N.H. Fish & Game Dep't v. Bacon

• Decision Date: 30 April 2015
• Docket Number: No. 2014–158,2014–158
• Citation: 116 A.3d 1060,167 N.H. 591
• Parties: NEW HAMPSHIRE FISH AND GAME DEPARTMENT v. Edward BACON
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

167 N.H. 591

116 A.3d 1060

NEW HAMPSHIRE FISH AND GAME DEPARTMENT

v.Edward BACON

No. 2014–158

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Argued: January 15, 2015

Opinion Issued: April 30, 2015

Joseph A. Foster, attorney general (Philip B. Bradley, assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State.

Seufert, Davis & Hunt, PLLC, of Franklin (Brad C. Davis on the brief and orally), for the defendant.

LYNN, J.

The defendant, Edward Bacon, appeals an order of the Circuit Court (Boyle, J.), following a bench trial, finding that he violated RSA 206:26–bb (2011) (amended 2014) by acting negligently while hiking, so as to require a search and rescue effort by the plaintiff, the New Hampshire Fish and Game Department (Department), and that he, thus, was responsible to the Department for the reasonable costs associated with the search and rescue. We affirm.

I

The following facts are established by the record. On September 16, 2012, the defendant began a five-day solo hiking trip in the White Mountains, during which he planned to hike several mountains with summits over 5,000 feet. At the time of the hike, the defendant was fifty-nine years old, had undergone four hip surgeries

since 2005, and had an artificial hip that had dislocated on five occasions, twice during the prior year. The defendant also had a "bad back" and was taking a variety of medications for multiple ailments. In preparation for his hike, the defendant trained in a city park in Michigan, which had 250–foot hills and some "gravelly" spots. The conditions on the Franconia Ridge Trail between Liberty and Little Haystack Mountains, on which the rescuers eventually located the defendant, are rocky and steep in various locations.

On September 18, the defendant left the Liberty Springs campsite to begin a planned hike to the summits of Liberty, Little Haystack, Lincoln, and Lafayette Mountains; he planned to end at the Greenleaf Hut, which provides overnight accommodations to hikers. Days in advance, stormy weather had been forecast for the morning the defendant began the hike, and rain began a few hours after he departed the campsite. A bit later, the defendant's pack cover "on its own accord came off and flew away in the wind." Sergeant Brad Morse, a Conservation Officer with the Department who helped rescue the defendant, testified that the winds were among the worst he had ever experienced in that part of the Franconia Ridge Trail and had repeatedly blown him to the ground. Sometime that morning, the defendant slipped on loose gravel, slid down the trail, hit his pack on a rock, and lost his tent which fell down a ravine. At noon time, the defendant took a photograph of two other hikers he encountered on the trail, both of whom were wearing full rain gear with their hoods over their heads.

At around 1:00 p.m., the defendant encountered a waist-high rock ledge that he needed to traverse in order to continue on the trail. He attempted to jump backward up onto the ledge and, in the process, fell and dislocated his hip

. Approximately one hour later, Morse received an alert that a hiker had dislocated his hip and needed assistance. He responded immediately and eventually located the defendant on the trail between Little Haystack and Lincoln Mountains. Morse testified that when he found the defendant his left leg was flexed and internally rotated, the very position that the defendant's orthopedic surgeon had warned him to avoid due to his hip replacement.

Approximately fifteen Department personnel and thirty-five volunteers participated in the defendant's rescue during the afternoon and evening of September 18 and into the early morning hours of September 19. When Lieutenant James Kneeland visited the defendant in the hospital after his rescue, the defendant explained that he had misread the weather report: he thought the forecast called for 30–40 mph winds with gusts up to 70 mph and heavy rain, instead of the actual forecast of 30–40 mph winds increasing to 70 mph and heavy rain. The defendant also told Kneeland that he had caught his left leg while attempting to jump backward up onto a rock ledge and dislocated his artificial hip when he fell.

