Price v. Atlantic Ro–Ro Carriers
| Decision Date | 18 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. CCB–11–1735. |
| Citation | 45 F.Supp.3d 494 |
| Parties | Troy D. PRICE, Jr. v. ATLANTIC RO–RO CARRIERS, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Gerald F. Gay, Bernard J. Sevel, Arnold Sevel and Gay PA, Towson, MD, for Troy D. Price, Jr.
J. Stephen Simms, Marios John Monopolis, John Thomas Ward, Simms Showers LLP, Baltimore, MD, Kirk M. Lyons, John Randolph Foster, Lyons and Flood LLP, New York, NY, for Atlantic Ro–Ro Carriers, et al.
Plaintiff Troy D. Price, Jr. seeks relief from defendants Atlantic Ro–Ro Carriers, Inc., Mos Shipping. Ltd., and Baltic Mercur Joint Stock Co. under section 905(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. (“LHWCA”). Price alleges that defendants' negligence resulted in his personal injuries aboard the M/V Valga. The parties have filed three separate motions for summary judgment: (1) defendants move collectively for partial summary judgment, arguing that section 11–108 of the Maryland Code's Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article applies to Price's claim, limiting his prospective noneconomic damages to $695,000; (2) Atlantic Ro–Ro Carriers, Inc. (“ARRC”) moves for summary judgment, alleging that it had no duty to Price under section 905(b) ; and (3) third-party defendant, The Rukert Terminals Corporation (“Rukert”), moves for partial summary judgment, maintaining that defendants' impleader under Rule 14(c) was improper. For the reasons set forth below, the motions will be granted in part and denied in part.
On August 19, 2008, Troy D. Price, Jr., a longshoreman employed by Beacon Stevedoring Corporation, an affiliate of The Rukert Terminals Corporation, was injured aboard the M/V Valga. Owned and operated by Mos Shipping. Ltd. (“Mos”) and Baltic Mercur Joint Stock Co. (“Baltic”), the Valga was moored at a pier in one of Rukert's terminals, where Beacon's harbor workers loaded and unloaded its cargo.
Prior to August 2008, the Valga arrived in Baltimore on a monthly basis transporting cargoes arranged by ARRC, the commercial manager under contract with the vessel's owner. Pursuant to its agreement with Mos, ARRC's role as the Valga's commercial manager required it to negotiate employment, or cargoes, for the vessel; coordinate the vessel's voyages; and appoint stevedores in locations where the vessel found work. (Shannon Decl. Ex. 1, Management Agreement 11, ECF No. 74.) ARRC's responsibilities under the agreement, however, did not extend to the technical management of the Valga, or to the management of its crew. (Id. ) To oversee the loading and unloading of the Valga's cargo in Baltimore, ARRC's “port captain,” Vadim Belyakov, routinely joined the vessel upon its arrival at Rukert's terminals, where he checked the condition of the cargo and communicated with both the stevedores and the crew regarding the operation's logistics. (Belyakov Dep. 11:18–21, 14:14–21, 15:1–8, ECF No. 71–2.) According to Belyakov, while the stevedores worked aboard the vessel, he would split his time between the pier and the Valga. When aboard the Valga, he conducted business from a computer in a private cabin, separated from the decks where the longshoremen discharged the cargo. (Id. at 31:5–19.)
On the day of the accident, Price placed cargo onto the elevator lift in the lower “hold” of the Valga, while a fellow harbor worker, Elliott Nichols, operated a forklift on the upper “tween” deck. Used to raise cargo from the hold to the tween, the elevator lift left a large open “hatch” in the upper deck when lowered back to the hold. The lift was manned by Alexandr Nosov, the Valga engineer responsible for operating the elevator lift and for directing the stevedores to evenly distribute cargo on its platform. (Price Dep. 47:5, ECF No. 77–1.)
