Laschke v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 2D99-2081.

Citation766 So.2d 1076
Decision Date30 June 2000
Docket NumberNo. 2D99-2081.,2D99-2081.
PartiesJane LASCHKE and Rudolph Laschke, Appellants, v. BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORPORATION, individually and as successor by merger to The American Tobacco Company, a foreign corporation, and Lorillard Tobacco Company, a foreign corporation, Appellees.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Florida (US)

Howard M. Acosta, St. Petersburg, for Appellants.

Joseph W. Hatchett, C. Lawrence Stagg and Margaret D. Mathews of Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, P.A., Tampa, and Kenneth J. Reilly of Shook, Hardy & Bacon, L.L.P., Miami, for Appellee Lorillard Tobacco Company.

Daniel F. Molony, Richard M. Zabak and Michael P. Winter of Shackleford, Farrior, Stallings & Evans, P.A., Tampa, and William E. Hoffmann, Jr. of King and Spalding, Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellee Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company.

CAMPBELL, Acting Chief Judge.

Appellants, Jane and Rudolph Laschke (the Laschkes), challenge the trial court's final summary judgment entered in favor of Appellees, Lorillard Tobacco Company and Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, individually and as a successor by merger to The American Tobacco Company (collectively Appellees). We affirm in part and reverse in part.

The Laschkes' second amended complaint seeks damages for injuries suffered by Jane Laschke allegedly due to prolonged cigarette smoking. The complaint alleges that Mrs. Laschke began smoking in 1956 at the approximate age of sixteen. She continued smoking until she was diagnosed with throat cancer in 1995. Discovery indicates that Mrs. Laschke smoked Appellees' brands of cigarettes from 1956 through 1972 and other brands until 1995.

All of the counts of the Laschkes' second amended complaint are based on product liability theories. The Laschkes sought recovery from Appellees in three counts: Count I for negligence, including allegations of negligent design resulting in an inherently dangerous product unfit for the purpose for which it was manufactured and marketed, and failure to warn of the dangers posed by cigarettes as an inherently dangerous product; Count III for strict liability, including allegations of defective design resulting in an inherently dangerous product, and failure to warn of the dangers inherent in cigarette smoking; and Count V for conspiracy to commit fraud, including allegations of both misrepresentation of material facts and concealment of material facts.

The posture of this case before us makes meaningful review of the final summary judgment difficult to say the least. Appellees' motions sought final summary judgment based on eight different legal grounds. No one ground is dispositive of the entire case. The final summary judgment entered by the trial court contains no findings concerning any of the eight grounds raised. Rather, without any discussion of the issues raised by either party, the court simply entered summary judgment for Appellees "based upon all of the grounds asserted and argued...." Neither of the parties chose to provide this court with a transcript of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment. In the absence of a transcript of the hearing and a reasoned discussion of the issues, we are left with no meaningful legal analysis to review.

Despite these deficiencies, or perhaps because of them, we conclude that the record before us demonstrates that there are genuine issues of material fact that remain to be resolved. A defendant's motion for summary judgment is not a vehicle to test the sufficiency of the evidence to support a plaintiff's claims. See Meigs v. Lear, 191 So.2d 286, 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966)

. Rather, a defendant's motion for summary judgment can determine only whether there is a complete absence of evidence to support the plaintiff's claims. Id.; see also Holl v. Talcott, 191 So.2d 40, 43-44 (Fla.1966). In this case, the parties dispute numerous factual issues, including when Mrs. Laschke smoked Appellees' brands, whether Mrs. Laschke relied on specific advertisements, whether her reliance on these advertisements caused her to continue smoking, and whether Mrs. Laschke was actually addicted to cigarettes. Appellees contend that the Laschkes' allegations on these matters are not supported by record evidence and so any dispute should be resolved in their favor. We decline to do so. To the extent that the final summary judgment is based in any way on a resolution of disputed facts, it is reversed.

Having determined that the Laschkes' claims are not defeated as a matter of fact, it remains for us to determine whether any of the Laschkes' claims are defeated as a matter of law so as to warrant the entry of summary judgment in favor of Appellees. Appellees advance two theories to defeat portions of the Laschkes' claims as a matter of law. First, Appellees argue that the Laschkes' claims based on a failure to warn and their conspiracy claim based on concealment are preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (the Labeling Act). Second, Appellees argue that the Laschkes' conspiracy to commit fraud claims are barred by the fraud statute of repose. See § 95.031(2), Fla. Stat. (1995). We agree with Appellees as to their first argument, but disagree as to the second.

The preemption issue is controlled by Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992). In Cipollone, the Supreme Court held that the preemptive scope of the Labeling Act is governed by the express language of section 5(b), which states:

No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act.
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