Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. LOCAL NO. 1464, ETC.
| Decision Date | 14 January 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 75-CV-653-W-2-5.,75-CV-653-W-2-5. |
| Citation | 506 F. Supp. 1151 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
| Parties | KANSAS CITY POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. LOCAL NO. 1464, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, Defendant. |
Jack Whitacre, Spencer, Fane, Britt & Browne, Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiff.
William A. Jolley, Jolley, Moran, Walsh, Hager & Gordon, Kansas City, Mo., for defendant.
This is a declaratory judgment action brought by plaintiff Kansas City Power & Light Company (hereinafter "the Company") pursuant to § 301 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 185. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that defendant Local No. 1464, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (hereinafter "the Union"), by virtue of certain actions taken against three of the Company's supervisory employees, violated a strike settlement agreement entered into by the parties in September, 1974. Defendant Union has filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that this dispute falls within the grievance and arbitration provisions of the parties' collective bargaining agreement and that plaintiff is required by that agreement to submit this matter to arbitration.
Plaintiff and defendant both have indicated that the facts of this case are essentially undisputed. Accordingly, by agreement of the parties, and with the consent of the Court, it was determined that a formal hearing or trial would not be necessary in this case and that this matter would be submitted to the Court for final adjudication based on a stipulation of facts jointly tendered by the parties and accompanied by uncontested documents and exhibits.1 Further, each side has submitted both an original brief and a reply brief in support of their respective position.
Preliminarily, the Court notes that under 29 U.S.C. § 185 the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties to this case without regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties. Plaintiff, a corporation organized and existing pursuant to the laws of the State of Missouri with its principal offices located in Kansas City, Jackson County, Missouri, is an employer engaged in commerce and affecting commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 185. Defendant, a local union affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, with its principal offices located in Kansas City, Jackson County, Missouri, is a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 185.
Defendant Union has been certified by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) as the exclusive bargaining representative for certain employees of the Kansas City Power & Light Company and, in February, 1973, entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the Company.2 This agreement contained a "wage reopener provision" which provided as follows:
Either party may open this Agreement on June 30, 1973, and June 30, 1974, for the sole purpose of a general upward or downward revision in wage rates, vacations and holidays; but any such proposed revision should relate only to a general wage increase or decrease, and shall not be available for adjustments in wage rates for individual employees or job classifications or for changes in fringe benefits other than vacations and holidays. The party desiring such revision shall notify the other party in writing of the desired revision not later than sixty calendar days prior to June 30, 1973, and June 30, 1974, whereupon the revision so requested shall be promptly considered by the duly accredited representatives of the Union and the duly accredited representatives of the Company in joint session. Should the parties be unable to agree upon the revision desired or the effective date thereof after all reasonable efforts so to do by July 1, 1973 or July 1, 1974, the provisions of Article XIV shall no longer be applicable.
Pursuant to the foregoing provision, the Union notified the Company in April, 1974 of its intent to reopen their collective bargaining agreement and negotiate the areas specified in the wage reopener provision. Although negotiations took place, the parties were unable to reach an agreement on the contract areas reopened and, on July 8, 1974, the employees represented by the Union initiated an economic strike against the Company in support of their contract demands.3 This strike continued until the latter part of September, 1974. On September 24, 1974, the parties entered into a tentative agreement to settle the strike subject to ratification by the Union members. A majority of the members of the Union subsequently ratified the tentative agreement,4 and on September 30, 1974, representatives of the Union and the Company formally executed a document entitled "Supplemental Agreement." This agreement sets forth the revisions to the collective bargaining agreement which had been agreed upon by the parties in settling the strike.5 As pertinent to this case, the settlement agreement provided that:
7. All charges, including Unfair Labor Practice charges, will be withdrawn by both the Company and the Union and there will be no reprisals by either party.
Shortly after the strike ended, certain members of the Union filed written charges against three supervisory employees of the Company alleging that these employees had violated the constitution of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) and the bylaws of Local 1464. Specifically, these individuals were charged with working for the company and crossing picket lines established by the Union during the recently concluded strike. At the time the strike originally commenced, there were approximately 115 persons employed by the Company in supervisory positions who were affiliated with the Union by way of either an "honorary withdrawal" or a "participating withdrawal" membership.6 The Company continued to operate during the strike and supervisory personnel were required to perform work which normally would have been performed by members of the striking Union. In order to accomplish these tasks, the supervisory employees routinely crossed the Union's picket lines. However, with the exception of the three supervisors named in the charges, all other supervisory employees resigned their membership or affiliation with the Union at the inception of the strike.7
A hearing regarding the charges brought against the three supervisors was held by the Trial Board of the Union, and fines of $3,600 each were levied against two of the supervisors and a $2,400 fine against the third. The supervisors refused to pay these fines, contending that the Union's action constitutes a reprisal for the supervisors' activities during the strike and that such reprisals are prohibited by the strike settlement agreement. To date, although the fines remain unpaid, the Union has not taken any action to collect the fines. But the Union has adopted the position that the supervisors are "members in arrears" as defined in the IBEW constitution, and as such, have lost all rights and privileges of IBEW membership, including, but not limited to, certain pension benefits, right of admission to a local IBEW union, rights in the IBEW death benefit fund and the right to either a participating or honorary withdrawal card.8
As a result of the action taken against the supervisors by the Union, the instant lawsuit was filed. Plaintiff seeks to have the Court declare that the Union's disciplinary action violates the "no reprisal" provision of the parties' strike settlement agreement. Defendant asserts, however, both by way of an affirmative defense to plaintiff's complaint and as a counterclaim for declaratory judgment, that the question of whether the Union violated the "no reprisal" agreement is a matter which must be submitted to arbitration. And, although plaintiff disputes the "arbitrability" of the reprisal issue, even plaintiff concedes that if the Court should determine that this is a subject encompassed by the arbitration provision of the parties' collective bargaining agreement, the Court is precluded from addressing the merits of plaintiff's claim. Thus, the Court's role at this juncture in the case is limited; the Court's initial task is to determine whether this dispute is a mandatory subject for arbitration under the parties' collective bargaining contract. See Ben Gutman Truck Service, Inc. v. Teamsters Local No. 600, 484 F.Supp. 893, 895 (E.D.Mo.1980).
The principles of law governing the duty to arbitrate labor disputes are well-established. The duty to arbitrate does not arise simply as a matter of law and "a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate any matter in the absence of a contractual obligation to do so." Nolde Brothers, Inc. v. Local No. 358, 430 U.S. 243, 250-51, 97 S.Ct. 1067, 1071, 51 L.Ed.2d 300 (1977). Accord, Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 374, 94 S.Ct. 629, 635, 38 L.Ed.2d 583 (1974); Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 241, 82 S.Ct. 1318, 1320-1321, 8 L.Ed.2d 462 (1962). Assuming, however, that the parties' collective bargaining agreement contains an arbitration provision, then the question of whether a party is "bound to arbitrate, as well as what issues it must arbitrate, is a matter to be determined by the Court on the basis of the contract entered into by the parties." Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., supra, 370 U.S. at 241, 82 S.Ct. at 1320.
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