Rose & Walker, Inc. v. Swaffar

• Decision Date: 10 January 2000
• Docket Number: No. 53A01-9905-CV-176.,53A01-9905-CV-176.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court
• Parties: ROSE & WALKER, INC., Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Scott E. SWAFFAR and Donna K. Swaffar, and Irwin Union Bank and Trust Company, Appellees-Defendants.

721 N.E.2d 899

ROSE & WALKER, INC., Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Scott E. SWAFFAR and Donna K. Swaffar, and Irwin Union Bank and Trust Company, Appellees-Defendants.

No. 53A01-9905-CV-176.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

January 10, 2000.

Edward F. McCrea, Bloomington, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.

Joan Tupin Crites, John A. Stroh, Columbus, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellees.

OPINION

HOFFMAN, Senior Judge

Plaintiff-Appellant Rose & Walker, Inc. (Rose) appeals the trial court's denial of its motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

Rose raises one issue for our review, which we restate as: whether the trial court erred by denying Rose's motion for summary judgment because it did not comply with Ind.Code § 32-8-3-1.

Defendants-Appellees Scott E. Swaffar and Donna K. Swaffar (Swaffars) were having a residence built on a lot they had purchased. Rose provided insulation and drywall materials for this construction project but was never paid for these materials. Based upon this situation, Rose mailed to the Swaffars a Notice of Lien Rights and Personal Liability. Additionally, Rose recorded in the county recorder's office its Notice of Mechanic's Lien, a copy of which was also sent to the Swaffars. Rose subsequently filed a lawsuit upon its mechanic's lien. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Swaffars and denied Rose's motion for summary judgment because Rose had failed to record with the county recorder a copy of the Notice of Lien Rights and Personal Liability that it had mailed to the Swaffars. This appeal ensued.

The party appealing the denial of summary judgment has the burden of persuading this Court that the trial court's ruling was improper. Morton v. Moss, 694 N.E.2d 1148, 1151 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). Upon review of the denial of a motion for summary judgment, we apply the same standard as the trial court. We resolve any doubt as to any fact, or inference to be drawn therefrom, in favor of the non-moving party. Id. Summary judgment should be granted only when the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). Therefore, on appeal, we must determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the law has been correctly applied by the trial court. Morton, 694 N.E.2d at 1151. A fact is material when its existence facilitates resolution of any of the issues involved. Id. Notwithstanding a conflict in the facts on some elements of a claim, summary judgment is appropriate when there is no dispute with regard to facts which are dispositive of the litigation. Id.

When construing a statute, we may not interpret a statute that is facially clear and unambiguous. Rather, we give the statute its plain and clear meaning. Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, Inc. v. Indiana Statewide Ass'n of Rural Elec. Cooperatives, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 1324, 1327 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). Additionally, when construing a statute, the legislature's definition of individual words is binding upon us. When the legislature has not defined a word, we give the word its common and ordinary meaning. Id. In order to determine the plain and ordinary meaning of words, we may consult English language dictionaries. Id. If a statute is ambiguous, we seek to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. Id. In doing so, we read the individual sections of an act as a whole if it can be reconciled with the rest of the statute. Id. Moreover, we presume that our legislature intended its language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with the underlying goals and policy of the statute. Id.

Indiana's Mechanic's Lien statute creates a lien where none exists at law or in equity. Garage Doors of Indianapolis, Inc. v. Morton, 682 N.E.2d 1296, 1302 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied, 698 N.E.2d 1183 (1998). As a creature of statute, a mechanic's lien exists only by virtue of the claimant's compliance with the statute creating it. Id. Being in derogation of the common law, these statutes have historically been strictly construed. Id.

Here, the parties agree that Rose complied with Ind.Code § 32-8-3-3 entitled "Notice of intention to hold lien; filing." However, there is discord among the parties as to whether Rose complied with the requirements of Ind.Code § 32-8-3-1. This statute provides, in pertinent part:

(e) Any person, firm, partnership, limited liability company, or corporation that sells or furnishes on credit any material, labor or machinery, for the original construction of a single or double family dwelling for the intended occupancy of the owner upon whose real estate the construction takes place to any contractor, subcontractor, mechanic, or anyone other than the owner or the owner's legal representatives shall furnish the owner of the real estate as named in the latest entry in the transfer books described in IC...