Davidson v. At&T Mobility, LLC

• Decision Date: 21 March 2018
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:17-CV-0006-D
• Parties: THOMAS LANDELL DAVIDSON, Plaintiff, v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC; CITY OF DALLAS, TEXAS; and ALAN JARVIS, Individually, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

THOMAS LANDELL DAVIDSON, Plaintiff, v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC; CITY OF DALLAS, TEXAS;and ALAN JARVIS, Individually, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:17-CV-0006-D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

March 21, 2018

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

In this action by plaintiff Thomas Landell Davidson ("Davidson") asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Texas tort law, defendants AT&T Mobility ("AT&T") and the City of Dallas, Texas ("the City") move to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, and defendant Alan Jarvis ("Jarvis") moves under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss all state-law claims against him. For the reasons that follow, the court grants AT&T's and the City's motions to dismiss, denies Jarvis' motion to dismiss, and grants Davidson leave to replead.

I

The following facts are taken from Davidson's first amended complaint ("amended complaint"), which the court accepts as true for the purposes of deciding the defendants' motions to dismiss.¹

Davidson, a Florida resident, visited Dallas in January 2015. Before he returned to Florida, he stopped at an AT&T store to purchase cell phones for his family. Davidson told a store attendant that AT&T had pre-approved him for a family plan, and that AT&T had told him that he needed a cash deposit when purchasing phones for the plan. The store attendant assisted Davidson in selecting three phones.

When Davidson attempted to pay for the phones in cash, an AT&T manager told him that, due to the value of the three phones, this particular store required a major credit card for the purchase. AT&T's cashier subsequently told Davidson that he could still purchase a single phone with cash. But when Davidson attempted to change his order to a single phone, the AT&T manager informed him that he could not purchase any phones for cash because he had originally requested three phones.

Hearing this, Davidson attempted to question why he was now unable to purchase any phone. At this point, Jarvis—an off-duty City of Dallas policy officer working as a security officer for the mall's landlord—approached Davidson. He yelled at Davidson to "get the hell out" of the store. Although no one else had requested that Davidson leave the store, heagreed to do so.

Davidson began walking to the exit. As he did so, Jarvis grabbed his arm and pushed him to the door. Davidson asked Jarvis not to touch him, considering that he was complying with the request to leave. Jarvis again pushed Davidson as he exited the store. At this point, the incident devolved into more physical violence:

When Davidson turned to face Defendant Jarvis, Jarvis had his fist balled up and proceeded to strike Davidson. Davidson stopped the punch by Jarvis as Jarvis continued to push Davidson out the store and into wall. While Davidson struggled against the unnecessary and unexpected beating, other persons joined in to take Davidson to the ground and hold his legs. While on the ground, Defendant Jarvis began choking Davidson as two other men held Davidson's feet.

Am. Compl. ¶4. As the assault continued, Davidson told Jarvis that he was unable to breathe. When Jarvis did not stop, Davidson attempted to free himself. He also attempted to record the encounter with his cell phone. Both attempts were unsuccessful. Jarvis proceeded to use his taser on Davidson's neck and back several times. Davidson was then arrested and charged with aggravated assault on a public servant, assault on a public servant, and criminal trespass. All charges were eventually dismissed.

Davidson now brings the following claims: against the City² and Jarvis a claim under42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force, seizure, and false arrest and/or false imprisonment; against AT&T and Jarvis Texas-law claims for false arrest and false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress,³ and assault and battery; and against AT&T a claim for negligence. In separate motions, the City and AT&T move to dismiss all claims against them, and Jarvis moves to dismiss all state-law claims against him under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.106(f). Davidson opposes all three motions.

II

Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court evaluates the pleadings by "accept[ing] 'all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'" In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Martin F. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)). To survive a motion to dismiss, Davidson must allege enough facts "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant[s] [are] liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has actedunlawfully." Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 ("Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]"). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Furthermore, under Rule 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Although "the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require 'detailed factual allegations,'" it demands more than "'labels and conclusions.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). And "'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

III

The court first considers Davidson's municipal liability claims against the City under § 1983.

A

A municipality is a "person" subject to suit under § 1983 under certain circumstances. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Although a municipality cannot be held liable simply on a theory of respondeat superior, id. at 691, it can be held liable if a deprivation of a constitutional right is inflicted pursuant to an official policy or custom, Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 579 (5th Cir. 2001). Municipal liability requires proof of three elements: "(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policy maker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) aconstitutional violation whose 'moving force' is that policy or custom." Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 541-42 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The first element requires that Davidson adequately plead an official policy or custom. "[A] policy can be shown through evidence of an actual policy, regulation, or decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by lawmakers or others with policymaking authority." Id. at 542 (citing Burge v. St. Tammany Parish, 336 F.3d 363, 369 (5th Cir. 2003)). Although a "single decision by a [policymaker] may, under certain circumstances, constitute a policy for which a municipality may be liable[,] . . . this 'single incident exception' is extremely narrow and gives rise to municipal liability only if the municipal actor is the final policymaker." Id. (citations, brackets and some internal quotation marks omitted). A custom is "a persistent, widespread practice of City officials or employees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy." Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 579 (quoting Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (per curiam)).

To satisfy the second element, Davidson must adequately plead the identity of a policy maker with "final policymaking authority." Rivera v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988)). "A 'policymaker' must be one who takes the place of a governing body in a designated area of city administration." Webster, 735 F.2d at 841 (citing Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d762, 769 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc)). "City policymakers not only govern conduct; they decide the goals for a particular city function and devise the means of achieving those goals . . . . [T]hey are not supervised except as to the totality of their performance." Bennett, 728 F.2d at 769. "[The court's] analysis must also take into account the difference between final decisionmaking authority and final policymaking authority, a distinction that this circuit recognized as fundamental[.] . . . [D]iscretion to exercise a particular function does not necessarily entail final policymaking authority over that function." Bolton v. City of Dallas, 541 F.3d 545, 548-49 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citations omitted); see also Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 1241, 1247 (5th Cir. 1993) (explaining distinction between final policymaking authority and mere decisionmaking).

The third element requires that Davidson adequately plead that the municipal policy or custom was the "moving force" of the constitutional deprivation, which requires a "high threshold of proof." Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 580 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). The "plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights." Valle, 613 F.3d at 542 (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Davidson therefore ...