Lenhardt Tool & Die Co., Inc. v. Lumpe

• Decision Date: 31 January 2000
• Docket Number: No. 49A05-9706-CV-216.,49A05-9706-CV-216.
• Citation: 722 N.E.2d 824
• Parties: LENHARDT TOOL & DIE COMPANY, INC., Appellant (Defendant Below), v. Duane LUMPE, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

722 N.E.2d 824

LENHARDT TOOL & DIE COMPANY, INC., Appellant (Defendant Below), v. Duane LUMPE, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).

No. 49A05-9706-CV-216.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

January 31, 2000.

Donald M. Snemis, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.

William L. O'Connor, Eric D. Johnson, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.

Prior report: Ind.App., 703 N.E.2d 1079.

Petition to transfer denied.

Dissent from denial of petition to transfer. BOEHM, Justice, dissenting from the denial of transfer.

I believe we should grant transfer to clarify the standard for summary judgment in Indiana under Trial Rule 56.

On August 22, 1992, an explosion occurred at the Olin Brass factory in Indianapolis injuring Duane Lumpe, who worked for Olin as a "melter." Olin manufactures brass bars using molds made by Lenhardt, among other firms. Lumpe sued Lenhardt and Lenhardt filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that, after adequate discovery, it was uncontroverted that Lumpe could prove neither that Lenhardt manufactured the mold in question nor that the mold was defective. The trial court first granted Lenhardt's motion, then reversed itself and denied summary judgment in an order that was certified for interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that summary judgment was improper because Lenhardt had not established that the mold was not from Lenhardt.

I believe this holding reflects a widespread misunderstanding of how the summary judgment standard is to work under Trial Rule 56. Specifically, I believe that this Court's ruling in Jarboe v. Landmark Community Newspapers, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118 (Ind.1994), has been understood by some, including the Court of Appeals in this case, to require Lenhardt to establish a negative proposition, i.e., that the mold did not come from Lenhardt. In my view, this is an incorrect reading of Trial Rule 56, and of Jarboe, and leads to unnecessary expense to litigants and unwarranted demands on judicial resources. Rather than require that Lenhardt prove that the mold came from someone else, I believe it was sufficient for summary judgment that Lenhardt establish (i.e., show that there is no genuine issue of material fact bearing on the issue) that Lumpe could not carry his burden of proof at trial that the mold was from Lenhardt.

I. Jarboe and Celotex

In Jarboe, this Court held that Indiana summary judgment law requires the movant to establish the "absence of any genuine issue of fact as to a determinative issue." Jarboe v. Landmark Community Newspapers, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ind.1994). This requirement was explicitly stated to be different from the federal standard as enunciated in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). See Jarboe, 644 N.E.2d at 123

.

Jarboe was this Court's response to a concern that the Celotex federal summary judgment standard had been broadly interpreted by some courts as shifting the burden of production on summary judgment to the party having the burden of proof at trial. Jarboe rejected that view under Indiana Trial Rule 56. See id. ("Merely alleging that the [non-movant] has failed to produce evidence on each element of [the claim or defense] is insufficient to entitle the [movant] to summary judgment under Indiana law."). It is now clear that the better-reasoned opinions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 also reject this interpretation. See, e.g., Logan v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 971, 978-79 (7th Cir.1996)

(explaining some misapplications of the Celotex standard to shift the burden in summary judgment proceedings to the non-movant). Indeed, Justice White, who provided the essential fifth vote for the Celotex majority, was careful to avoid such a broad reading: "[T]he movant must discharge the burden the Rules place upon him: It is not enough to move for summary judgment without supporting the motion in any way or with a conclusory assertion that the plaintiff has no evidence to prove his case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 328,

106 S.Ct. 2548,

91 L.Ed.2d 265 (White, J., concurring).¹

To be sure, many cases under Federal Rule 56 and its state counterparts cite Celotex and then leap to a discussion of the non-movant's failure to carry a burden it will have at trial without first dealing with the movant's initial obligation—sometimes called a burden of production—under Rule 56.²See, e.g., Baulos v. Roadway Express, Inc., 139 F.3d 1147, 1150-51 (7th Cir.1998)

