PARK & PLANNING COMMISSION v. Anderson
| Decision Date | 30 September 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 00080,00080 |
| Citation | PARK & PLANNING COMMISSION v. Anderson, 884 A.2d 157, 164 Md. App. 540 (Md. App. 2005) |
| Parties | MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING COMMISSION v. Kathleen ANDERSON. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
William C. Dickerson(Devin J. Doolan, Jr., on the brief), Riverdale, for appellant.
Michael Marshall, Baltimore, for appellee.
Panel: HOLLANDER, JAMES R. EYLER, LAWRENCE F. RODOWSKY(Retired, specially assigned), JJ.
In this case of first impression, we must determine whether a police department is entitled to judicial review of a "not guilty" finding rendered by a hearing board convened pursuant to the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights ("LEOBR"), Md. Code(2003),Title 3, Subtitle 1 of the Public Safety Article("P.S.").1The appeal arises from an alleged unauthorized vehicular pursuit conducted by Kathleen Anderson, appellee, an officer with the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission(the "Commission"), appellant.
As a result of Anderson's conduct, appellant initiated disciplinary proceedings under LEOBR.After an "Administrative Hearing Board"(the "Board") found appellee not guilty of engaging in an unauthorized vehicular pursuit, the Commission filed a "Petition for Appeal" with the Circuit Court for Prince George's County.Concluding that the Commission was not entitled to judicial review, the circuit court granted Anderson's motion to dismiss.
On appeal, the Commission presents two issues, which we quote:
For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm.
The Commission is a body corporate and an agency of the State.SeeMd.Code Ann.(1957, 2003 Repl.Vol.), Art. 28, § 1-101.Recently, in Boyle v. Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Comm'n,385 Md. 142, 146, 867 A.2d 1050(2005), the Court of Appeals outlined the rights and responsibilities of the Commission:
The Commission is a bi-county agency created by the General Assembly to develop both general and functional plans of proposed land development for the Washington Metropolitan District, which consists of most of Montgomery and Prince George's Counties.SeeMaryland Code, Art. 28, § 7-108.That is the main "planning" function.In carrying out the general plan, the Commission is authorized to acquire property within the District for roads, parks, forests, and other recreation facilities, and to improve and control such property for those purposes.Seeid.§ 5-101.That is the main "park" function.
Pursuant to Art. 28, § 5-114(a), the Commission "may appoint whatever park police officers as may be necessary to provide protection for the Commission's activities and property."These officers "are responsible to and are under the supervision of the Commission."Boyle,385 Md. at 146, 867 A.2d 1050.The park police also "have concurrent general police jurisdiction with the Montgomery and Prince George's County police within the parks and other areas ... under the jurisdiction of the Commission...."Art. 28, § 5-114(a).
Regarding park police officers, the Boyle Court explained, 385 Md. at 146-47, 867 A.2d 1050(emphasis added):
[S]ome functions of the Commission are handled by the central Commission staff while others are implemented by geographically-based Divisions of the Commission within each of the two counties.Among the functions handled centrally are human resources, finance, and general counsel, and included within the finance department is general procurement for the Commission.Among the functions handled by Divisions within the respective counties is the police function.There is a separate Park PoliceDivision, headed by a Chief and having its own command and administrative structure, in each of the two counties.
Since 1998, appellee has served as a Park Police Officer.On September 8, 2001, she was assigned to the midnight shift for the Prince George's County Park Police Division("the Division"),2 operating a marked police cruiser equipped with an in-car computer and camera.At approximately 10:30 p.m. on that date, while appellee was on a two-lane residential road in Prince George's County(the "County"), she activated the emergency lights on her patrol car, intending to stop a vehicle bearing license plates that had been reported as stolen.When the vehicle did not stop, appellee activated the siren on her patrol car, and remained in contact with the Division's "communications" by means of her police radio.At that point, the suspect vehicle exceeded the posted speed limit, crossed the center line, and may have struck another vehicle.As the vehicle was moving, the occupants jumped out.Their vehicle continued to move, without a driver, and struck a telephone pole.
Notably, "[a]ny other pursuits are prohibited."
By "Memorandum" dated October 4, 2002, appellee was notified that she was charged as follows:
In light of the charges, the Division informed Anderson that it "intend[ed] to take the disciplinary measure of termination of employment...."Accordingly, appellee exercised her right to an administrative hearing, pursuant to P.S. § 3-107(a), which was held on March 13 and 14, 2003.
Captain Robert Ashton testified that he proposed the 2001amendment to BCD 414 so it would conform to the more restrictive vehicular pursuit policy adopted by the County.He explained that he wanted to avoid "extreme liability" for the agency.3
On October 10, 2001, Ashton spoke with Diane Robertson-Griggs, who claimed she was the driver of a sport utility vehicle struck by the suspect vehicle on September 8, 2001.Following that conversation, Captain Ashton asked Sergeant Daren Uhrig to "retrieve the in-car videotape from Officer Anderson."4He also "spoke with Officer Christopher Perry regarding what he saw on the scene when he went to back up Officer Anderson."Then, he"spoke with Lieutenant [Tom] Kane and made a verbal request for the radio transmission tapes regarding the incident."On October 17, 2001, after having reviewed the requested items, Ashton "wrote a complaint against police practice for this matter to be investigated further."
On cross-examination, Captain Ashton conceded that the mere activation of emergency equipment "doesn't mean you're in pursuit[.]"He also acknowledged that there are "occasions when you follow a vehicle and it's not a pursuit[.]"
Sergeant Uhrig was appellee's supervisor on the night of September 8, 2001.He recalled that, at approximately 10:30 p.m. on September 8, 2001, he was "listening to the [police] radio" when he overheard that "Officer Anderson had called out with a license plate."Uhrig testified:
According to Sergeant Uhrig, Lieutenant Tom Kane"wanted to know what occurred," and if "there was a fast chase."Uhrig questioned appellee about whether there was a chase, but she"said there wasn't."Uhrig testified: After speaking with Officer Anderson, Uhrig "didn't think a fast chase had occurred."He added: "From the information I had I felt that she handled it properly."
On the night of ...
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