Hudson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 170

Citation89 S.E.2d 441,242 N.C. 650
Decision Date12 October 1955
Docket NumberNo. 170,170
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of North Carolina
Parties, 36 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2761, 28 Lab.Cas. P 69,496 ; Luther Jefferson DeVane; William Rush Chishoim; Joe Marion Tilley; Herbert Lewis Darden; Thomas Alfred Shepard, Jr.; Irvin Eldridge Rackley; John Hubert Shannon; Clark Weldon Poisson; John Monroe Binkley; for and on behalf of Themselves and all Other Employees of Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company in North Carolina With a Common or General Interest, v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY; International Association of Machinists; International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders & Heipers of America; International Brotherhood of Blacksmiths, Drop Forgers and Helpers; Sheet Metal Workers International Association; International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers; Brotherhood of Rallway Carmen of America; International Brotherhood of Firemen, Oilers, Helpers, Roundhouse and Railway Shop Laborers; Brotherhood of Rallway and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees; Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees; the Order of Railroad Telegraphers; Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen of America; Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union; American Train Dispatchers Association. Supreme Court of North Carolina

Lester P. Schoene, Milton Kramer, Washington, D. C., and George Rountree, Jr., Wilmington, for defendant unions, appellants.

L. P. McLendon, Thornton H. Brooks, Greensboro, and R. S. McClelland, Wilmington, for plaintiffs, appellees.

M. V. Barnhill, Jr., and Alan A. Marshall, Wilmington, for defendant Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., appellee.

BOBBITT, Justice.

Is a union shop agreement, complying in all respects with the provisions of the Union Shop Amendment to the Railway Labor Act, Act of Congress, Jan. 10, 1951, ch. 1220, 64 Stat. 1238, 45 U.S.C.A. § 152, Eleventh, hereinafter called Union Shop Amendment, void under the North Carolina statute, sometimes called the Right to Work Act, Session Laws of 1947, ch. 328, G.S. § 95-78 et seq., hereinafter called the 1947 Act or the North Carolina statute? This question, of primary importance to decision, must be answered, 'No.' The reasons are stated below.

A closed shop agreement, a fortiori a union shop agreement, has been recognized as valid in most jurisdictions unless abrogated or restricted by statute. 31 Am.Jur. 876, Labor, sec. 108, 1954 Cumulative Supplement, p. 99; 56 C.J.S., Master and Servant, § 28(40), p. 192. In the absence of statute, Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. IV, sec. 788, under the caption, 'Closed Shop,' gives the generally accepted rule as follows: 'Restriction of employment by an employer throughout his business, or on specified jobs within it, to workers who are members of a labor union, or of a particular union, is a proper object of concerted action by his employees.'

It was so decided in North Carolina in State v. Van Pelt, 136 N.C. 633, 49 S.E. 177, 189, 68 L.R.A. 760, 1 Ann.Cas. 495. The court's opinion by Connor, J., and the concurring opinion of Clark, C. J., set forth cogently the reasons in support of this view. As expressed succinctly by Clark, C. J.: 'It was not unlawful for the carpenters' union to try to induce the prosecutor to employ none but members of their union, neither illegal threats nor violence or other unlawful means being used; nor was it forbidden by any law to publish the fact of his refusal, and to ask those friendly to their organization not to patronize him.'

But the common law in North Carolina as so declared by this Court in 1904 was abrogated by the 1947 Act of our General Assembly, which declared the public policy of North Carolina to be 'that the right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or nonmembership in any labor union or labor organization or association. ' Specifically, the 1947 Act provides (1) that union membership shall not be required or forbidden as a condition of employment or continuation therein; (2) that no employer shall require, as a condition of employment, the payment of dues or other fees to any labor union; and (3) that any agreement between an employer and a labor union requiring such membership or payments as a condition of employment shall be unlawful. The 1947 Act, challenged as violative of provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions, was held by this Court a valid and constitutional exercise of legislative power by our General Assembly. State v. Whitaker, 228 N.C. 352, 45 S.E.2d 860; State v. Bishop, 228 N.C. 371, 45 S.E.2d 858. See also, In re Port Publishing Co., 231 N.C. 395, 57 S.E.2d 366, 14 A.L.R.2d 842. In State v. Bishop, supra, it was held that an act in violation of the statute was a misdemeanor.

