Martin v. General Electric Co., Civ. A. No. 93-4837.

• Decision Date: 28 June 1995
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 93-4837.
• Citation: 891 F. Supp. 1052
• Parties: Robert F. MARTIN v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

891 F. Supp. 1052

Robert F. MARTIN v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY.

Civ. A. No. 93-4837.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

June 28, 1995.

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Ellis M. Saull, King of Prussia, PA, for plaintiff.

Kathryn H. Levering, Daniel J. Brennan, Philadelphia, PA, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DITTER, District Judge.

This action, before me on defendant's motion for summary judgment, derives from plaintiff's being twice laid off from defendant company, General Electric. After the second layoff, plaintiff located another job in the company and received an offer of employment. That offer was later rescinded. Plaintiff's four-count complaint alleges two counts of age discrimination, based on the two layoffs, and one count of unlawful retaliation, based on the rescinded job offer. The fourth count is for damages. For the reasons given below, defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part.

I. FACTS

Plaintiff, Robert Martin, began working for General Electric ("GE") in 1966. After receiving his engineering degree, he was involved in the area of quality control. Plaintiff became a manager in 1988. His annual salary had risen to over $60,000. In September 1991, when Martin worked in GE's Astro Space Division, business conditions required GE to reduce the size of its workforce and lay off employees. Pursuant to its reduction-in-force policy, GE laid off employees based on their relative rankings on a scoring matrix, with low-rated employees receiving layoff notices. Martin was one of approximately 1,000 workers laid off in this initial layoff. At the time of the layoff he was 49 years old.

Following the 1991 layoff, Martin was hired into a position within the Space Power Group, effective November 1991. The new position paid approximately $4,000 less than Martin's previous position. Another round of layoffs occurred in March 1992 and, akin to being twice struck by lightning, plaintiff again received a layoff notice. As with the earlier layoff, GE employees were again ranked on a matrix and low-ranking employees were the ones laid off. Martin was 50 years old when he was laid off for the second time.

Following the March 1992 layoff, Martin sought and obtained another offer of employment within GE, this time in California, with GE Government Services. GE extended the offer on May 8, 1992. Plaintiff asserts that his attorney notified GE on June 15, 1992, that plaintiff was the victim of age discrimination and that he intended to utilize "appropriate avenues of redress" regarding the alleged discrimination. GE rescinded the offer of employment on June 19, 1992.¹

In count 1 of his complaint, plaintiff alleges that he was laid off in September 1991 because of his age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. Count 2 makes the same claim with regard to the March 1992 layoff. Count 3 alleges that the job offer was rescinded in retaliation for plaintiff's asserting his rights under the ADEA, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 623(d).

II. THE AGE DISCRIMINATION COUNTS

A. Analysis of an Age Discrimination Claim

The same burden-shifting analysis applicable to Title VII discrimination claims also applies to age discrimination claims under the ADEA. Torre v. Casio, Inc., 42 F.3d 825, 829 (3d Cir.1994). Therefore, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination in a reduction-in-force ("RIF") situation, a plaintiff alleging age discrimination must show that he or she (1) is a member of the protected class; (2) was discharged from employment; (3) was qualified for the job from which he or she was terminated; and (4) other similarly situated, but substantially younger employees, were retained. Torre, 42 F.3d at 831.²

If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions.³ The presumption of discrimination which arose from plaintiff's prima facie case is then dispelled and plaintiff, to survive a defendant's motion for summary judgment, must present either evidence that discredits the defendant's proffered reasons or evidence that shows that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating cause of defendant's adverse employment action. Id. at 830; Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir.1994). It is important to recognize that plaintiff can defeat a motion for summary judgment either by discrediting defendant's reason or by coming forward with additional evidence of discrimination, but that he or she need not do both. Torre and Fuentes are clear that either "discrediting evidence" or "discrimination evidence" will suffice at the summary judgment stage, although plaintiff at trial will need to convince the factfinder both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason. 42 F.3d at 829-830; 32 F.3d at 763, 764. Defendant confuses plaintiff's burden at summary judgment with his burden at trial, asserting that Martin can defeat GE's motion for summary judgment only by proving both that GE's articulated reasons for the layoffs were false and that the real reason was age discrimination. Defendant cites Seman v. Coplay Cement Company in support of its position. 26 F.3d 428 (3d Cir.1994). Seman is inapplicable at this stage, however — though clearly relevant if this matter goes to trial — because it involved plaintiff's burden of proof at trial.

