Bouret-Echevarría v. Caribbean Aviation Maint. Corp.

• Decision Date: 24 April 2015
• Docket Number: No. 13–2549.,13–2549.
• Parties: Lizzette M. BOURET–ECHEVARRÍA, in her own capacity and in representation of her minor children; N.V.-B., minor; C.V.-B, minor; C.V.-B., minor, Plaintiffs, Appellants, José Antonio Montano; Diego Vidal–Lampón; Irma Iris Vidal–González; Marinieves Vidal–González; Diego Vidal–Shirley, Plaintiffs, v. CARIBBEAN AVIATION MAINTENANCE CORP.; Robinson Helicopter Company ; Chartis Insurance Company of Puerto Rico, a/k/a American International Insurance Company of Puerto Rico ; Pathfinder Indemnity Company Ltd.; D & O Aviation, Inc., Defendants, Appellees, Insurance Companies X, Y, and Z; Corporations A, B and C; John Doe; Richard Roe; ABC Insurance Companies; Def Insurance Company; Jane Doe, Corp.; JKL Insurance Company, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

784 F.3d 37

Lizzette M. BOURET–ECHEVARRÍA, in her own capacity and in representation of her minor children; N.V.-B., minor; C.V.-B, minor; C.V.-B., minor, Plaintiffs, Appellants

José Antonio Montano; Diego Vidal–Lampón; Irma Iris Vidal–González; Marinieves Vidal–González; Diego Vidal–Shirley, Plaintiffs

v.CARIBBEAN AVIATION MAINTENANCE CORP.; Robinson Helicopter Company ; Chartis Insurance Company of Puerto Rico, a/k/a American International Insurance Company of Puerto Rico ; Pathfinder Indemnity Company Ltd.; D & O Aviation, Inc., Defendants, Appellees

Insurance Companies X, Y, and Z; Corporations A, B and C; John Doe; Richard Roe; ABC Insurance Companies; Def Insurance Company; Jane Doe, Corp.; JKL Insurance Company, Defendants.

No. 13–2549.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

April 24, 2015.

David P. Angueira, for appellants.

Tim A. Goetz, with whom Cathrine E. Tauscher was on brief, for appellee Robinson Helicopter Company. Tim A. Goetz, with whom Cathrine E. Tauscher was on brief, for appellee Robinson Helicopter Company.

Louis R. Martínez for appellees Caribbean Aviation Maintenance Corp. and Chartis Insurance Company of Puerto Rico.

Before TORRUELLA, LIPEZ, and BARRON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

LIPEZ, Circuit Judge.

This case arose from a helicopter crash in November 2008 that killed a passenger in the helicopter, Diego Vidal–Gonzalez. The decedent's widow, Dr. Lizzette Bouret–Echevarria, and her three minor children (together “appellants”), brought a products liability action against the helicopter's manufacturer and repair company. The jury absolved all defendants of liability.

Appellants claim that eighteen months after the jury returned its verdict, they were told that the verdict was influenced by the jurors' improper knowledge of a confidential settlement offer. In this appeal, they challenge the district court's rejection of their request for an evidentiary hearing, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), to explore the alleged jury taint.

In denying this request, the district court miscalculated the timeliness of the motion, did not assume, as required by law, the truth of fact-specific statements set forth in affidavits supporting the Rule 60(b)(6) motion, and did not appreciate the inability of appellants, under the unusual circumstances here, to avoid reliance on hearsay in seeking Rule 60(b)(6) relief. Hence, we conclude that the court abused its discretion in denying the motion for 60(b) relief without holding an evidentiary hearing. We therefore vacate the court's order and remand for such a hearing.

I.

A. Background

In the underlying products liability suit, appellants filed a wrongful death action against Robinson Helicopter Company (“Robinson”), the manufacturer of the helicopter, and Caribbean Aviation Maintenance Corp. (the “CAM defendants”), who repaired the helicopter. The products liability case was tried in February 2012, with Attorney Carlos J. Morales–Bauza (“Attorney Morales”), a San Juan attorney, representing appellants.

Appellants assert that, prior to jury deliberations, Attorney Morales received a confidential settlement offer of $3.5 million, comprised of $3 million from one defendant and $500,000 from another defendant. The CAM defendants acknowledge that they unsuccessfully attempted to settle with appellants, but they deny that either amount reflects their settlement offer. Robinson admits that settlement was discussed at various times, but asserts it made no formal settlement offer and that it was unaware of the settlement amount offered by the CAM defendants. Appellants rejected the offer and proceeded to trial. On March 16, 2012, the jury returned a unanimous verdict finding that the CAM defendants were not negligent in their repair of the helicopter, and that Robinson's design of the helicopter was not defective. Final judgment was entered on March 19, 2012. Appellants filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied on May 9, 2012.

