Robinson v. V&S Detroit Galvanizing, LLC, Case No. 16-10589

• Decision Date: 19 July 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 16-10589
• Court: United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Michigan)
• Parties: OBERIA ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. V&S DETROIT GALVANIZING, LLC, Defendant.

OBERIA ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. V&S DETROIT GALVANIZING, LLC, Defendant.

Case No. 16-10589

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

July 19, 2016

Paul D. Borman United States District Judge

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF NO. 5)

This action was originally filed by Plaintiff Oberia Robinson in 3^rd Circuit Wayne County Court on October 21, 2015. Plaintiff sets forth claims of "Breach of Wage and Fringe Benefit Law" and "Declaratory Judgment" related to the termination of his employment and his entitlement to certain vacation pay, sick pay, and disability pay or "fringe benefits." (ECF No. 1, Compl.) Defendant V&S Detroit Galvanizing, LLC was served with the complaint and summons on January 28, 2016. (ECF No. 1, Removal.) On February 17, 2016, Defendant removed the action to this Court based on federal jurisdiction pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Defendant contended in its removal that while Plaintiff's claims were couched in state law, both of his claims arose under and required the interpretation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") that was negotiated by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 299 on Plaintiff's behalf with Defendant. Defendant submits that Plaintiff's claims are therefore preempted by Section 301. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Leuck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985).

On February 18, 2016, Defendant filed the present Motion to Dismiss or in the alternative a Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff did not file a response to Defendant's dispositive motion, nor did Plaintiff request more time to respond. A hearing on this matter was held on July 12, 2016. Plaintiff's attorney attended the hearing and offered oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Defendant's motion and dismiss this action with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant from 2005 until February 2011 as a warehouseman. (Compl., at ¶ 4.) On January 27, 2011, Defendant terminated Plaintiff's employment for failing to immediately report a work related injury. (Id., at ¶ 5.) Plaintiff allegedly injured his toe in a work related injury and made a claim for workers' compensation. (Id., at ¶ 6.) Plaintiff's claim for workers' compensation was denied "based on a theory that Plaintiff may have injured his toe outside of work." (Id., at ¶ 7.)

Plaintiff alleged in his Complaint that at the time Defendant terminated his employment he had accrued fringe benefits "including vacation pay, sick pay, disability insurance and retirement benefits." (Id., at ¶ 8.) Plaintiff alleged Defendant refused to allow him to file for disability pay or pay him for his accrued vacation and sick pay. (Id., at ¶ 9.)

Finally, Plaintiff alleged that "[t]he clause upon which Plaintiff was terminated violate[d] a guaranteed right under the workers disability compensation act, namely; the rightto provide notice and claim of a work related injury within ten (10) days of a work related injury." (Compl., at ¶ 10.) Defendant submits that while Plaintiff was employed with Defendant he was a member of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 299 ("Local 299"). Defendant and Local 299 entered into a collective bargaining agreement in December 2009 that was effective until December, 2012. Plaintiff's employment with Defendant was governed by this CBA. (Ex. B, CBA.) The CBA required that "any employee involved in any accident shall immediately report said accident and any physical injury sustained to the company." (Ex. B, Art. 20.02, Pg ID 113.) Under the CBA a violation of this provision was an "unacceptable act of misconduct" and resulted in "immediate discharge." (Id., at Rules of Conduct, Pg ID 119.)

The CBA also provided a grievance procedure that covered any "dispute, disagreement, or difference between any employee and/or any designated union official and the Company based on employee's contention that the Company or Union has violated any specific provision of this agreement." (Ex. B, at Art. 14, Pg ID 110-12.) The grievance procedure involved a three step process that culminated in arbitration of the dispute. (Id.)

Plaintiff filed the present complaint on October 21, 2015, more than four years after his termination, and set forth two claims: a "Breach of Wage and Fringe Benefit Law" and "Declaratory Judgment." (ECF No. 1, Compl.) In regards to his claim that Defendant breached the "Wage and Fringe Benefit Law," Plaintiff stated that he was owed vacation time, sick time, and disability pay, Defendant did not pay these benefits, and that "Michigan statutes provide that Defendant must pay the benefits owed and that Defendant is subject totreble damages." (Compl., at ¶¶ 12-14.) As to his claim for declaratory judgment, Plaintiff alleged that "Defendant terminated Plaintiff for a reason that is clearly contrary to [a] Michigan Statute. As such, Plaintiff's termination should be declared void ab initio and Plaintiff's termination should be declared a nullity." (Id., at ¶¶ 15-17.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) allows for the dismissal of a case where the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must "construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." DirectTV, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007). To sufficiently state a claim, a complaint must provide a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). "[T]he complaint 'does not need detailed factual allegations' but should identify 'more than labels and conclusions.'" Casias v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 695 F.3d 428, 435 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). But the court "need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences." Treesh, 487 F.3d at 476 (quoting Gregory v. Shelby County, 220 F.3d 433, 446 (6th Cir. 2000)). "[L]egal conclusions masquerading as factual allegations will not suffice." Eidson v. State of Term. Dep't of Children's Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007).

A plaintiff must provide more than "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" and "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above thespeculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). The Sixth Circuit has recently reiterated that "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a litigant must allege enough facts to make it plausible that the defendant bears legal liability. The facts cannot make it merely possible that the defendant is liable; they must make it plausible." Agema v. City of Allegan, --- F.3d ---, *3 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

In addition to Plaintiff's allegations in his complaint, the Court will also consider the Collective Bargaining Agreement attached to Defendant's motion and referenced by Plaintiff in his pleadings (Def.'s Br., Ex. B). Although this document is outside the pleadings, the Sixth Circuit has recognized that the "documents that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in a plaintiff's complaint and are central to her claim." Weiner v. Klais and Co., Inc., 108 F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). The Collective Bargaining Agreement is referenced in Plaintiff's complaint and central to his claims, where Plaintiff alleges that he was terminated pursuant to a "clause" of an employment agreement and also claims the clause is contrary to public policy. Thus, the Court may consider this document in its evaluation of Defendant's motion to dismiss. The Court declines, however, to consider the other documentary evidence attached to Defendant's motion - a grievance regarding Plaintiff's termination and Plaintiff's charge against Local 299 - because consideration of that evidence would require this Court to treat the motion as one for summary judgment under FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Preemption

Defendant removed this action based upon the theory that Plaintiff's vague state law claims were preempted by federal law and thus this Court had proper subject matter jurisdiction over this action. Plaintiff did not dispute the removal through a motion for remand and, in fact, has not filed any pleadings in this action since the removal.

Before evaluating the Defendant's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, the Court must first determine whether Plaintiff's claims were properly removed to this Court and are preempted by federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Section 301 of the LMRA states that

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ... may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.

29 U.S.C. § 185(a). "Section 301 allows employees to bring suit against employers and labor organizations for violations of a [collective bargaining agreement]." Watts v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 701 F.3d 188, 191 (6th Cir. 2012). The Supreme Court has held that "[t]he interests in interpretive uniformity and predictability that require that labor-contract disputes be resolved by reference to federal law also require that the meaning given a contract phrase or term be subject to uniform federal interpretation." Id. (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985)). The Supreme Court has since clarified, however, that "not every dispute involving a CBA is preempted by § 301: '[A]s long as the...