B. The September 1991 Layoff

To establish a prima facie case for age discrimination Martin must establish that he was a member of the protected class when he was laid off, that he was qualified for his position, and that other similarly situated, but substantially younger employees, were retained. There is no dispute as to the first three of the required four elements of a prima facie case. Martin was 49 when first laid off; thus he was within the protected class of workers over age 40. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). GE does not contest that he was qualified for the position or that he was laid off.

GE does contest, however, whether plaintiff has satisfied the fourth element. GE's argument focuses on whether younger employees replaced Martin. The proper focus in a RIF situation is not whether new workers replaced the plaintiff, but whether similarly situated but substantially younger workers were retained when Martin was laid off. Plaintiff has established this fourth prong. Sixteen employees were listed on the scoring matrix used in connection with the September 1991 layoff.⁴ (Def.Mot. for Summ.J., ex. 6). Martin and two others (Ruggles and Barlow) were laid off. (Ex. to Pl.Resp., p. 25). As shown in the table titled "Ages of Employees Appearing on September 1991 Matrix," Martin was 49 years old when laid off, while substantially younger employees — aged 29, 34, and 40 — were retained.⁵ (Def.Mot. for Summ.J., ex. 2, tab 3). I find that Martin has therefore established a prima facie case with regard to the September 1991 layoff.

Once plaintiff has established a prima facie case of age discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. GE has done so. Plaintiff stipulated that business conditions forced GE to reduce the size of its workforce and that GE had a RIF policy in place which detailed the procedures for filling out the scoring matrix and providing follow-up assistance to employees identified for layoff. (Def.Mot. for Summ.J., ex. 2, tab 2). Plaintiff's score on the relevant matrix was the second lowest; three employees were laid off. GE has thus carried its burden.

To survive the motion for summary judgment Martin must respond with either evidence that discredits GE's proffered reason or evidence that shows that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating cause of GE's decision to lay him off. Martin argues that he has offered both types of evidence. He claims to discredit GE's proffered reason — that plaintiff was the second-lowest scored employee on his matrix — by asserting that the scoring was incorrect and he should have been awarded more points. He also presents evidence which he says shows that age discrimination was likely the motivating reason for GE's decision. I find that plaintiff has not offered sufficient evidence that would discredit GE's given reason, but that he has presented sufficient evidence from which a factfinder could conclude that age discrimination was more likely than not a motivating cause in GE's decision. See Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765.

In attempting to discredit GE's proffered reason for the layoff, Martin argues that his supervisor, Charles Krisch, who filled out the matrix for the September 1991 layoff, underrated plaintiff in several areas. For example, plaintiff received zeros in the skill areas of leadership, communication, and analytical. Plaintiff asserts that he was good in those areas, stating with regard to leadership, "with the group that I inherited.... there was a constant trail to human resources because of the personality problems that they were having ... by the time the matrix was made, there were no problems, everything was resolved. We were working together as a smooth team." (Ex. to Pl. Resp., p. 24). With respect to communications, plaintiff explained that he had daily input into Krisch's voicemail, conceded that "communication" applied both up and down, and offered that he met regularly with his team and tried to kill rumors as fast as they happened. (Id.). Finally, plaintiff explained that he had good analytic skills and that his entire experience at GE had been in identifying and resolving problems. (Id.). Plaintiff's belief as to his own abilities, however, are not sufficient to cast doubt on GE's proffered reason that it laid off plaintiff because he scored low on the skills matrix. Simply, Martin must cast doubt...