The Whitaker case and a Nebraska case, involving substantially the same questions, were considered together, upon appeals to the Supreme Court of the United States; and the citation to the reported decision bears the caption of the Nebraska case. The decision of this Court was affirmed. Lincoln Federal Labor Union, etc. v. Northwestern I. & M. Co., 335 U.S. 525, 69 S.Ct. 251, 93 L.Ed. 212. See also, American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 69 S.Ct. 258, 93 L.Ed. 222, 6 A.L.R.2d 481.

The 1947 Act of our General Assembly embodied substantially the provisions of constitutional amendments and legislative enactments adopted in some seventeen states. Persuasive arguments were and are urged in favor of and against this legislation. It was not for this Court to say whether such legislation was desirable, appropriate or wise. Nor did this Court undertake to approve or disapprove the public policy of North Carolina as expressed in the 1947 Act. But it was determined, as stated by Seawell, J., that it is for the legislative power to delineate 'the area within which two factions with largely conflicting aims may wage their disputes without transgressing the public welfare.' [228 N.C. 352, 45 S.E.2d 873.]

In the Whitaker case, Seawell, J., for this Court, and Mr. Justice Black, for the Supreme Court of the United States, reviewed the history of labor legislation and related court decisions. A restatement thereof is unnecessary. Suffice it to say that the conclusion reached was that state constitutional and legislative provisions, such as those embodied in our 1947 Act, are valid except to the extent they conflict with an Act of Congress enacted within the orbit of Congressional authority.

It is clear that the proposed union shop agreement is in direct conflict with the 1947 Act. Nothing else appearing, such agreement would be void. It is equally clear that the Union Shop Amendment does not invalidate the 1947 Act. Except to the extent Congress, in enacting labor legislation related to interstate commerce, has preempted the field, the 1947 Act is in full force and effect. Local Union No. 10, etc., A. F. of L. v. Graham, 345 U.92, 73 S.Ct. 585, 97 L.Ed. 946. Our attention, therefore, must turn to the Union Shop Amendment.

Upon adoption of the Railway Labor Act, May 20, 1926, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577, Congress 'made a fresh start toward the peaceful settlement of labor disputes affecting railroads '. Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 57 S.Ct. 592, 597, 81 L.Ed. 789. This Act, as amended, is now codified as 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. The basic principle underlying this Act is embodied in these provisions: 'Employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. The majority of any craft or class of employees shall have the right to determine who shall be the representative of the craft or class for the purposes of this chapter.' 45 U.S.C.A. § 152, Fourth. In the case cited, the Supreme Court of the United States sustained the constitutionality of the Railway Labor Act, both under the commerce clause, Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, and as to the Fifth Amendment, in relation to the requirement that the carrier treat exclusively with the employees' duly chosen bargaining representative. As stated by Mr. Justice Stone (later Chief Justice): 'The power of Congress over interstate commerce extends to such regulations of the relations of rail carriers to their employees as are reasonably calculated to prevent the interruption of interstate commerce by strikes and their attendant disorders. * * * It was for Congress to make the choice of the means by which its objective of securing the uninterrupted service of interstate railroads was to be secured, and its judgment, supported as it is by our long experience with industrial disputes, and the history of railroad labor relations, to which we have referred, is not open to review here.'

As enacted in 1926, the Railway Labor Act, contained no provision as to union shop agreements. But, as amended by Act of June 21, 1934, 48 Stat. 1185, it was provided that no carrier should require any employee to join or not to join any labor organization as a condition of employment nor should any carrier deduct from the wages of employees any dues, etc., payable to labor organizations. 45 U.S.C.A. § 152, Fourth and Fifth.

It is of interest to note that the 1934 amendments were supported by labor organizations because of the prevalence then of so-called 'company-dominated' unions. The labor organizations sought to restrict the ban on union shop agreements to such local unions or associations, but Congress saw fit to make the provision apply to all unions. Report No. 2811, 7 August, 1950, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 81st Congress, 2d Session, House Miscellaneous Reports, Vol. VI; Report No. 2263, 9 August, 1950, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 81st Congress, 2d Session, Senate Miscellaneous Reports, Vol. V. As intended, the 1934 legislation invalidated union shop agreements theretofore in effect. Brotherhood of Railroad Shop Crafts, etc., v. Lowden, 10 Cir., 86 F.2d 458, 108 A.L.R....

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