Meat & Allied Food Wkrs. v. Packerland Pkg. Co.

• Decision Date: 04 May 1976
• Docket Number: No. 74-C-577.,74-C-577.
• Citation: 411 F. Supp. 1280
• Parties: MEAT & ALLIED FOOD WORKERS LOCAL NO. 248 a/w Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, Plaintiff, v. PACKERLAND PACKING CO., INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin

411 F. Supp. 1280

MEAT & ALLIED FOOD WORKERS LOCAL NO. 248 a/w Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, Plaintiff, v. PACKERLAND PACKING CO., INC., Defendant.

No. 74-C-577.

United States District Court, E. D. Wisconsin.

May 4, 1976.

Gerry M. Miller, Goldberg, Previant & Uelmen, Milwaukee, Wis., for plaintiff.

James A. Gilker, John F. Buergler, Fort Smith, Ark. by Bernard Berk and Joseph A. Hoida, Green Bay, Wis., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WARREN, District Judge.

This is an action whereby the plaintiffs named above seek to obtain judicial confirmation and enforcement of an award entered in a labor arbitration proceeding on October 8, 1974. An application for such relief was filed on December 5, 1974, and an answer to that application was submitted on December 20, 1974.¹ Counsel for the plaintiffs have filed various memoranda of points and authorities in support of their particular positions; counsel for the defendant have filed a motion for summary judgment together with their own supporting brief.

This memorandum opinion serves to resolve the several issues that are outstanding at this time.

I.

The factual background to this controversy is set out with great detail in the arbitration award opinion entered on October 8, 1974 by Arbitrator Howard S. Bellman. Said opinion is attached hereto as Appendix A. At this juncture it will be sufficient to note that it is undisputed that the award of backpay thereby granted has never been honored by the defendant.

II.

Counsel for the plaintiffs in this case have alleged that this Court enjoys jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to certain provisions of both the Arbitration Act and the Labor Management Relations Act. See: 9 U.S.C. § 9 and 29 U.S.C. § 185, respectively. Counsel for the defendant initially challenge these jurisdictional assertions and claim that the Court is without power to enter any award of enforcement at this time.

The parties at this proceeding do not dispute the fact that they had entered into a collective bargaining agreement which was in full force and affect at all times material hereto.² Article 4 Section 2 of said agreement contains a specific provision whereby a grievance which is not satisfactorily adjusted is to be submitted to an impartial arbitrator whose decision in the grievance is to be final and binding.³

In a situation such as the foregoing, it is generally thought that a district court has jurisdiction to confirm and enforce the final arbitration award that is entered. Despite any qualifications to jurisdiction imposed by the terms of the Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq, the refusal of one of the parties to a collective bargaining agreement to abide by an arbitrator's decision is seen as an unfair labor practice within the meaning of the broad jurisdictional provisions of section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).⁴ See, e. g., Truck Drivers v. Gateway Erectors Division, 91 L.R.R.M. 2180, 2181 (S.D.Ohio 1975). Compare: Varley v. Tarrytown Associates, Inc., 477 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1973); and I/S Stavborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1974).

"The Supreme Court has held that a party to a collective bargaining agreement may sue in federal court pursuant to Section 301 of the LMRA to specifically enforce a promise to arbitrate. Textile Workers of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 451, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957). In reaching this decision the Court made no mention of the Arbitration Act.

"In the wake of Lincoln Mills, the Court also held that a suit may be maintained by a party to a collective bargaining agreement under Section 301 to enforce the award of an arbitrator. General Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local Union No. 89 v. Riss & Company, 372 U.S. 517, 519, 83 S.Ct. 789, 9 L.Ed.2d 918 (1963); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596, n. 1, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960). The Court again made no mention of the Arbitration Act."

White Motor Corp. v. International Union, etc., 365 F.Supp. 314, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) aff'd, 491 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1974).

The power to enforce the award of an arbitrator is seen as but one method by which a district court carries out the congressional and national policy in favor of arbitration of labor disputes, as codified by the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act. See, e. g., Pacific Maritime Association v. International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union et al., 304 F.Supp. 1315, 1316 (N.D.Calif.1969), aff'd, 454 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1971).