After several hours of operations on August 19, fluid—likely from a hydraulic leak in one of the forklifts—began to accumulate on the tween level and remained, despite being visible to the stevedores and crew. (Nichols Dep. 51:17–18, 108:22, 109:1–5, ECF No. 77–3). When Nichols subsequently attempted to maneuver his forklift around the open hatch, the forklift's brakes malfunctioned and its wheels began to skid on the slippery deck. (Id. ) Nichols lost control of the machinery and jumped off the forklift, which then fell through the open hatch and struck Price, who was working in the hold below. Price's leg was severely injured as a result. Nichols, Price, Nosov, and several other stevedores at the work site witnessed Price's accident. (Nosov Dep. 43:18–21, ECF No. 77–2.) Belyakov did not.
Although Price, Nichols, and Nosov disagree about whether safety cones and painted lines surrounded the hatch's opening, they all agree that the platform lacked surrounding metal guardrails, which, according to Belyakov and Nosov, would have impeded the stevedores' ability to remove the cargo from the elevator lift. (Id. at 34:20–22, 35:1.)1 Belyakov, however, was not on the tween deck when the accident occurred, and arrived only after being summoned by the Valga's captain. (Belyakov Dep. 32:1–8.) ARRC did not investigate the accident or its causes and was not involved in any formal probe conducted by Mos, or by Rukert and Beacon. (Id. )
On May 20, 2011, Price filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City alleging that Mos, Baltic, and ARRC negligently permitted the Beacon stevedores to operate forklifts at a high rate of speed around the open and unprotected hatch, failed to rectify the hazard caused by the fluid on the tween deck, and did not properly safeguard the opening in the tween deck. In his complaint, Price claimed damages under the general maritime law and section 905(b) of the LHWCA. On June 23, 2011, defendants removed the suit to this court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and subsequently impleaded Rukert as a third-party defendant.
For his section 905(b) claim, Price seeks damages for pain and suffering in addition to damages for loss of earnings. Because his claim arises under federal maritime law, he maintains that his pain and suffering damages are not subject to Maryland's cap on noneconomic loss. Defendants disagree and moved for partial summary judgment on August 30, 2013.
Meanwhile, employing Rule 14(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants filed a third-party complaint against Rukert, alleging that, although Beacon was the formal employer of the stevedores, Rukert was responsible for both maintaining the forklifts used by longshoremen aboard the Valga and training harbor workers in the correct use of machinery. By failing to meet these duties, Rukert allegedly breached its contract with defendants and contributed to Price's injury. Consequently, defendants counterclaimed for both indemnity or contribution and a judgment against Rukert on behalf of Price. Challenging defendants' use of Rule 14(c), Rukert moved for partial summary judgment on November 18, 2013.
Finally, rejecting Price's claim that ARRC is liable under a theory of vessel negligence, ARRC moved for summary judgment on January 16, 2014. According to ARRC, its limited control over the Valga and the stevedores' operation constrained its duties under section 905(b).
The issues raised by the pending motions were argued at a hearing on July 10, 2014.
According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The Supreme Court has clarified that this does not mean any factual dispute will defeat the motion: “By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original).
“A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,’ but rather must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” See Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 525 (4th Cir.2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) ). The court should “view the evidence in the light most favorable to ... the nonmovant, and draw all inferences in her favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witnesses' credibility.” See Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Medical Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 644–45 (4th Cir.2002). The court must, however, also abide by “the affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.” See Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778–79 (4th Cir.1993) ) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Although defendants acknowledge that Price's section 905(b) claim arises under federal maritime law, they urge the court to apply Maryland's cap on noneconomic damages in personal injury suits. Md.Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 11–108. Though I am mindful of the Supreme Court's warning to avoid “seeking out conflicts between federal and state regulation where none clearly exists,” Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 446, 80 S.Ct. 813, 4 L.Ed.2d 852 (1960), after evaluating the scope of the federal and Maryland rules, I disagree with the defendants. For the reasons explained below, I conclude that Maryland's cap on damages for pain and suffering does not apply to Price's negligence claim under section 905(b).
Courts have permitted state law to supplement federal maritime law in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 214–16, 116 S.Ct. 619, 133 L.Ed.2d 578 (1996) (...
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Price v. Carriers
... 45 F.Supp.3d 494 Troy D. PRICE, Jr. v. ATLANTIC RO–RO CARRIERS, et al. Civil No. CCB–11–1735. United States District Court, D. Maryland. Signed Sept. 18, 2014 ... Motions ... ...