Herndon by Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 11 July 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-2525,HILL-CARRBORO,95-2525
• Parties: , 110 Ed. Law Rep. 1037 Aric HERNDON, a minor, by Christiana and John HERNDON, as Guardians; Christiana Herndon, as Guardian of Aric Herndon, a minor, and in her own right; John Herndon, as Guardian of Aric Herndon, a minor, and in his own right; John Reinhard, III, a minor, by John and Ellen Reinhard, as Guardians; John Reinhard, as Guardian of John Reinhard III, a minor, and in his own right; Ellen Reinhard, as Guardian of John Reinhard III, a minor, and in her own right, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHAPELCITY BOARD OF EDUCATION; Ken Touw, in his official capacity as member of the Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Board of Education; Sue Baker, in her official capacity as member of the Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Board of Education; Lavonda Burnette, in her official capacity as member of the Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Board of Education; Mary Bushnell, in her official capacity as member of the Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Board of Education; Judith Ortiz, in her official capacity as member of the Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Board of Education; Ruth Royster, in her official capacity as member of the Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Board of Education; Neil G. Pedersen, in his official capacity as Superintendent of Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Schools, Defendants-Appellees. Kate Breen; Amy Cloud; Amy Rouse; American Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities; North Carolina School Boards Association, Amici Curiae.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 174

89 F.3d 174

65 USLW 2075, 110 Ed. Law Rep. 1037

Aric HERNDON, a minor, by Christiana and John HERNDON, as Guardians; Christiana Herndon, as Guardian of Aric Herndon a minor, and in her own right; John Herndon, as Guardian of Aric Herndon, a minor, and in his own right; John Reinhard III, a minor, by John and Ellen Reinhard, as Guardians John Reinhard, as Guardian of John Reinhard III, a minor and in his own right; Ellen Reinhard, as Guardian of John Reinhard III, a minor, and in her own right, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHAPEL HILL-CARRBORO CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION; Ken Touw, in his official capacity as member of the Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Board of Education; Sue Baker, in her official capacity as member of the Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Board of Education; Lavonda Burnette, in her official capacity as member of the Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Board of Education; Mary Bushnell, in her official capacity as member of the Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Board of Education; Judith Ortiz, in her official capacity as member of the Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Board of Education; Ruth Royster, in her official capacity as member of the Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Board of Education; Neil G. Pedersen, in his official capacity as Superintendent of Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Schools, Defendants-Appellees. Kate Breen; Amy Cloud; Amy Rouse; American Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities; North Carolina School Boards Association, Amici Curiae.

No. 95-2525.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued March 5, 1996.

Decided July 11, 1996.

ARGUED: Scott Glenn Bullock, Institute for Justice, Washington, DC, for Appellants. John Gregory McCormick, John G. McCormick, P.A., Chapel Hill, North Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: William H. Mellor, III, Clint D. Bolick, Institute for Justice, Washington, DC, for Appellants. Eric W. Hinson, John G. McCormick, P.A., Chapel Hill, North Carolina; Rex E. Lee, Joseph R. Guerra, Dennis D. Hirsch, Michael J. Raphael, Sidley & Austin, Washington, DC; for

Appellees. Richard Schwartz, Schwartz & Associates, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Amici Curiae Breen, Cloud, Rouse, and American Alliance. Ann L. Majestic, Ruth T. Dowling, Kathleen C. Boyd, Tharrington Smith, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Amicus Curiae School Boards Association.

Before ERVIN and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge ERVIN wrote the opinion, in which Judge NIEMEYER and Senior Judge BUTZNER joined.

OPINION

ERVIN, Circuit Judge.

The Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Schools require as a condition of graduation that high school students perform fifty hours of community service. Two students and their parents sued the Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Board of Education, the individual board members, and the system superintendent (collectively "the district"). The plaintiffs charged that the community-service requirement violates the students' constitutional rights to freedom from involuntary servitude, personal liberty, and privacy; and the parents' constitutional right to direct the upbringing and education of their children. They sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction prohibiting implementation of the requirement. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the district, finding that the requirement does not violate the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. We agree, and therefore affirm.

I.

Subject matter jurisdiction in the district court was proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202, and 1331. We have appellate jurisdiction over the district court's summary judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the summary judgment de novo. E.g., Goodman v. RTC, 7 F.3d 1123, 1126 (4th Cir.1993).

