Rigney v. Wilson & Co.

• Decision Date: 11 July 1945
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 152.
• Citation: 61 F. Supp. 801
• Parties: RIGNEY v. WILSON & CO., Inc.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia

61 F. Supp. 801

RIGNEY v. WILSON & CO., Inc.

Civ. A. No. 152.

District Court, S. D. West Virginia.

July 11, 1945.

Joseph M. Sanders, of Bluefield, W. Va., for plaintiff.

George Richardson, Jr., of Bluefield, W. Va., for defendant.

MOORE, District Judge.

Plaintiff brings this action against the defendant claiming compensation for overtime work under the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, and seeking judgment for the amount found to be due him, plus an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, and a reasonable attorney's fee as provided therein. 29 U.S. C.A. § 216.

Findings of Fact.

Plaintiff was employed by the defendant to work as a shipping clerk in defendant's place of business at Northfork, West Virginia. His contract of employment provided for a salary of $32 per week. No regular number of hours of work per week was agreed upon, but plaintiff actually worked more than 40 hours each week beginning August 21, 1943, and ending September 30, 1944. The total number of hours worked by plaintiff in excess of 40 hours per week during his employment was 410¼ hours.

Defendant's place of business at Northfork was divided into three departments, namely, shipping, salesmen and office. Plaintiff was first designated as shipping clerk, and later as manager of the shipping department. There were no subdivisions in the shipping department. The personnel of the shipping department in addition to Rigney comprised the following:

                Clerk                       Ramsey
                Chauffeur                   Smith
                Chauffeur                   Terry
                Lugger                      Robbins
                Lugger                      Kemp
                Lugger                      Packer
                Lugger                      Alley
                Egg candler                 Nowlin
                Egg candler and
                 lugger                     Wood
                

The clerk was not under Rigney's supervision at all. The two chauffeurs were under his supervision only to a limited extent while they were actually loading their trucks. The egg candlers were under his supervision only in so far as their duties in furnishing eggs in sufficient quantity for shipments were concerned. The candling of eggs was not done under his direction. The only persons who were under the complete supervision of Rigney were the luggers. The luggers were the employees who did the manual labor in connection with defendant's business of storing and shipping meats and kindred products.

Plaintiff customarily and regularly directed the work of the luggers in the shipping department. Plaintiff's suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring or firing or other change of status of the luggers were given particular weight.

The only discretionary power exercised by plaintiff was occasional substitution of one kind of meat for another on customers' orders. He did not exercise any discretion in connection with the rationing of meats or the general management of the shipping department. His whole employment was of a menial and routine character. He did not customarily and regularly exercise any discretionary powers.

Plaintiff spent more than 20 percent of his working time in helping to load and unload meats and other products, wrapping meats, cleaning up the premises, defrosting the refrigeration rooms, and other work of a similar kind as that performed by the luggers, although not doing exactly the same work which the luggers did.

Discussion.

It is clear to me that the purpose of the Fair Labor Standards Act in relation to overtime pay for non-exempt employees is to grant the right to overtime pay to that class of employees who come within the commonly understood designation of workers as distinguished from managers, superintendents, foremen or bosses. The basis on which defendant claims that plaintiff is exempt from provisions of the Act is that he was "employed in a bona fide executive * * * capacity." 29 U.S.C.A. § 213(a). The regulation of the Administrator contains a comprehensive definition of such an employee as follows:

"Sec. 541.1. Executive. — The term `employee employed in a bona fide...