Ridge v. State

• Decision Date: 30 June 1921
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 406
• Citation: 206 Ala. 349,89 So. 742
• Parties: RIDGE v. STATE ex rel. TATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

89 So. 742

206 Ala. 349

RIDGE v. STATE ex rel. TATE.

6 Div. 406

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 30, 1921

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; Richard Evans, Judge.

Bill by the State of Alabama on the relation of Joseph R. Tate, as Solicitor of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, against Nora J Ridge, to abate a nuisance. From an order overruling demurrers to the bill and granting the writ, respondent appeals. Affirmed.

C.B Powell, of Birmingham, for appellant.

Harwell G. Davis, Atty. Gen., for the State.

SOMERVILLE J.

This proceeding is filed under the act approved February 12, 1919 (Gen.Acts 1919, p. 52), which is entitled:

"An act to declare and abate nuisances defined in the act, and to prescribe procedure, remedies, punishments, and penalties."

The nuisances dealt with by the act (section 1) are defined as:

Any "building, erection, or place or any separate part or portion thereof, or the ground itself; *** in or upon which lewdness, assignation or prostitution is conducted permitted, continued, or exists, and the personal property and contents used in conducting or maintaining any such place for any such purpose."

Appellant contends that the subject of the act is not "clearly expressed in the title," as required by section 45 of the Constitution. The meaning and construction of that provision has been often considered by this court.

In Mobile Trans. Co. v. City of Mobile, 128 Ala. 335, 30 So. 645, 64 L.R.A. 333, 86 Am.St.Rep. 143, it was said:

"The object of this provision of the Constitution was to prevent surprise and fraud, in passing laws under misleading titles. It should not, therefore, be construed so as to defeat, by too technical an application, legislation not clearly within the evil aimed at. If the title of an act is single and directs the mind to the subject of the law in a way calculated to direct the attention truly to the matter which is proposed to be legislated upon, the object of the provision is satisfied. In such case, the generality of the title, not defining the particulars of the proposed legislation, would be more apt to excite general attention than otherwise, since the general words would give warning that everything within their limits might be affected and thus draw the attention of the whole body of legislators while narrower words only interest those concerned with the matters specially named. It is, therefore, held that the generality of the title is no objection if it may comprehend the particulars of the body of the act, and that the act must be upheld if the subject may be comprehended in the title."

In Ballentyne v. Wickersham, 75 Ala. 536, which discusses the subject at length, and is the leading authority in this state, it was said that the subject, as stated in the title, "may be as broad and comprehensive as the Legislature may choose to make it."

The subject of the act here in question is the abatement of certain nuisances by appropriate procedure and penalties. There is nothing in the generality of the title which is calculated to mislead or deceive as to the subject-matter of the act. Nor does the act contain more than one subject. It was necessary to define the nuisances intended to be abated, and every provision found in the act is cognate to its title, and germane to its one comprehensive purpose. We hold, therefore, that the act, as to its title and substance, does not offend section 45 of the Constitution.

In the abatement of nuisances by writ of injunction, the court of chancery exercises its inherent jurisdiction, and the proceeding therefore is strictly civil in its nature. Unaided by statute, the power of the court is limited to the suppression of the nuisance, and does not extend to the confiscation or destruction of property, the mere use of which creates or contributes to the offense. Radney v. Town of Ashland, 199 Ala. 635, 75 So. 25, L.R.A.1917E, 366; Cuba v. Miss. C.O. Co., 150 Ala. 259, 43 So. 706; Chenango, etc., Co. v. Paige, 83 N.Y. 178, 38 Am.Rep. 407; 29 Cyc. 1250.

It is however, within the power of the Legislature to confer upon courts of chancery the authority to condemn and confiscate the property of individuals by them...