Humphreys & Harding, Inc. v. District of Columbia
| Decision Date | 01 June 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 16230.,16230. |
| Citation | 293 F.2d 150,110 US App. DC 311 |
| Parties | HUMPHREYS & HARDING, INC. and Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, Appellants v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, for the use of The JOSLYN COMPANY, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Mr. Thomas H. McGrail, Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. Bernard J. Gallagher and J. Roy Thompson, Jr., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before WILBUR K. MILLER, Chief Judge, and DANAHER and BASTIAN, Circuit Judges.
Appellants, a contractor and its surety, entered into a payment bond running to the District of Columbia on a bridge construction contract. The contractor placed a verbal purchase order with the L & S Lumber Company, Inc. The latter in turn procured the appellee to treat oak pilings with creosote as called for by the specifications in the contract. The contractor paid L & S, but the latter failed to pay a certain balance due the appellee, Joslyn. After appellants rejected appellee's demand, Joslyn sued and was granted judgment for $6,627.40.
On this appeal, it is argued that since Joslyn had no contractual relationship with the contractor, such services and treatment of the pilings as had been performed for L & S were too remote to found a suit on the contractor's payment bond. It is not disputed that Joslyn rendered the pilings suitable for use in the bridge construction according to contract specifications. The pilings were delivered to and used on the job.
The complaint here was based upon D.C.Code § 1-804 (1951) which provides in part:
"Any person or persons entering into a formal contract with the District of Columbia for the construction of any public building * * * shall be required * * * to execute the usual penal bond * * * with the additional obligation that such contractor or contractors shall promptly make payments to all persons supplying him or them with labor and materials in the prosecution of the work provided for in such contract * * *."1
The Supreme Court has pointed out that the Heard Act and similar statutes have generally been given a liberal interpretation so as to protect those who have contributed by their labor and material to the erection of public structures. "If the contractor sees fit to let the work to a subcontractor, who employs labor and buys materials which are used to carry out and fulfill the engagement of the original contract to construct a public building, he is thereby supplied with the materials and labor for the fulfillment of his engagement as effectually as he would have been had he directly hired the labor or bought the materials."2
Appellants, in effect, would have us read our Code section, supra, as though it contained the proviso to be found in section 2(a) of the Miller Act.3 They argued that since the purposes of the two statutes are the same, they must be read and applied alike. The short answer is that Congress has never so conditioned our payment bond section. Moreover, treating our Code section as remedial, we pointed out in Boka Electrical Construction Co. v. W. M. Chappell, Inc.:
4
Despite such recent discussion, appellants argue on brief that a contractor's bond should not protect "persons supplying labor or materials to another materialman." Such coverage would extend, it is urged, to a hardware concern which sells a keg of nails which finds its way to the job, a relationship not only remote but one leading to confusion.5
We are not dealing with a keg of nails. On the contrary, the specifications of the contract here read:
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...public contracts — and with the practical realities of the construction industry. Humphreys & Harding, Inc. v. District of Columbia ex rel. The Joslyn Co., 110 U.S. App.D.C. 311, 314, 293 F.2d 150, 153 (1961).7 In supplying goods to the general contractor, the subcontractor relies on knowle......
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