Falls Stamping & Welding Co. v. INTERN. UNION, ETC.

• Decision Date: 06 July 1976
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. C76-170A.
• Citation: 416 F. Supp. 574
• Parties: FALLS STAMPING & WELDING COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. The INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AIRCRAFT & AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

416 F. Supp. 574

FALLS STAMPING & WELDING COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. The INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AIRCRAFT & AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. C76-170A.

United States District Court, N. D. Ohio, E. D.

July 6, 1976.

Herman E. Rabe, Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs, Edward C. Kaminski, John N. Childs, Akron, Ohio, for plaintiff.

Ray C. Sheppard, Erickson & Sheppard, Akron, Ohio, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

CONTIE, District Judge.

Falls Stamping & Welding Company (hereinafter plaintiff) initiated this action on June 7, 1976 under Section 10 of the United States Arbitration Act of 1947, 9 U.S.C. § 10, to vacate and/or modify an arbitrator's award. Defendants have answered by denying the material allegations and counterclaiming for enforcement of the award and for compensatory and punitive damages for the allegedly malicious delay in execution.

On the same date this action was filed, the Court granted plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order staying the effect of said award. After hearing, the Court issued a preliminary injunction on June 14, 1976, which further stayed the award. The final hearing in this action was conducted on June 22, 1976. The following shall constitute the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The facts necessary to this decision are undisputed. In response to plaintiff's decision to discipline four press operators for allegedly cheating in piecemeal work at the plant, certain members of defendants' Local Union No. 1194, United Automobile, Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Workers of America (hereinafter Local) went on strike on August 28, 1975. After negotiations culminating in plaintiff's agreement to further investigate the charges of cheating, the employees returned to work on September 2, 1975. No disciplinary action was taken by plaintiff against the striking employees, although the collective bargaining agreement contained a "no-strike" clause.

After further investigation, plaintiff resolved to discharge two of the employees charged with cheating, and to suspend the two female employees involved for twenty days. Upon learning of this action, the employees on the second shift went on strike on September 9, 1975. These employees were discharged on September 10, 1975. The strike spread to plaintiff's first shift on September 10, 1975.

On September 11, 1975, this Court granted a temporary restraining order enjoining the strike. The striking employees failed to return to work. On September 13, 1975, plaintiff wrote to the day shift employees and informed them that if they did not return to work by September 16, 1975, they would be discharged. None of these employees appeared for work on September 16, 1975, and were accordingly discharged on that date. Thereafter, a number of the striking employees applied for re-employment, apparently pursuant to a disputed agreement between the parties. Only fifteen (15) of the approximately one hundred and twelve (112) employees involved were rehired; none of these employees were granted retroactive seniority.

Thereafter, grievances were filed pursuant to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. Said agreement provides a multiple step procedure culminating in arbitration. After the initial steps of the grievance procedure failed to adequately resolve the controversy, the matter was referred to an arbitrator on four representative grievances. The arbitrator heard testimony and received exhibits for nine days and, on May 28, 1976, rendered a sixty-nine (69) page decision and award. The award ordered reinstatement with seniority but without back pay of "all discharged employees of August 28 and September 16, 1975" except the two employees on suspension for cheating at the time of the September 9 and 10, 1975 strike. The two female employees were ordered reinstated with seniority and back pay from October 1, 1975. By letter dated June 11, 1976, the arbitrator corrected the reference to August 28, 1975 to read September 10, 1975. The error was apparently clerical in nature, as there were no employees discharged as a result of the August 28, 1975 strike. If this award is implemented, as many as ninety-three (93) of plaintiff's present employees must be discharged.

The subject grievances clearly fall within the scope of the parties' definition of matters subject to the grievance procedure. Similarly, it appears that, with two possible exceptions, all grievances were procedurally perfected.¹ The pivotal provisions of the collective bargaining agreement are those dealing with the powers of an arbitrator and the no-strike covenant.

Section 24 of the contract defines the arbitrator's powers as follows:

"The arbitrator's powers shall be limited to the application and interpretation of this Agreement as written. He shall at all times be governed wholly by the terms of this Agreement and he shall have no power or authority to amend, alter or modify this Agreement in any respect nor shall he consider any statute or laws not specifically incorporated herein. Any award of the arbitrator shall not be retroactive prior to the time that the grievance was first submitted in writing. The arbitrator's decision shall be final and binding upon the Union, Company, and employees. The expenses of the arbitrator shall be shared equally by the Company and the Union."

The no-strike provision is contained in Section 25 which reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

"During the term of this Agreement, the Union, its officers and stewards shall not instigate, promote, sponsor, or engage in a strike, slowdown, stoppage of work, or any other interruption of production. In the event any employee or group of employees covered by this Agreement participate in a strike, slowdown, stoppage of work, or any other interruption of production, the Union shall immediately, upon being notified by the Company, instruct any such employee or group of employees to resume work immediately. The Company shall have the right to discharge or otherwise discipline any employee who does engage in a strike, slowdown, stoppage of work, or interference with Company's operation during the term of this Agreement, any discipline or discharge as a result of the foregoing is subject to the grievance procedure."

Although plaintiff advances a number of the grounds contained in Section 10 of the United States Arbitration Act of 1947, 9 U.S.C. § 10, the Court concludes that subparagraph (d) of said section is dispositive of this action. Said subparagraph provides that an award may be vacated where the arbitrators "exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made."

As stated by the Supreme Court in United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1362, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960):²

"It is the arbitrator's construction that was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from his."

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court also said in that opinion:

"An arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice . . . His award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from this collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award." 363 U.S. at 597, 80 S.Ct. at 1361. Emphasis supplied.

This "essence" concept has been consistently applied by the lower federal courts. See e. g. Timken Co. v. Local Union No. 1123, United Steelworkers of Am., 482 F.2d 1012 (6th Cir. 1973); Amanda Bent Bolt Co. v. International U. U.A.A., A.I.W., 451 F.2d 1277 (6th Cir. 1971); Diamond v. Terminal Railway Alabama State Docks, 421 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1970); Master S.M.W. & C. R. Ass'n. of R. I. Inc. v. Local Union No. 17, D.C., 397 F.Supp. 1372 (1975); Amerada Hess Corp. v. Local 22026 Fed. Lab. Union, AFL-CIO, 385 F.Supp. 279 (1974).

Plaintiff argues that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by entering an award which is contrary to the express language of Section 25 of the contract granting it the right to discharge striking employees. The Court agrees.

In Amanda Bent Bolt Co. v. International U., U.A.A., A.I.W., supra, the Sixth Circuit dealt with a very similar situation. In that case, the arbitrator determined that employees striking in violation of a no-strike provision in the collective bargaining agreement should be reinstated with back pay. The court held that as said award was directly contrary to express language of the contract allowing the company to discharge striking employees, the arbitrator had exceeded his authority under the contract.

Defendants argue that Amanda Bent Bolt is not determinative of this action. Specifically, they contend that that case is distinguishable because Section 25 of the instant contract expressly provides that any discipline effected by plaintiff for violations of the no-strike clause is subject to arbitration, whereas the Amanda Bent Bolt contract did not have such a clause. This argument is specious for while the inclusion of said provision is relevant to a determination of the arbitrability of the issue, it in no way expands the authority of the arbitrator delineated in Section 24 of the collective bargaining agreement. The simple fact remains that, unless findings of the arbitrator demonstrate cogent grounds for disregarding the express terms of the contract, Amanda Bent Bolt requires the vacation of this award.

Identification of the grounds for the arbitrator's decision has not been an easy task, as said decision is repetitive, loquacious,...