Adams v. TEXAS & PAC. MOTOR TRANSPORT CO.

• Decision Date: 10 September 1975
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 72-207.
• Citation: 408 F. Supp. 156
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana
• Parties: Louis ADAMS v. TEXAS & PACIFIC MOTOR TRANSPORT COMPANY.

408 F. Supp. 156

Louis ADAMS v. TEXAS & PACIFIC MOTOR TRANSPORT COMPANY.

Civ. A. No. 72-207.

United States District Court, E. D. Louisiana.

September 10, 1975.

Thomas J. Divens, New Orleans, La., for plaintiff.

Rutledge C. Clement, Jr., Phelps, Dunbar, Marks, Claverie & Sims, New Orleans, La., for defendant Texas & Pacific Motor Transport Co.

John W. Ormond, New Orleans, La., for defendant International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Warehousemen & Chauffeurs, Local 270.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BOYLE, District Judge:

Plaintiff Louis Adams is a black man who sought employment as a truck driver with the defendant company on March 2, 1970. As part of the application procedure, he was required to complete an "employment registration card" and take the Wonderlic Personnel Test. Returning the next day, he was told he would not be hired because he had failed to achieve a required minimum score on the test. No other reason was given for the rejection of his application.

Adams now proceeds against both Texas & Pacific and Local 270 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc.¹ He alleges that the company's use of the Wonderlic test as a precondition of employment effectively discriminated against black applicants such as himself, and represented an employment practice violative of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) and of 1866 (42 U.S.C. § 1981). He seeks declaratory judgment that use of the test was illegal, an injunction against any such further discriminatory practices, and an award of back pay, "other compensation benefits,"² and "reasonable" attorney's fees.

We are constrained at the outset to declare moot plaintiff's claim for permanent injunctive relief. The uncontroverted testimony at trial by Angelo Petrillo, Texas & Pacific's Manager of Safety and Employee Relations, established that the company discontinued use of the test in August of 1971 because of the controversy surrounding it and the expense of validation if it were maintained. There is no indication that use of the test will be renewed. Hence, we proceed to the substantive question of the defendant's liability within the framework of Adams' remaining claims for declaratory and compensatory relief.

As to plaintiff's Title VII cause of action, we restate the established rule that a complainant alleging racial discrimination under the statute carries the initial burden of proving a prima facie case. The Supreme Court has held that this may be done

by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.³

We concern ourselves with the second of these criteria. It is not disputed that, at the time of his application, plaintiff had 12-13 years of truck-driving experience and a valid Louisiana chauffeur's license. However, Mr. Petrillo testified to additional requirements in terms of an applicant's personal and employment background; and the employment registration card,⁴ which each applicant was asked to complete, suggests it was a matter of company policy to inquire into these areas at the very outset.⁵

In keeping with motor carrier safety regulations imposed by the United States Department of Transportation,⁶ it was Texas & Pacific policy to avoid hiring drivers who were accident-prone or had unsafe driving records. Accordingly, one of the first inquiries on the registration card asks how many "chargeable accidents" the applicant has had in the previous three years.⁷ To this question, plaintiff answered "None." Yet the evidence clearly shows that he was involved in two such accidents while employed by Herrin Transportation Company, and that both incidents (one in November, 1968, and the other in February, 1969) occurred well within the three years preceding Adams' application.⁸ Cross-examined at trial, plaintiff simply replied that he omitted reference to the accidents because he did not remember them at the time of his application.

The short-form application card also inquired whether he had ever been convicted or arrested, to which Adams responded "Fight and Assault." Testifying in deposition and at trial, plaintiff elaborated by admitting to arrests and convictions for assaulting a policeman in 1960,⁹ for driving without a license in 1965, for disturbing the peace in 1967, and for assaults in both 1968 and 1969.

Regarding his record of employment, plaintiff was required to list his four previous employers, the dates of employment with each, and the reasons for leaving. He listed: England Transportation, 8/69 to 11/69, "no work left extra man"; Strickland Transportation, 6/69 to 8/69, "no work left & extra man"; Red Ball, 5/69 to 6/69, "work got slack"; and West Bros., 8/62 to 11/68, no reason stated. Without holding a man with an eleventh grade education to strict standards of accuracy in such matters, we are compelled to note the discrepancies between this information and the facts on record.