Recognition of this public policy in favor of arbitration has been reaffirmed by the decisions of the courts of this judicial circuit. See, e. g., Inland Steel Co. v. Local Union No. 1545, United Mine Workers of America etc., 505 F.2d 293, 298 (7th Cir. 1974).

In view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that any challenges to jurisdiction to enforce the final and binding arbitration award at issue here must fail.

III.

Once jurisdiction to enforce the award of the arbitrator has been established, this Court is entitled to review the merits thereof. Such review, however, is to be exercised in a very circumscribed fashion.

Essentially, the Court has power to review and set aside a particular labor arbitration award only if the grievance is not arbitrable, if the arbitrator exceeds his contractual authority, if indicia of fairness are absent, if the decision of the arbitrator is arbitrary or capricious, or if the process is tainted by fraud or deceit. See: Cannon v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 524 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1975) cases cited at pp. 294-295; and Mogge v. District 8, International Ass'n of Machinists, 454 F.2d 510 (7th Cir. 1971).

Furthermore, labor arbitration awards which do not "draw their essence" from a pertinent collective bargaining agreement are subject to judicial vacation. See, e. g., Master Sheet Metal Workers, etc. v. Local Union No. 17 et al., 397 F.Supp. 1372 at note 15 (D.R.I.1975). This proviso has been interpreted such that:

". . . a labor arbitrator's award does `draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement' if the interpretation can in any rational way be derived from the agreement, viewed in the light of its language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties' intention; only where there is a manifest disregard of the agreement, totally unsupported by principles of contract construction and the law of the shop, may a reviewing court disturb the award."

Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1969).

Counsel for the defendant argue that the award in question here was both arbitrary and capricious in nature, and beyond the scope of the relevant collective bargaining agreement. The Court disagrees.

The arbitrator found that the backpay award in question was appropriate because the 30-day suspension giving rise thereto was not "for cause" as required by article 3 section 1 of the bargaining agreement. This determination was supported by clear logical analysis and cannot be said to be arbitrary.

In addition, the award drew its "essence" from the bargaining agreement because, in accordance with the definition of that term noted above, it was rationally derived from the agreement and not in total disregard thereof. As stated in the preceding paragraph, management agreed to suspend or discipline only "for cause." The arbitrator rationally found cause to be wanting. An award of backpay is not an unreasonable remedy to correct that particular breach.

"When an arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and apply the collective bargaining agreement, he is to bring his informed judgment to bear in order to reach a fair solution of a problem. This is especially true when it comes to formulating remedies. There the need is for flexibility in meeting a wide variety of situations. The draftsmen may never have thought of what specific remedy should be awarded to meet a particular contingency."

United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 597, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1361, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409, 1428 (1960).

The labor arbitration award at issue here is not to be vacated as frivolous or arbitrary or not derived from the essence of the collective bargaining agreement. Generally speaking, this Court can find no basis upon which to interfere with the arbitrator's decision, and thus no alteration thereof is warranted. See: Papenfuss v. Abe W. Mathews Engineering Co., 397 F.Supp. 165 (W.D.Wis.1975).

IV.

Counsel for the plaintiffs have requested that any decree affirming the labor arbitration award at issue include a provision for an award of interest. In order to make the complaining employee whole, interest at the rate of 6 percent from the date of the arbitration award is to be granted. See: Local Union 494 etc. v. Artkraft, Inc., et al., 375 F.Supp. 129 (E.D.Wis.1974).

V.

Counsel for the plaintiffs have also requested an award of attorneys' fees if they prevail. In light of the complexities of the issues here the Court cannot find this particular dispute to have been raised in bad faith. Because of this fact, and in view of recent commentary by the United States Supreme Court concerning the propriety of awards of attorneys' fees, this request will be denied in this particular proceeding. See generally, Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society et al., 421 U.S. 240, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1974).

VI.

After due consideration of the position of each party, as set out in the written record in this action to date, and for the reasons stated in the foregoing memorandum opinion,

THE COURT FINDS that jurisdiction over this dispute exists pursuant to the provisions of § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a);

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that no sufficient cause has been shown to warrant interference with the labor arbitration award at issue here,

THE...