The defendant testified to a different version of events at trial. For instance, he testified that he was unaware of the weather conditions on the day of the hike because he did not have his reading glasses with him, and that he did not encounter any significant rain or wind. Additionally, he testified that when he dislocated his hip

he had not fallen, as he told Kneeland, but instead had jumped backward over a rock ledge and swung his legs up while perfectly maintaining his left leg to avoid flexion and internal rotation.

At the close of the trial, the court accepted closing memoranda from both parties. Thereafter, the court found for the Department "for all of the reasons cited in the plaintiff's closing memorandum," and awarded the Department $9,334.86 in damages. The defendant filed a motion to reconsider, to which the Department objected. The court denied the defendant's motion, stating that "[t]he actions of the defendant were a gross deviation from those of a reasonable person that surpasses the [negligence] standard required." This appeal followed.

II

The defendant raises three arguments on appeal. First, he argues that the trial court erred by judging his conduct under an ordinary negligence standard which, he asserts, is not the standard mandated by RSA 206:26–bb. Second, he argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the court's finding that his actions while hiking were negligent, thus necessitating his rescue by the Department. Third, he argues that the court's damages award was improper under RSA 206:26–bb because the award included recovery for expenses that the Department would have incurred regardless of its effort to rescue him. We address each argument in turn.

A

The defendant first argues that the court erred by applying the ordinary negligence standard to determine his liability under RSA 206:26–bb. He characterizes this standard as "incorrect," and asserts that the court should instead have applied "the full and complete" civil standard of negligence, although he fails to articulate how this standard differs from the standard of "ordinary negligence."

To resolve this issue we must engage in statutory interpretation. "Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo. " Appeal of Local Gov't Ctr., 165 N.H. 790, 804, 85 A.3d 388 (2014). "In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole." Id. "We first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning." Id. "We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include." Id. "We construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and avoid an absurd or unjust result." Id.

We have not previously had occasion to construe the search and rescue response statute. It provides, in pertinent part:

I. [A]ny person determined by the department to have acted negligently in requiring a search and rescue response by the department shall be liable to the department for the reasonable cost of the department's expenses for such search and rescue response. The executive director shall bill the responsible person for such costs. Payment shall be made to the department within 30 days after the receipt of the bill, or by some other date determined by the executive director. If any person shall fail or refuse to pay the costs ... the department may pursue payment by legal action....

RSA 206:26–bb. This statute plainly is intended to create a statutory cause of action in favor of the Department to recover the costs it incurs in conducting a search and rescue operation for a person whose negligent conduct required such an operation. See Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708, 714, 662 A.2d 272 (1995) ("Whether or not a common law duty exists, ... a plaintiff may maintain an action directly under [a] statute if a statutory cause of action is either expressed or implied by the legislature."). Also plain is that the statute imposes as the duty of care the common law standard of negligence, which we have defined as how a reasonable person would be expected to act under the same circumstances. See Gelinas v. Metropolitan Prop. & Liability Ins. Co., 131 N.H. 154, 161, 551 A.2d 962 (1988). Thus, in order to avoid liability for search and rescue costs, the defendant must have hiked in a manner that was reasonable under all of the circumstances. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in using the common law standard of negligence to evaluate the defendant's conduct under RSA 206:26–bb.

B

The defendant next argues that there was insufficient evidence upon which to find that he acted negligently, resulting in his need for rescue by the Department. In particular, the defendant takes issue with the fact that the trial court's order stated that it found for the Department "for all of the reasons cited in the plaintiff's closing memorandum." He asserts that, in so doing, the court improperly adopted as its findings the facts recited in the Department's memorandum—which facts, he claims, are not supported by the evidence. We disagree.

We will uphold the trial court's findings and rulings unless they lack evidentiary support or are legally erroneous. Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774, 780, 829 A.2d 1059 (2003). "It is within the province...