To begin with the most glaring of these, plaintiff neglected to even mention a 1968-1969 term of employment with Herrin Transportation Company. John Wagoner, a terminal manager at Herrin during the time, testified that Adams was released because of habitual absenteeism. As already noted, plaintiff also had two chargeable accidents while with Herrin. Further, although "no work" is given as the reason for leaving his most recent employer, England Transportation, it appears that plaintiff filed an EEOC grievance alleging a racially motivated discharge by that company. The Commission's decision letter rejects the charge, noting instead that "the evidence of record does establish that Charging Party had a less than satisfactory production record . . ." with the company.¹⁰ Finally, a complaint in section A of this court was filed on behalf of plaintiff on May 30, 1974, wherein it is alleged he was employed by Red Ball not from "5/69 to 6/69," but from February of 1968 to January of 1971, and that he was discharged "because of race" and not because work got slack.¹¹

It is not necessary to hold as a matter of law that, on the basis of the foregoing, Texas & Pacific was bound to reject plaintiff's application. Nothing in the DOT safety regulations requires rejection of an application by one with Adams' driving record.¹² Nor is it the position of Texas & Pacific, expressed through Mr. Petrillo, that his driving record alone or his employment record alone or his convictions and arrests alone would have mandated rejection of Adams' application. We do find, however, that ample support exists in the record for Petrillo's testimony that Louis Adams — given the conglomerate of circumstances in his background — was not qualified to be a truck driver for the defendant company. His record of unsafe driving,¹³ convictions and arrests, and his troubled relations with prior employers all would have contributed to, and justified, a decision that he was not fit for employment, aside from his performance on the Wonderlic test.

As has been mentioned, the short-form application form was a screening device. Had Adams answered its inquiries truthfully, we are convinced his application would have proceeded no further. Through material misrepresentations and omissions on the card, however, he was able to take the Wonderlic test, his score simply providing grounds for his inevitable rejection. Petrillo's testimony establishes that, even had he passed the test, Adams' hiring would have been on a probationary basis. Investigation by the company into his driving and employment record, as required by law,¹⁴ quickly would have exposed the falsity of his application in these areas, and this alone probably would have led to his discharge. In any event, the disclosures also would have revealed what was true to begin with: that plaintiff lacked the necessary qualifications to serve in the position for which he had applied.

Admittedly, job qualification is but one of the four elements of a prima facie case under Title VII which the Supreme Court listed in McDonnell, supra; and the specifications were not announced as absolutes in every case, but as guidelines which would vary with each factual situation.¹⁵ Nonetheless, we concur in our Circuit Court's recent observation that one's qualification for a position he has been denied is a "necessary element to a finding of job discrimination."¹⁶ Accordingly, we find that plaintiff's lack of the necessary qualifications to drive a truck for Texas & Pacific — whether revealed to the company earlier or later than his Wonderlic test performance — is fatal to his Title VII cause of action. In so holding, we echo the language of the Supreme Court in its landmark decision which reprobated use of this same pre-employment test:

Congress did not intend by Title VII . . . to guarantee a job to every person regardless of qualifications.¹⁷

Plaintiff also alleges a violation of his civil rights under section 1981 of the U.S.Code, Title 42.¹⁸ Of course, his failure to establish an employment practice violative of Title VII does not foreclose a challenge that the same practice is racially discriminatory under section 1981.¹⁹ Separate consideration of the claims is warranted even though they derive from an identical theory, i. e., that use of Wonderlic as a pre-employment test was discriminatory not by intention but in effect.

We recognize that, in Title VII litigation following the landmark opinion of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra, such use of Wonderlic has been rejected.²⁰ In applying Griggs to the present case, however,²¹ we also recognize the need for a twofold analysis. First, discriminatory impact via administration of the test must be not only alleged but evidenced. Only then is the employer expected to demonstrate that,...