II.

The facts are not in dispute, so we adopt the statement from the district court's opinion:

Defendant Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Board of Education is a governmental agency and body corporate organized under the education code of North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-40. Its members are charged with administering the Chapel Hill-Carrboro City School System. The system's high school, Chapel Hill High School, is located in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, and had a 1994-95 enrollment of 2,061 students in grades nine through twelve. Defendants Ken Touw, Sue Baker, Lavonda Burnette, Mary Bushnell, Judith Ortiz, Mark Royster, and Ruth Royster were, at the time this action was filed, individuals holding elective office as members of the Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Board of Education and each is sued in his or her official capacity.

At the time this action was filed, Defendant Neil G. Pedersen was superintendent of the Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Schools and an agent and employee of Defendant Board of Education. Defendant Pedersen is sued in his official capacity.

Beginning with the graduating class of 1997, students enrolled in the Chapel Hill-Carrboro School System are required to complete fifty (50) hours of community service during grades nine through twelve as a condition to receiving a diploma. ¹ Failure to complete the Program makes a student ineligible for graduation and the Program does not contain an opt-out provision for students who object to performing community service. The community service required by the Program must be performed after school, on weekends or holidays, or over summer recesses. Students are required to perform a minimum of two different types of service. Clerical work is limited to no more than eight (8) hours, as are fundraising activities. The community service coordinator at Chapel Hill High School keeps on file a list of approved agencies and organizations for whom students may work to satisfy the requirements of the Program. The list of organizations for which students may work is extensive and includes many with significantly different purposes and philosophies.

Students may also receive credit for service performed for organizations which are not included on the list of approved organizations. However, in order for a student to receive credit for service performed for an organization not included on the list, a student must receive approval from the Service Learning Committee, a group of teachers, students, and members of community organizations charged with administering the Program. Ultimately, however, the principal of the high school is the final decision-maker concerning community service credit.

Services for which students receive monetary compensation or which are required as a form of restitution cannot be used to satisfy the requirements of the Program. Credit may not be received for service to a for-profit organization unless the service provides a benefit to the clients of such organization that they otherwise would not receive. Service provided to a group such as a church or student club, which primarily benefits the organization's members, will not be approved. Neither may activities that promote political parties or individual candidates be credited. Students must set their own work schedule and provide their own transportation to and from the location at which they perform community service. The organizations for which students perform their services are responsible for providing any training or necessary supervision. When students arrive to perform their service, students must sign in with the organization and a contact person with the organization must document the hours the student works. Students are required to turn verified time sheets in to the school. Each time a student performs service for an organization, he or she is thereafter required to reflect on any "memories or special feelings" gained from the particular service experience. After students complete the fifty (50) hours of required service, they must submit a one-to-two-page paper reflecting on their service experiences.

899 F.Supp. 1443, 1446-47 (1995) (citation to appendix omitted).

III.

The plaintiffs do not appeal the district court's finding that the service requirement does not intrude on the students' right to privacy. We address individually the remaining constitutional issues.

A.

The parents argue that the service requirement "violates parents' right to direct and control the upbringing and education of their children secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." That right is fundamental, they contend, so any infringement of it is subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Unless the district can demonstrate a compelling interest in implementing the service requirement, they assert, and can show that the requirement is narrowly tailored to advance that interest in the manner least restrictive of the parents' right, the requirement cannot survive strict scrutiny.

The parents' argument is controlled by the substantive due process branch of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. Under that body of law, courts examine whether government intrusions into citizens' liberties are justified by adequate state interests. We apply a tiered framework of analysis, subjecting infringements on liberties deemed constitutionally "fundamental" to a heightened or "strict" level of judicial scrutiny, and examining encroachments on lesser rights under "the traditional standard of review, which requires only that the [challenged state action] be shown to bear some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes." San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37-40, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1299-1300, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973).

The Supreme Court long has recognized the existence of parents' right to direct their children's education. It first did so nearly seventy-five years ago in Meyer v. Nebraska in which a teacher appealed his conviction for teaching German in violation of state law. 262 U.S. 390, 396-97, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923). "[W]ithin the liberty of the [Fourteenth] Amendment," the Court held, is a right of parents to seek German instruction for their children. Id. at 400, 43 S.Ct. at 627. Two years after Meyer,...