car in which Mr. and Mrs. Francis and Franklin LaBuff were riding proceeded West on U. S. Highway 190, a distance of approximately 22 miles from the point where Franklin LaBuff was picked up to the railroad tracks of defendant which crossed the highway at Fulton, Louisiana in Beauregard Parish. The car was being driven by Mr. Francis. It was hit by an engine of the defendant which was proceeding North. All three occupants of the car were killed. At the time of the accident Franklin LaBuff was 19 years of age, unmarried, and had his home with his parents, the plaintiffs.

The case was tried on its merits resulting in a verdict of the jury in favor of plaintiffs in the amount of $10,000 for Mrs. LaBuff and $15,000 for Mr. LaBuff. At the close of plaintiffs' case and of the evidence, defendant filed motions for directed verdicts. Acting under Rule 50 (b), 28 U.S.C.A. the court denied the motions and submitted the issues of negligence and contributory negligence to the jury. Subsequent to the trial and the verdict, defendant filed a motion to set aside the verdict and to grant to defendant a judgment notwithstanding same. These motions are to be considered together, since the same legal principles are applicable thereto. Defendant has also filed an alternate motion for a new trial. This motion is to be considered separately inasmuch as it deals with different legal precepts.

We wish first to discuss the motions for a directed verdict and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. No civil engineer would start out on a survey without first finding out how far the survey was to extend. It is just as essential and just as much a time-saver to define in advance the outer limits of the area to be considered in disposing of these motions.

The law applicable to the pending motions has been well set out by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in a case considered on appeal from the Western District of Louisiana (Judge Benjamin C. Dawkins, Sr., Trial Judge). The language and citation follow:

As this court has pointed out, a motion for a directed verdict or for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict can be granted only when there is no evidence which, if believed, would authorize a verdict against the movant, while the district judge may grant a new trial when he thinks the verdict is wrong, though supported by some evidence. Marsh v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 5 Cir., 175 F.2d 498, 500." Audirsch v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 5 Cir., 195 F.2d 629, at page 630.

This presents only one issue before the court. The question is one of law only; whether there is only evidence, which, if believed, would authorize a verdict against defendant. The motion to set aside the verdict and the motion for a directed verdict, on which decision was postponed, are to be subjected to the same test.

Defendant is therefore faced with the problem of demonstrating an all-inclusive negative. It must show that in all the record there is no evidence which, if believed, would justify the verdict. On the other hand, from the standpoint of plaintiff, the pointing out by page and line of specific evidence is all that is needed to prove the existence of some evidence on which the verdict was authorized.

The Supreme Court of the United States has expressed this point clearly in a decision also interesting for its emphasis on the point that the drawing of inferences of fact is a part of the fact-finding process. In Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union R. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 64 S.Ct. 409, 412, 88 L.Ed. 520, the Supreme Court considered a case involving the questions whether the defendant was negligent and whether such negligence was the proximate cause of the fatal accident. No one knew exactly how Harold Tennant, a railway switchman, had been killed by the train. The jury's verdict was, therefore, based on inferences from the proven facts. The Court of Appeals thought other inferences as to the deceased employee's position and conduct prior to the fatal accident would have been more reasonable. The Court of Appeals declared that there was no substantial proof that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of Tennant's death. On certiorari, the Supreme Court summed up as follows:

"It is not the function of a court to search the record for conflicting circumstantial evidence in order to take the case away from the jury on a theory that the proof gives equal support to inconsistent and uncertain inferences. The focal point of judicial review is the reasonableness of the particular inference or conclusion drawn by the jury. It is the jury, not the court, which is the fact-finding body. It weighs the contradictory evidence and inferences, judges the credibility of witnesses, receives expert instructions, and draws the ultimate conclusion as to the facts. The very essence of its function is to select from among conflicting inferences and conclusions that which it considers most reasonable. Washington & Georgetown R. Co. v. McDade, 135 U.S. 554, 571, 572, 10 S.Ct. 1044, 1049, 34 L.Ed. 235 241, 242; Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra, 318 U.S. 54 68, 63 S.Ct. 444 451, 87 L.Ed. 610 618, 143 A.L.R. 967; Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 353, 354, 63 S.Ct. 1062, 1064, 87 L.Ed. 1444 1447, 1448. That conclusion, whether it relates to negligence, causation or any other factual matter, cannot be ignored. Courts are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions or because judges feel that other results are more reasonable.

"Upon an examination of the record we cannot say that the inference drawn by this jury that respondent's negligence caused the fatal accident is without support in the evidence. Thus to enter a judgment for respondent notwithstanding the verdict is to deprive petitioner of the right to a jury trial. No reason is apparent why we should abdicate our duty to protect and guard that right in this case. We accordingly reverse the judgment of the court below and remand the case to it for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

"Reversed".

The identical situation came up in the Fifth Circuit in Huff v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 198 F.2d 347, 348, decided July 24, 1952. Here, see what the Fifth Circuit said in the Huff case:

"Summary judgment is not authorized to cut litigants off from their right of trial by jury if there is any genuine issue for the jury's determination. Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 627, 64 S.Ct. 724, 88 L.Ed. 967; Chappell v. Goltsman, 5 Cir., 186 F.2d 215, 218. Where negligence may reasonably be inferred even from undisputed facts, it is for the jury to say whether negligence shall be so inferred."

From the foregoing authorities, we may advance this summary of the viewpoint of the federal courts on motions such as here in issue (except the motion for a new trial):

The Fact-Finding Power belongs to the Jury, and this Power includes the determination of all Questions of Fact, and the drawing or rejection of inferences from the facts. Both Negligence and Proximate Cause are for the Jury to Find or Reject, and the finding of the jury are not to be disturbed wherever they rest upon some evidence, or upon a reasonable inference or conclusion based upon some evidence. Neither Conflicting Evidence nor Conflicting Inferences are to be re-weighed or considered by the Trial Judge in testing the verdict. The sole question in testing the verdict is whether there is any evidence in the record, or any reasonable inference from any evidence in the record, which, if believed, would authorize a verdict against D...