; Phillips v. Marist Soc'y, 80 F.3d 274, 275-76 (8th Cir.1996); Short v. Little Rock Dodge, Inc., 297 Ark. 104, 759 S.W.2d 553, 554 (1988) (placing burden of proof on non-movant); Garzee v. Barkley, 121 Idaho 771, 828 P.2d 334, 337 (1992) (summary judgment is proper if the plaintiff cannot offer proof of a material element of the claim); Tucher v. Brothers Auto Salvage Yard, Inc., 564 N.E.2d 560, 562 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) (reciting the correct standard, but addressing only the non-movant's burden); Poplaski v. Lamphere, 152 Vt. 251, 565 A.2d 1326, 1329 (1989). Many of these cases are correctly decided on their facts, but do not explicitly articulate each step in reaching the ultimate conclusion.³ This occurs where, as is often the case, the undisputed facts establish as a matter of law either the case for the movant or the case for the non-movant. Not all cases fall into this either/or category. Where the facts are not in dispute as to an element of a claim or defense, there may be at least three potential circumstances: (1) the undisputed facts support the movant's claim; (2) the undisputed facts support the non-movant's claim; or (3) the undisputed facts establish that we cannot determine whose version is correct.

The issue presented here, and in Celotex, is the requirement for summary judgment to be rendered against the party who has the burden of proof at trial in the third circumstance. Under a correct reading of Celotex, the non-moving party is required to point to evidence supporting its claim or defense only after the moving party has either (1) established the non-movant's inability to prevail as a matter of law or (2) offered evidence that supports the movant's argument that the non-movant cannot carry its burden of proof at trial. See 11 James Wm. Moore & Jeffrey W. Stempel, Moore's Federal Practice § 56.13[1] (3d ed.1999); 10A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2727 (3d ed.1998).

Although under Indiana Trial Rule 56 Jarboe clearly rejected the view that a party seeking summary judgment could simply point to the opponent's burden of proof at trial and prevail unless the non-movant produced evidence supporting its claim or defense, Jarboe did not disable summary judgment as a tool to resolve matters as to which there is no genuine issue of material fact. Rather, as explained below, in my view under Indiana Trial Rule 56, as under federal practice, it is sufficient for summary judgment to establish on undisputed facts either that: (1) the non-movant will be unsuccessful as a matter of law or (2) the non-movant will be unable at trial to establish an essential fact on which the non-movant carries the burden of proof.

II. Indiana Trial Rule 56

Trial Rule 56(C) provides that a summary judgment movant must show "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." This requires the movant to designate sufficient proof to foreclose the non-movant's reasonable inferences and eliminate any genuine factual issues. However, as some decisions have recognized, summary judgment under Indiana Trial Rule 56 should not require that the movant prove a negative. See Town of Montezuma v. Downs, 685 N.E.2d 108, 116 n. 9 (Ind.Ct.App.1997)

("To require the Downs to affirmatively prove that the pipeline was not inspected would require them to prove a negative, something which we refuse to do."). I believe it is sufficient if the movant either disproves an element of the non-movant's claim or demonstrates that the non-moving party cannot carry its burden of proof at trial.⁴

This flows from the basic structure of Indiana Trial Rule 56. In my view, once the movant has put forward evidence to (1) establish the elements of its claim or defense, or (2) negate an essential element of the non-movant's claim or defense, or (3) prove that the non-moving party will be unable to present evidence to prove an essential element of its claim or defense, the burden shifts to the non-movant to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue for trial on each challenged element. See Mullin v. Municipal City of South Bend, 639 N.E.2d 278, 281 (Ind.1994)

; see also Ind. Trial Rule 56(E); Shell Oil Co. v. Lovold Co., 705 N.E.2d 981, 984 (Ind.1998). This does not mean that there is a shift of the burden of persuasion on any element of a claim or defense or that the non-movant must establish its entire case to defeat a motion for summary judgment. It does mean, as Trial Rule 56 provides, that, once the movant meets its burden, the non-movant must articulate specific facts that show an issue of material fact requiring a trial. See Clark v. Estate of Slavens, 687 N.E.2d 246, 248 (Ind.Ct.App.1997),

abrogated on other grounds by Indiana Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Richie, 707 N.E.2d 992, 995 (Ind.1999).

This view of Indiana Trial Rule 56 derives from the plain language of the rule, and is also consistent with the purpose of the rule. Cf. Hess v. Bob Phillips West Side Ford, Inc., 159 Ind.App. 46, 50, 304 N.E.2d 814, 816 (1973)

(using "literal and commonsense reading of the rule" to interpret the meaning of Indiana Trial Rule 50).⁵ This Court determined that the revisions to Indiana Trial Rule 56 in 1991 were intended "[t]o promote the expeditious resolution of lawsuits and conserve judicial resources." Rosi v. Business Furniture Corp., 615 N.E.2d 431, 434 (Ind.1993). Also, Indiana Trial Rule 1 requires the rules,...