EAST TEX. GUIDANCE & ACHIEVEMENT CTR., INC. v. Brockette, TY-76-113-CA.
| Decision Date | 04 April 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. TY-76-113-CA.,TY-76-113-CA. |
| Citation | 431 F. Supp. 231 |
| Parties | EAST TEXAS GUIDANCE AND ACHIEVEMENT CENTER, INC., a Texas Corporation, Individually and as next friend for David August, et al. v. Dr. Martin L. BROCKETTE, State Commissioner of Education for State of Texas and Executive Secretary for the State Board of Education for Texas, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
Kenneth R. Barron, Tyler, Tex., for plaintiffs.
Tracy Crawford, Ramey, Flock, Hutchins, Grainger & Jeffus, Tyler, Tex., for White-house Independent School Dist.
John R. Brumbelow, Tyler, Tex., for Chapel Hill Independent School Dist Elizabeth B. Levatino, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Texas, Austin, Tex., for State of Texas.
Before GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge, and FISHER and STEGER, District Judges.
This is a suit brought by the East Texas Guidance and Achievement Center, a commercial child-caring institution, on behalf of itself and certain children who reside at that institution. The Defendants in this suit are Dr. Martin Brockette, the Commissioner of Education for the State of Texas, the Superintendent and Board of Trustees of the Whitehouse Independent School District, and the Superintendent and Board of Trustees of the Chapel Hill Independent School District.
The Plaintiffs are complaining of section 21.0311 of the Texas Education Code. Section 21.0311 provides as follows:
The effect of this statute is that students who are wards of states other than Texas must pay tuition to attend the public schools in Texas. The Plaintiffs assert that this statute discriminates against them and violates the equal protection clause and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Plaintiffs further assert that rights guaranteed to them under the First and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution have been violated, but their pleadings fail to specify exactly which First and Fifth Amendment rights were violated. These alleged denials of First and Fifth Amendment rights were not urged in the briefs, and the Court determines that the Plaintiffs are no longer relying on them in their constitutional attack on the statute in question.
The Plaintiffs assert that the statute in question deprives them of due process of law because it deprives them of any input into the determination of the tuition rate that should be charged. According to the Plaintiffs, the State Commissioner of Education has approved exorbitant tuition rates which were determined by the school districts in accordance with formulas which the individual school districts themselves have established, all without giving notice and an opportunity to be heard to the Plaintiffs.
The Defendants in this cause contend, in response to the due process claims, that the establishment of the formula by the State Board of Education (hereinafter referred to as the State Board) under which the tuition rates were to be calculated constitutes an exercise of the rule making function of the State Board, and one has no due process right to a hearing prior to an administrative body's exercise of its rule making duty. The Defendants also contend that a public hearing was held before the formula in question was adopted, and further, that state administrative remedies provide the Plaintiffs with an adequate forum for protesting any tuition rates to which they object.
After consideration of the briefs, the pleadings, and the stipulations of facts, the Court is of the opinion that the statute in question does not deprive the Plaintiffs of their right to due process of law guaranteed to them under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Subsection (b) of section 21.0311 provides that the State Board of Education shall establish formulas which govern the calculation of tuition rates. In the Court's view, this determination constitutes an exercise by a governmental agency of its rulemaking function, and there is no constitutional requirement for public hearings before a government agency exercises its rule-making authority. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 64 S.Ct. 641, 88 L.Ed. 892 (1944); Bi-Metallic Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 36 S.Ct. 141, 60 L.Ed. 372 (1915); California Citizens Band Ass'n v. United States, 375 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. den., 389 U.S. 844, 88 S.Ct. 96, 19 L.Ed.2d 112 (1967); Parsons v. United States Postal Service, 380 F.Supp. 815 (D.N. J.1974).
But even if it may be said that due process required a hearing before the State Board adopted the formula for calculating tuition rates, a hearing which afforded due process to the Plaintiffs and similar parties was held by the board. The Texas Open Meetings Law, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6252-17 (Supp.1975-1976) requires that, with certain exceptions irrelevant to this case, every meeting or session of every governmental body shall be open to the public, and further, a state governmental body, such as the State Commission of Education, shall furnish, before each meeting, written notice to the Secretary of State which tells the date, hour, and subject of the meeting, and the Secretary of State shall post the notice, for at least seven days preceding the day of the meeting, on a bulletin board located in the main office of the Secretary of State at a place convenient to the public. Any action taken at a meeting which is held in violation of the Texas Open Meetings Law can be invalidated by judicial action. Lower Colorado Riv. Auth. v. City of San Marcos, 523 S.W.2d 641 (Tex.1975).
There is no indication that the meeting at which the State Board established the formula was not held in compliance with the Texas Open Meetings Law. In the Court's opinion a meeting which complied with the open meetings law would provide to the Plaintiffs a proper hearing. If the Plaintiffs believe that the meeting at which the formula was established was not held in compliance with the open meetings law, the Plaintiffs may seek to have the formula set aside in the appropriate state court.
The laws of Texas afford to the Plaintiffs a further procedure for redressing any grievances they may have concerning either the formula established for calculating tuition rates, or the actual tuition rate charged. Section 11.13 of the Texas Education Code provides:
Under this statute, if the Plaintiffs take issue with the formula established by the State Board, they may appeal the decision of the State Board to the state district court in Travis County, Texas. If they take issue with the tuition rate charged by the school district, they may appeal the rate to the State Commissioner of Education, whose decision may be appealed to the State Board of Education. As previously stated, the decisions of the State Board are appealable to the state district court in Travis County, Texas.
The term "due process of law" used in the Fourteenth Amendment is an abstract one, and the meaning can be elusive. The type of procedures that due process may require depends on the precise nature of the government function involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by the governmental function. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961).
Considering the private interest involved and the nature of the government function complained of in this case, the Court holds that the procedures provided by the laws of the State of Texas comply with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, and the Plaintiffs have not been deprived of due process of law in any respect.
The Plaintiffs' assertion of a denial of rights guaranteed them under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is two-fold.
The Plaintiffs first assert that section 21.0311 deprives them of equal protection of the laws because it does not require payment of tuition for the education of all children residing within the state who are receiving some part of their maintenance expenses from another state, but only requires the payment of tuition for those children who are receiving maintenance expenses from...
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Arredondo v. Brockette
...various components of the state educational system, i. e., the individual school districts. East Texas Guidance and Achievement Center, Inc. v. Brockette, 431 F.Supp. 231, 236 (E.D.Tex. 1977). It must also be remembered that although the Plaintiffs in this case have concentrated their focus......
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Arredondo v. Brockette
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