Doe v. Cong. of the United States

Decision Date29 May 2018
Docket NumberNo. 16-4345,16-4345
Parties NEW DOE CHILD #1; New Doe Child #2; New Doe Parent; New Roe Child #1; New Roe Child #2; New Roe Parent; New Poe Child; New Poe Parent; New Coe Child; New Coe Parent; New Boe Child; New Boe Parent; New Hoe Child #1; New Hoe Child #2; New Hoe Parent #1; New Hoe Parent #2; Holly Huber; Mitchell Kahle; Bernard Klein ; Marni Huebner-Tiborsky; Loren Miller; Martin Maier ; Michael Howard; Larry Knight; Devin Kuchnya; Tracey Martin; Mark Petricca; Beverly Shapiro ; Ron Thomas; Derek Rose; George Shiffer; Nancy Dollard; Dennis Rosenblum; Joseph Milon; Salvatore Salerno ; Jessica Mcquarter; Susan Carrier; Sarah Maxwell ; Stuart Chisolm; Michael Martinez; Adam Clayman; Michigan Atheists; Northern Ohio Freethought Society, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CONGRESS OF the UNITED STATES of America, Defendant, United States of America, Department of the Treasury; United States Mint; United States Bureau of Engraving and Printing; The American Legion; American Center for Law and Justice, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

ARGUED: Michael Newdow, Nice, California, for Appellants. Lowell V. Sturgill, Jr., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Michael Newdow, Nice, California, Thomas M. Horwitz, Westlake, Ohio, for Appellants. Lowell V. Sturgill, Jr., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. Eric Rassbach, Diana M. Verm, THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, Washington, D.C., Jay Alan Sekulow, AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW & JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae.

Before: NORRIS, MOORE, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.

STRANCH, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which NORRIS, J., joined, and MOORE, J., joined in part. MOORE, J. (pp. 595–603), delivered a separate opinion dissenting from Part II.A.4 of the majority opinion.

OPINION

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge.

Atheists, Humanists, and one Jewish Plaintiff challenge the federal statutes requiring inscription of the National Motto, "In God We Trust," on U.S. currency. Plaintiffs allege that the currency statutes cause them to bear, affirm, and proselytize an objectionable message in a way that, for the Atheist and Humanist Plaintiffs, violates their core religious beliefs, and, for the Jewish Plaintiff, renders him complicit in the sins of superfluously printing God’s name and destroying God’s printed name. Plaintiffs claim that the statutes violate their rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The district court dismissed all claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons below, we AFFIRM .

I. BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiffs’ Allegations

Plaintiffs are nine anonymous children, seven of their anonymous parents, and twenty-four named individuals who identify as Atheist and/or Humanist (or otherwise profess disbelief in a God or Gods); one Jewish individual; and two organizations whose members identify as Atheist, Michigan Atheists and Northern Ohio Freethought Society. Broadly speaking, Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (Complaint) alleges that the inscription of the Motto "In God We Trust" on U.S. currency, as required by 31 U.S.C. § 5112(d)(1) (coins) and § 5114(b) (bills), violates their individual rights under RFRA and various constitutional provisions.

Plaintiffs allege that the Motto’s inscription on U.S. currency places a substantial burden on their religious exercise in violation of RFRA in three primary ways. The Motto’s inscription on the currency allegedly causes Plaintiffs to: (1) "personally bear a religious message that is the antithesis of what they consider to be religious truth"; (2) affirm as true a statement they believe to be false (both that God exists and that "we" as Americans trust in God) when "their religious ideologies mandate that they act with honesty"; and (3) "proselytize for a religious claim that is completely contrary to their personal religious opinions." Most of the allegations state that Plaintiffs object to carrying, affirming, and proselytizing a message whose content contradicts their religious beliefs, but some allegations assert that Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs specifically forbid the very acts of carrying, affirming, or proselytizing the Motto. The single Jewish Plaintiff alleges that it is sinful for him to participate in an activity that involves the superfluous printing of God’s name on secular documents and that leads to the destruction of that printed name (when currency is destroyed). Plaintiffs allege that carrying and transacting with U.S. coins and bills is often necessary to participate in everyday commerce. By forcing Plaintiffs to choose between not using cash and violating their religious beliefs, Plaintiffs allege, the Government has substantially burdened their religious exercise without a compelling interest as required by RFRA.

Plaintiffs’ Free Exercise claim has a similar basis, while further alleging that the challenged statutes are impermissibly "aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs." Plaintiffs provide sixty pages of allegations regarding the history of the Motto and its placement on money, which allegedly demonstrate the Government’s consistent, longstanding intent to promote Christian monotheism by including the Motto on the currency. Plaintiffs’ Free Speech claim alleges that the Government intentionally compels Plaintiffs to proselytize when they pass currency to others. Finally, Plaintiffs allege that the Government’s inscription of the Motto on the national currency denies equal dignity to Plaintiffs’ religious views, contributing to cultural stigma, alienation, and denigration of their views in violation of the Equal Protection component of the Fourteenth Amendment, as incorporated by the Fifth Amendment.

In January 2016, Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit against Congress, the United States, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Principal Deputy Director of the Mint, and the Director of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. Plaintiffs later voluntarily dismissed Congress. Plaintiffs asked the court to declare that 31 U.S.C. §§ 5112(d)(1) and 5114(b) violate RFRA and the Constitution and to permanently enjoin Defendants from producing currency inscribed with "In God We Trust."

The district court dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). It analyzed the RFRA and Free Exercise claims together and concluded that Plaintiffs had not alleged a substantial burden on their religious exercise. Plaintiffs could avoid cash by using credit cards and checks. The court concluded that cash-only transactions did not compel Plaintiffs to proselytize a message that violates their religious beliefs, analogizing to a Supreme Court case that suggested the Motto’s inclusion on currency was not compelled speech. See Wooley v. Maynard , 430 U.S. 705, 717 n.5, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977). The court dismissed Plaintiffs’ Free Speech claim for the same reason, again relying on Wooley . Finally, the court dismissed Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim because it concluded that the challenged statutes do not treat different classes of people disparately. Plaintiffs timely appealed.

II. ANALYSIS

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Currier v. First Resolution Inv. Corp. , 762 F.3d 529, 533 (6th Cir. 2014). "To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff need only plead sufficient factual matter, which we must accept as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ). The court relies primarily on the complaint, which we construe in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Laborers’ Local 265 Pension Fund v. iShares Trust , 769 F.3d 399, 403 (6th Cir. 2014).

A. PlaintiffsRFRA Claims
1. Legal Framework

RFRA provides that "Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability," unless the Government "demonstrates that the application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)(b). A person whose religious exercise has been burdened may assert a claim against the Government under RFRA. Id. § 2000bb-1(c). If the claim is successful, courts may craft exceptions to statutory government programs to accommodate religious beliefs, but the Government may resist such accommodations with "evidence" that they would "seriously compromise its ability to administer the program." See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal , 546 U.S. 418, 435, 126 S.Ct. 1211, 163 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2006). Similarly, although the Government may be required to expend additional funds for such accommodations, the cost to the Government of modifying a program is an important factor in determining the viability of an accommodation for purposes of the least-restrictive-means analysis. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby , ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2781, 189 L.Ed.2d 675 (2014) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(c) ); see also id. at 2787 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that certain less restrictive means might not be viable if it would be "more difficult and expensive to accommodate a governmental program to countless religious claims").1

In sum, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege the following elements of a RFRA claim: (1) the plaintiff seeks to engage in ...

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