Clayton v. Swift & Company
| Decision Date | 10 January 1956 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 1101. |
| Citation | 137 F. Supp. 219 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
| Parties | Benjamin CLAYTON, doing business under the fictitious name and style of Refining, Unincorporated, Plaintiff, v. SWIFT & COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant. |
John M. Robinson, Charlotte, N. C., for plaintiff, Charles M. Thomas, Washington, D. C., Barron F. Black, Norfolk, Va., on the brief.
Craighill, Rendleman & Kennedy, Charlotte, N. C., for defendant.
This is a typical patent infringement case, laid in the Charlotte Division of the Western District of North Carolina, under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) "Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business." The complaint alleges that plaintiff now owns through a valid assignment and has sole control as such over letters patent No. 2,247,359, duly issued under the patent laws of the United States. That defendant is infringing said patent; that plaintiff is endamaged and that injunctive relief should be granted, damage assessed, and further intermeddling stopped. Jurisdiction is laid in the court by Title 28 U.S.C. § 1338.
Defendant in due time moves for an order transferring the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice, in accordance with Section 1404(a) Title 28 of the United States Code, which is in the following words: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought."
On the hearing and from the lengthy affidavits filed, evidence heard and argument advanced, it is made to appear that plaintiff is a business man of large and varied interests, and carries on his activities in many places over the United States. He has a place of residence in Pasadena, California and another in Houston, Texas, where it is alleged he does business under a sole proprietorship. He maintains offices and has research facilities and pilot plants in and near Chicago, and likewise maintains two main research and development laboratories in New York City and has other offices as well as incidental places of business elsewhere in the United States. He has no interest whatsoever in the Western District of North Carolina.
The defendant is an Illinois corporation with its main offices, principal laboratories, main research staff, including its principal records, located in the City of Chicago. Its general counsel, patent counsel, and virtually all of the experts constituting its staff reside in Chicago, and in its suburbs. It has large vegetable oil refineries and research facilities, including pilot plants in the greater Chicago area, and likewise has similar plants located in many other places in the United States and abroad. It maintains a small refinery in Charlotte which, however, does not have any laboratory facilities and no technical men are employed there, by which tests or demonstrations could be carried out.
Plaintiff very frankly admitted this forum was selected in view of a favorable, if not controlling decision, heretofore made by the Court of Appeals for this Circuit, in Proctor & Gamble Manufacturing Co. v. Refining, Inc., 4 Cir., 135 F.2d 900.
An action involving these same averments and seeking a similar relief was originally instituted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk Division, by the parties hereto, and following the June 8, 1955 decision of Judge Hoffman, 132 F.Supp. 154, this case was filed in this division. Plaintiff made the same argument with respect to selecting the Virginia forum that he made before me in his selection of this division in which to institute his action.
Judge Hoffman held that such argument was effectively foreclosed by Judge Parker's reasoning in Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp. v. United States Industrial Chemicals, Inc., 4 Cir., 140 F.2d 47, 49, 50, wherein he said:
"Acquaintance with the facts of prior litigation is a matter of doubtful advantage; and certainly abuse of discretion may not be predicated of a judge's refusal to exercise the declaratory jurisdiction, in the face of the prior institution of suit in another District, merely because he has had experience in trying prior litigation involving like issues."
Moreover, Judge Hoffman said:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
MOBIL OIL CORPORATION. v. WR Grace & Company
...Plastics, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., supra, 267 F.Supp. at 943-944; United States v. Swift and Co., supra; Clayton v. Swift and Co., 137 F.Supp. 219 (W.D.N.C. 1956), mandamus denied in Clayton v. Warlick, 232 F.2d 699 (4th Cir. 1956); cf.: Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, supra, 330 U.S. ......
-
Blaski v. Hoffman
...to be considered, but only that the discretion to be exercised is broader." For a discussion of the Norwood case see Clayton v. Swift & Co., D.C., 137 F.Supp. 219, 221. So that there will be no misunderstanding as to our position on the power of a District Court to transfer an action to ano......
-
Pharma-Craft Corporation v. FW Woolworth Co.
...by the statute, has produced a complex of indistinguishable decisions, it seems that Judge Warlick, in Clayton v. Swift & Co., D.C. W.D.N.C., 137 F.Supp. 219, 222, has given us a sound and practical rule to go by when he wrote: "To my way of thinking it the statute means nothing more than t......
-
Leesona Corp. v. Cotwool Mfg. Corp., Judson Mills Div.
...J. Barry, Inc., 4 Cir., 204 F.2d 583; Telephonics Corp. and Fabrionics Corp. v. Lindley & Co., 2 Cir., 291 F.2d 445; Clayton v. Swift & Company, W.D.N.C., 137 F.Supp. 219; Benrus Watch Company v. Bulova Watch Company, D.R.I., 126 F.Supp. 470; Aircraft Marine Products v. Burndy Engineering C......