Feliciano-Monroig v. AT&T Mobility P.R., Inc.

• Decision Date: 31 March 2019
• Docket Number: CIVIL NO. 16-2810 (JAG)
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
• Parties: JORGE FELICIANO-MONROIG, et al., Plaintiffs, v. AT&T MOBILITY PUERTO RICO, INC., et al., Defendants.

JORGE FELICIANO-MONROIG, et al., Plaintiffs, v. AT&T MOBILITY PUERTO RICO, INC., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL NO. 16-2810 (JAG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

March 31, 2019

OPINION AND ORDER

GARCIA GREGORY, D.J.

Plaintiffs Jorge O. Feliciano-Monroig ("Mr. Feliciano"), Madeline Salva Malaret, and Minor G.F.S. (collectively, "Plaintiffs") brought this action against AT&T Mobility Puerto Rico, Inc. ("AT&T") and Angel Rijos-Ortiz ("Mr. Rijos") (collectively, "Defendants")¹ alleging age discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.; Puerto Rico Law No. 100 of June 30, 1959, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 146 ("Law No. 100"); and Puerto Rico Law No. 115 of December 20, 1991, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 194a ("Law No. 115"). Docket No. 34. Plaintiffs also brought claims under the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the right to privacy under the Constitution of Puerto Rico. Id. Finally, Plaintiffs assert claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and malicious prosecution under Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, §§ 5141-42. Id. Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgmentseeking dismissal of all claims. Docket No. 85. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED, and Plaintiffs' case is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for summary judgment will be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is in genuine dispute if it could be resolved in favor of either party, and it is material if it potentially affects the outcome of the case. Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986)).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "Once the moving party has properly supported [its] motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party . . . ." Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir. 1997)). The non-movant must demonstrate "through submissions of evidentiary quality [] that a trial worthy issue persists." Iverson v. City of Bos., 452 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted).

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the entire record "in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging in all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Winslow v. Aroostook Cty., 736 F.3d 23, 29 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Suarez v. Pueblo Int'l, Inc., 229 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2000)). The court may safely ignore "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation." Medina-Rivera v. MVM, Inc., 713 F.3d 132, 134 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990)). Throughout this process, courts cannot make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence, as these are jury functions and not those of a judge. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Garcia-Gonzalez v. Puig-Morales, 761 F.3d 81, 99 (1st Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted).

ANALYSIS²

I. Individual Liability Claims

Defendants argue, and the Court agrees, that Plaintiffs lack actionable claims against Mr. Rijos under the ADEA and Law 115 because there is no individual employee liability under these statutes. Docket No. 85 at 6-7; see Otero-Merced v. Preferred Health Inc., 680 F. Supp. 2d 388, 390-91 (D.P.R. 2010). Plaintiffs concede this argument. Docket No. 95-2 at 13. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiffs' ADEA and Law 115 claims against Mr. Rijos.

II. Time-Barred Claims

Defendants contend that any discrete employment action taken against Mr. Feliciano before February 13, 2015 is not actionable pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1)(B). Docket No. 85 at 7-10. Plaintiffs seem to concede this point. Docket No. 95-2 at 13 ("Plaintiff Feliciano-Monroig filed a discrimination charge with EEOC December 9, 2015, [sic] all disciplinary actions taken against Feliciano after February 13, 2015, took place within 300 days of the Charge filing date.");id. at 14 ("Plaintiffs allegations regarding any events before February 13, 2015, are not time-barred under Art. 1802/1803.").³ The Court agrees.

The ADEA provides, in relevant part, that claimants seeking relief under the statute must file an EEOC charge alleging age discrimination "within 300 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred." 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1)(B). Discrete acts of discriminatory conduct occurring more than 300 days before the filling of an EEOC charge are time-barred. Fontanez-Nunez v. Janssen Ortho LLC, 447 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2006); see Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002) ("[D]iscrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges. Each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act."). In this Circuit, the following constitute discrete acts: termination, failure to promote, failure to assign work, negative performance evaluations, and letters of warning, among others. Ayala v. Shinseki, 780 F.3d 52, 57 (1st Cir. 2015).

Here, Mr. Feliciano first filed an EEOC charge on December 9, 2015. Any discrete act occurring 300 days before that filing, i.e. before February 13, 2015, must be dismissed as time-barred. This means that all counseling notices, written warnings, final written warnings, negative performance evaluations, and failure to assign work that occurred before that date are time-barred and, thus, not actionable.⁴ As such, Plaintiffs' only actionable disciplinary action is the February 2, 2016 Final Written Warning issued by Store Manager Miranda.⁵

Plaintiffs also allege the following discrete discriminatory acts: (i) that younger employees were promoted to management, while Mr. Feliciano was denied such promotions due to the disciplinary memoranda in his personnel file (failure to promote); and (ii) that, on at least one instance, the Store Manager gave corporate accounts to other Retail Sales Consultants, but not to Mr. Feliciano (failure to assign work). See Findings of Fact ¶ 118. Plaintiffs fail to provide any indication as to when these claims occurred, thereby preventing the Court from assessing whether these claims are also time-barred. Because the Court must view the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court shall assume without deciding that these claims occurred after February 13, 2015.

III. ADEA Claims

The Court now turns to the crux of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint: unlawful age discrimination and retaliation.

Pursuant to the ADEA, it is "unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire . . . or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). Under this statute, an employer may take an adverse action against an employee for any reason, fair or unfair, so long as the action is not motivated by an age-based discriminatory animus. Hidalgo v. Overseas Condado Ins. Agencies, Inc., 120 F.3d 328, 337 (1st Cir. 1997). Therefore, an employee has the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, "that age was the 'but-for' cause of the employer's adverse action." Acevedo-Parrilla v. Novartis Ex-Lax, Inc., 696 F.3d 128, 138 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009)).⁶

The framework for proving intentional age discrimination varies depending on the availability of direct evidence. See id. "Direct evidence normally contemplates only those statements by a decisionmaker that directly reflect the alleged animus and bear squarely on the contested employment decision." Vesprini v. Shaw Contract Flooring Servs., Inc., 315 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 2002) (quotation marks and citations omitted). It "does not include stray remarks in the workplace, particularly those made by nondecision-makers or statements made by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process itself." Ayala-Gerena v. Bristol Myers-Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 86, 96 (1st Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).

Here, the record contains no evidence of discriminatory statements made by a decisionmaker directly related to the adverse actions alleged by Plaintiffs.⁷ Therefore, absent direct evidence of intentional discrimination, Plaintiffs must meet the burden-shifting framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), which requires that

the plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case for age discrimination by showing that (i) [he] was at least 40; (ii) [his] work was sufficient to meet the employer's legitimate expectations; (iii) [his] employer took adverse action against [him]; and (iv) either younger persons were retained in the same position upon [his] termination or the employer did not treat age neutrally in taking the adverse action.

Del Valle-Santana v. Servicios Legales de P.R., Inc., 804 F.3d 127, 129-30 (1st Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Establishing a prima facie case creates a rebuttable presumption of discrimination and shifts the burden to the employer to articulate a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Id. If the employer meets this burden of production, the presumption vanishes and the plaintiff "must elucidate specific facts which would enable a jury to find that the...