Sixteen months later, on September 4, 2013, appellants filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) seeking an evidentiary hearing to assess an allegation that the introduction of extraneous prejudicial information, namely appellants' rejection of the settlement offer, was improperly injected into jury deliberations. In support of their motion, appellants submitted affidavits from Attorney David P. Angueira (“Attorney Angueira”) and Lizzette Bouret–Echevarria, the widow of the passenger killed in the helicopter crash. The affidavits reported that Luis Irizarry, an aviation expert witness who testified on behalf of appellants during their trial, was the source of the allegation of juror misconduct. In May 2013, subsequent to appellants' trial, Irizarry provided expert services in an unrelated aviation case where he allegedly met an individual who claimed to be the employer of a juror in appellants' case. The employer told Irizarry that his employee informed him that the jury declined to award appellant any money damages because they knew she had been offered and rejected a $3.5 million settlement.

Irizarry communicated this information to appellants' trial counsel, Attorney Morales, who in turn informed Bouret–Echevarria. She then retained Attorney Angueira, a Boston attorney, and informed him of the potential jury misconduct disclosures made by Attorney Morales. At the time, Attorney Angueira was not admitted to the Puerto Rico Bar. He asked appellants to inquire whether Attorney Morales would agree to act as co-counsel in order to file post-judgment motions and present evidence of jury misconduct to the court. Within twenty-four hours after that request was made, Attorney Morales sent a letter to appellants indicating that he was immediately withdrawing from the case. Attorney Angueira then sought other local counsel to assist him.

Attorney Angueira also called Irizarry in an attempt to confirm the information reported to appellants. In his affidavit, Attorney Angueira states that Irizarry told him he would not be able to speak with him without the permission of Attorney Morales. Attorney Angueira then called Attorney Morales and left a message asking that he return the call. Attorney Morales never returned the call.

B. District Court's Denial of the Rule 60(b)(6) Motion

The district court denied appellants' Rule 60(b)(6) motion, finding that the eighteen-month period between the entry of final judgment and the filing of the motion made the motion untimely, and that the materials filed in support of the motion were insufficient. The court stated, “[w]hile there is no specific limit under Rule 60(b)(6), seeking relief eighteen months after final judgment pushes against reasonableness.” The court went on to state that “Plaintiffs present to the court only hearsay evidence of the supposed tainted jury deliberations” and that the two affidavits brought in support of the motion were “insufficient to push Plaintiffs' claims beyond the daunting threshold required by Rule 60(b). If this material were sufficient to force a court to hold an evidentiary hearing, the court would be potentially required in any civil case to grant an evidentiary hearing following a jury verdict based on mere rumors, regardless of how much time had elapsed since judgment. Rule 60(b) is not satisfied that easily.”¹ Appellants filed this timely appeal.

II.

A. The Applicable Subsection of Rule 60(b)

Rule 60(b) grants federal courts the power to vacate judgments “whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice.” Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Local No. 59 v. Superline Transp. Co., 953 F.2d 17, 19 (1st Cir.1992) (internal citation omitted). Rule 60(b) recites six reasons justifying relief from final judgment. Two are at issue here. Under Rule 60(b)(3), a district court may vacate a judgment for “fraud ..., misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3). Rule 60(b)(6) is a catchall provision that provides relief for “any other reason” not otherwise covered by (b)(1)-(5). Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6).

The parties disagree about which subsection of Rule 60(b) applies in this case. If the motion should have been brought pursuant to 60(b)(3), as appellees contend, it would be time-barred because the motion was brought more than one year after the entry of final judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c)(1) (“A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time—and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.”). If, as appellants argue, the motion was proper pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), the timing is subject to a more lenient, “reasonable” standard. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988). Appellees argue that the motion falls squarely within the parameters of subsection (3) because it alleged misconduct by the appellees. They point to appellants' insinuation in their motion that appellees were the likely source of the settlement offer information because they would have benefitted from its disclosure to the jury.²

While appellants suggest in their Rule 60(b)(6) motion that the information of the settlement offer could have been leaked by appellees, they do not contend that appellees did in fact provide this information. Rather, the bulk of appellants' Rule 60(b) motion focuses on the assertion that the jury was tainted by its knowledge of a confidential settlement offer and that it improperly based its decision on that information. In the absence of any provision of Rule 60(b) dealing explicitly with juror misconduct, appellants' motion was appropriately brought, and the district court properly viewed it, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6).

B. Rule 60(b)(6) Factors

Rule 60(b)(6) grants federal courts “broad authority” to vacate final judgments provided that the motion is made within a reasonable time. Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 863, 108 S.Ct. 2194. The Supreme Court has...