Shipley v. Pittsburgh & LER Co.

• Decision Date: 18 September 1946
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 5586.
• Citation: 68 F. Supp. 395
• Parties: SHIPLEY et al. v. PITTSBURGH & L. E. R. CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

68 F. Supp. 395

SHIPLEY et al. v. PITTSBURGH & L. E. R. CO.

Civil Action No. 5586.

District Court, W. D. Pennsylvania.

September 18, 1946.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Alexander Unkovic, and Kountz, Fry, Staley & Meyer, by Austin L. Staley, all of Pittsburgh, Pa., for plaintiffs.

Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay, by James R. Orr, all of Pittsburgh, Pa., for defendant.

GOURLEY, District Judge.

This is an action filed in the first instance by twenty-four (24) named plaintiffs against the Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Railroad Company, each of whom were employees of said Company, a Pennsylvania corporation. Said action is based under a written contract for services performed beyond their ordinary and routine responsibilities, and for such services they claim to be entitled to extra compensation under the provisions of the aforesaid contract, and a recognized universal custom which existed at the time the contract was executed and the services performed.

It is set forth in the complaint that said extra services were performed in the coupling of air or steam hose, or in the chaining and unchaining of cars, but the cause of action which was based on the chaining and the unchaining of cars was withdrawn by the plaintiffs and an Order of Court has been duly signed which limits the right of recovery, if any, to the coupling of air or steam hose.

In the action filed by the twenty-four (24) original plaintiffs against the defendant, as is disclosed by the complaint, a diversity of citizenship is alleged and each of the original plaintiffs has a claim in excess of $3,000. It is furthermore set forth that there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights of approximately one hundred fifty (150) employees of the Defendant Company. It is further set forth that a common relief is sought by each of the plaintiffs, to wit, a right of recovery for services performed which were not required by the contract executed with the defendant, and for which the plaintiffs are entitled to recovery on the basis of a nation-wide established, habitual and customary practice among railroads and their employees.

Subsequent to the filing of said complaint, fifty-eight (58) additional named plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to intervene as party plaintiffs, in which it is set forth that each of said intervenors had been an employee of the Defendant Company during the period of time referred to in the complaint, and that each of them has a question of law or a question of fact in common with all of the plaintiffs who were parties in the original complaint. Although none of the plaintiffs in the motion to intervene satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of both diversity of citizenship and a claim in excess of $3,000, exclusive of interest and costs, the basis for the allowance of intervention is premised on the provisions of Rules 23 and 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c.

In addition thereto, the defendant has moved the Court to require the plaintiffs to submit a bill of particulars with respect to the plaintiffs' original complaint, and more particularly with respect to matters involving the dates and times when and where the plaintiffs performed the coupling of air or steam hose for which they are seeking compensation. Each of the questions has been duly argued before the Court, briefs have been presented, and a careful consideration and review has been given by the Court to the matters presented at argument and the various authorities cited in the respective briefs.

The Court will first consider the motion filed by the defendant for a bill of particulars. In connection therewith, it is only necessary to make brief comment.

This is true for at the time of argument the defendant requested that counsel for the plaintiffs make available such information as they have, or which they might be able to reasonably secure from each of the plaintiffs, as to the nature or extent of the employment of each of said plaintiffs which gives rise to the cause of action set forth in the complaint. Counsel for the plaintiffs expressed their willingness to make available such information which the Court believed proper and which it, therefore, directed. Although the records of the Defendant Company would show in detail the nature of the employment of each of the plaintiffs and the services performed during the period of time set forth in the complaint, it was believed that the defendant was entitled to any knowledge or information which any of the plaintiffs might have as to when the services were performed generally upon which the cause of action would be based. Fleming v. Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp., D.C., 41 F.Supp. 330.

An appropriate order will, therefore, be filed by the Court in connection with the motion for a bill of particulars.

The next question before the Court for consideration is more involved, and generally is expressed as follows: Where a class action has been filed, in which jurisdiction is based on the diversity of citizenship and amount involved being in excess of $3,000, does the Court have jurisdiction to permit the intervention of other claimants in the class as new plaintiffs under the provisions of Rules 23(a) Paragraph (3) and 24(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, although there is no diversity of citizenship between the intervenors and the defendant, and the intervenors' claims are less than $3,000 in each instance?

It is first essential to refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which are involved herein.

"Rule 23. Class Actions.

"(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is

"(1) * * *

"(2) * * *

"(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought."

"Rule 24. Intervention. * * *

"(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common. In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties."

It must first be borne in mind that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not either extend or limit the jurisdiction or venue of the Federal Courts.

"Rule 82. Jurisdiction and Venue Unaffected.

"These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the district courts of the United States or the venue of actions therein."

Each of the plaintiffs involved in this proceeding has a common question of law as to whether or not the contract executed with the defendant is subject to the custom, or established and habitual practice, upon which it is claimed that the right of recovery exists. However, each of the plaintiffs allege that certain services were performed for the defendant which were not required during the period, to wit, beginning on the date which immediately precedes by six (6) years the date of the filing of this action, April 10, 1946, and ending December 1, 1944. It is apparent that some of the plaintiffs might be found to have performed the services complained of, and others may not be able, for one reason or another, to establish or prove that the services were performed and, therefore, no right of recovery might exist.

It would, therefore, appear that the rights of the individual plaintiffs and the persons who desired to intervene are separate causes of action, and they have no right to a common fund or to common property, but each case would rest on its individual facts as to recovery and the amount thereof from a factual standpoint. As a result thereof, even if the legal question as to whether or not the contract can be modified or abrogated, as a result of the custom which exists would be interpreted favorably as contended by the plaintiffs, each of the plaintiffs would be obligated to prove that said services were performed in each instance, and the periods of time when performed, and it is, therefore, apparent that one of the plaintiffs may be able to support his claim and another plaintiff may not. It, therefore, appears to me that although there is a joint or common interest on the part of the plaintiffs in one part of the subject matter or from a legal standpoint, there is not a joint and common interest in another part of the controversy or from a factual standpoint. It is a definite and general rule that when several plaintiffs assert separate and distinct claims in a single suit, the amount involved in each separate controversy must be of the requisite amount to be within the jurisdiction of a district court, and those amounts cannot be added together to satisfy jurisdictional requirements. Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594, 36 S.Ct. 416, 60 L.Ed. 817; Grand Rapids Furniture Co. et al. v. Grand Rapids Furniture Co., 7 Cir., 127 F.2d 245; Clark et al. v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 59 S.Ct. 744, 83 L.Ed. 1001.

It is the policy of Congress to have citizens of different states settle their disputes in state courts unless the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of $3,000, or unless the matter involves a federal statute, and this same rule has application between citizens who reside in the same state. This rule is only subject to modification when the plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right in which they have a common, undivided interest, both as to law and facts, and, in such event, it is enough if their interests collectively equal the jurisdictional amount. Sturgeon v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 6 Cir., 143...