U.S. v. Caves

Decision Date22 November 1989
Docket Number88-5512,Nos. 88-5511,s. 88-5511
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jimmie Calvin CAVES, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Chloe Kathleen GORMAN, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Stuart Southerland, Tulsa, Okl., for Caves.

Barry V. Voss, Minneapolis, Minn., for Gorman.

John M. Lee, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellee.

Before ARNOLD, Circuit Judge, HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and BEAM, Circuit Judge.

HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge.

Jimmie Calvin Caves and Chloe Kathleen Gorman were indicted on counts of interstate travel to distribute controlled substances, and aiding and abetting such travel, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 2, 1952 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and aiding and abetting such possession, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a)(1) (1982) and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2; and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and aiding and abetting such possession, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(b)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. V 1987) and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2. They moved to exclude evidence seized during a warrantless roadside search of their automobile and a later search of the vehicle conducted pursuant to a warrant at a police station house. In addition, Gorman challenged the admissibility of evidence obtained from two inventory searches of her purse conducted subsequent to her being taken into custody. After the district court 1 adopted the magistrate's 2 order denying their motions to suppress, the defendants entered guilty pleas on the condition that they be allowed to withdraw their pleas if this court reversed the district court's ruling on their motions to suppress. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2). We affirm.

I.

At around 10:50 p.m. on July 21, 1988, a Minnesota state trooper made a roadside stop of the Ford LTD being driven by Caves and in which Gorman was a passenger, after clocking the vehicle's speed at seventy-six miles per hour in a sixty-five miles-per-hour zone. The LTD bore Oklahoma license plates and had been travelling northward on Interstate 35 approximately four miles north of Owatonna, Minnesota. As the police officer approached on foot from the rear of the automobile, Caves got out and met him before the officer reached the vehicle. The trooper told Caves that he had been stopped for speeding and asked to see his driver's license and evidence of automobile insurance. Caves produced an Oklahoma license and asked Gorman, who was still in the LTD, to obtain insurance documentation from the glove compartment, which she did. The trooper then requested that Caves return to the squad car with him.

While Caves was in the squad car discussing the speeding violation, the patrolman smelled an intense odor of burnt marijuana on Caves's person and breath. On at least two prior occasions, the trooper had received law enforcement training in the identification of the odor of burnt marijuana, and he recognized the smell on Caves without difficulty. Without informing Caves of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the patrolman advised Caves that the automobile would be searched for marijuana, adding that Caves "may as well tell [him] where the marijuana [is] in the car." Caves first responded by saying he had "littered the highway with it," but then admitted that marijuana was in the console compartment of the front seat.

Joined by another patrolman, the trooper conducted a pat search of Caves, removing approximately $700.00 in cash from his pockets. The trooper then instructed Gorman to get out of the LTD and stand outside while he searched the passenger compartment.

The trooper discovered cigarette papers and two clear plastic bags of suspected marijuana in the console compartment between the driver's and front-passenger's seats. A can of aerosol disinfectant was under the armrest. The patrolman was aware that aerosol disinfectants are used to conceal the odor of large quantities of controlled substances in a given area. He then removed the keys from the ignition and opened the trunk. The trooper noticed a sheet of shiny galvanized metal spanning the width of the bottom of the trunk area and affixed by sheet metal screws. The metal sheet sealed off the spare tire compartment. The spare tire was sitting on the metal along with other items, including luggage belonging to Caves and Gorman and a cardboard box labelled "telephone." In the "telephone" box was an electronic digital scale capable of weighing gram amounts.

The trooper took Caves and Gorman to the local station house for what he termed "investigation purposes" and impounded the vehicle until a warrant could be obtained to search the concealed space. At the station house, the police took and inventoried the defendants' personal property, including Gorman's purse.

On the next morning the patrolman applied for a warrant to search all of the LTD, including the concealed space in its trunk. The warrant contained the following pertinent language: "Controlled Substances/Documents such as but not limited to, invoices and receipts indicating possession of property." The subsequent search that morning resulted in some eighty pounds of suspected marijuana being seized from behind the sheet-metal enclosure, as well as a significant quantity of suspected cocaine, a variety of suspected controlled substances in pill form, and about $25,000.00 in cash.

On the following Monday, July 25, 1988, a special agent of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) Task Force took the defendants into federal custody. The DEA agent also took the personal belongings that had been inventoried earlier, and he conducted a second search of those items. Found in Gorman's purse were suspected drug notations, cash and pills.

II.

Caves and Gorman first contend that the warrantless roadside search of their automobile violated their fourth amendment rights and that therefore the evidence obtained from that search is inadmissible.

The fourth amendment guarantee of the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures" is "preserved by a requirement that searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by an independent judicial officer." California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 2068-69, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985). In certain circumstances, however, a search may comport with the fourth amendment reasonableness standard even though not conducted pursuant to a warrant. See id. One such exemption to the warrant requirement is the so-called "automobile exception," which allows a police officer who has lawfully made a roadside stop of an automobile to search that vehicle without a warrant if probable cause exists to believe that contraband or evidence of criminal activity is located inside. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). This exception is recognized because "[t]he mobility of automobiles ... 'creates circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible' " and because " 'the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's home or office.' " Carney, 471 U.S. at 391, 105 S.Ct. at 2069 (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3096, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976)).

The scope of this warrantless search may be as extensive as that of a search authorized by a warrant supported by probable cause and "particularly describing the place to be searched." United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2160, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). Police may search throughout both the passenger compartment and trunk of the automobile. See id. at 825, 102 S.Ct. at 2173. They may examine the contents of all containers, packages and compartments located in the vehicle, provided that there is probable cause to believe that the object of the search will be found there. See id.

Probable cause for an automobile search exists if the facts and circumstances known by the police when they began the search were "sufficient in themselves" for a person "of reasonable caution" to believe that contraband or evidence of criminal activity was in the vehicle. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310-11, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949); Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162, 45 S.Ct. at 288. We do not examine each fact known by the police in isolation, but rather we consider "the totality of the circumstances" in determining whether probable cause existed for the search. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2328, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). We are also aware that "a 'trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions ... that might well elude an untrained person,' and evidence collected 'must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.' " United States v. Reed, 882 F.2d 147, 149 (5th Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)).

Caves and Gorman argue that the trooper did not have probable cause to conduct the roadside search. Although the police officer smelled burnt marijuana when Caves was in the squad car, the officer did not detect the odor of any unused marijuana on Caves's person. Also, the officer did not smell any marijuana, burned or unburned, emanating from Caves's automobile. The defendants contend that while the odor of burnt marijuana on Caves's person and breath was evidence of his past use of this drug, or presence in an area where the drug was used, it was not sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for inferring the immediate presence of unused marijuana in the automobile.

The...

To continue reading

Request your trial
101 cases
  • US v. McKibben
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota
    • 21 Mayo 1996
    ...vehicle at the Law Enforcement Center. See United States v. Chaidez, 906 F.2d 377, 385 (8th Cir.1990); see also, United States v. Caves, 890 F.2d 87, 92, n. 4 (8th Cir.1989). The officers had probable cause to search the vehicle both at the scene and at the Law Enforcement Center. The fact ......
  • U.S. v. Elkins
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee
    • 6 Marzo 2000
    ...(emphasis added). In support the government cites United States v. Garza, 10 F.3d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir.1993) and United States v. Caves, 890 F.2d 87, 89 (8th Cir.1989). The court agrees that the smell of marijuana alone could be sufficient to supply the probable cause for the issuance of the......
  • U.S. v. O'Connell
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa
    • 7 Diciembre 2005
    ...without a warrant if probable cause exists to believe that contraband or evidence of criminal activity is located inside. United States v. Caves, 890 F.2d 87, 89-90 (citations omitted). The automobile search exception has two justifications: "ready mobility" and "the individual's reduced ex......
  • U.S. v. Mims
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota
    • 18 Junio 2008
    ...which the general public may find innocuous.'" United States v. Mendoza, 421 F.3d 663, 667 (8th Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Caves, 890 F.2d 87, 94 (8th Cir.1989)). Furthermore, "[b]ecause probable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, rather t......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT