Hudjohn v. S&G MACHINERY CO.
Decision Date | 22 June 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 01-02-40656; A121002.,01-02-40656; A121002. |
Citation | 114 P.3d 1141,200 Or. App. 340 |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Parties | Alexander HUDJOHN, Appellant, v. S&G MACHINERY CO., an Oregon corporation, and Deere & Company, a foreign corporation, Respondents. |
Dwain M. Clifford, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were James T. McDermott and Ball Janik LLP.
Bruce H. Orr, Portland, argued the cause for respondent S&G Machinery Co. With him on the briefs were James E. Bartels and Meyer & Wyse LLP.
R. Daniel Lindahl, Portland, argued the cause for respondent Deere & Company. With him on the brief were Stephen F. English, Peter J. Viteznick, and Bullivant Houser Bailey PC.
Before HASELTON, Presiding Judge, and ORTEGA, Judge, and DEITS, Judge pro tempore.
Plaintiff appeals from a judgment for defendants in this personal injury action, raising several assignments of error. Defendants counter with a battery of cross-assignments of error, including a contention that the trial court erred in denying defendants' motion for a directed verdict based on the legal insufficiency of plaintiff's proof of medical causation. As explained below, we agree with defendants that the trial court so erred. See Chouinard v. Health Ventures, 179 Or.App. 507, 512, 39 P.3d 951 (2002)
. Accordingly, we affirm.
In reviewing the denial of a motion for directed verdict, we view the evidence, including reasonable attendant inferences, in the right most favorable to the nonmoving party, here, plaintiff. Mauri v. Smith, 324 Or. 476, 479, 929 P.2d 307 (1996); Joshi v. Providence Health System, 198 Or.App. 535, 536, 108 P.3d 1195 (2005). To place the directed verdict motion in procedural context, we recount the background of this litigation and then, consistently with the standard of review, describe plaintiff's evidence pertaining to causation of injury.
In the summer of 2000, plaintiff was working for defendant S&G Machinery Co. (S&G) in La Grande. S&G is an authorized dealer of defendant Deere & Company (Deere). On or about July 26, 2000, plaintiff's supervisor told plaintiff to puncture and drain approximately 50 spent aerosol cans that had contained Deere products, including paints, cleaning agents, and lubricants. The supervisor directed plaintiff to puncture the cans, using a so-called "apparatus," draining the liquid into a bucket.
At least some of the products in the aerosol cans contained hazardous chemicals. For example, the label on Deere paint cans bore the following warning:
The label also included a warning: "Do not puncture or incinerate (burn) container."1 Nevertheless, plaintiff's supervisor gave plaintiff no warnings and did not provide plaintiff with a respirator or protective clothing.
Plaintiff punctured and drained the cans for between 30 and 45 minutes, working roughly five feet away from a large, partially opened shop door. Immediately afterward, plaintiff told a coworker that he felt "light-headed." In the days and weeks that followed—and, for the most part, continuing at the time of trial—plaintiff experienced extreme fatigue, nausea, weight loss, trembling in his extremities, forgetfulness, and mental "confusion." When plaintiff's parents saw him for the first time after July 26, approximately a week later, they were extremely concerned about his appearance and behavior. According to plaintiff's father, plaintiff "was not the same person I knew."
Plaintiff subsequently filed a workers' compensation claim against S&G for a "neurological injury to his brain" from alleged workplace exposure to toxic vapors on or about July 26, 2000. S&G denied that claim in November 2000. On January 4, 2002, an evidentiary hearing on that claim was held before an administrative law judge (ALJ). Plaintiff, as claimant, and S&G offered medical evidence on the questions of whether plaintiff had suffered a brain or neurological injury and whether the July 2000 episode, as described by plaintiff, could have caused such an injury. On April 22, 2002, the ALJ issued an opinion and order, determining that plaintiff had failed to prove the compensability of his claim:
(Emphasis added.) Plaintiff did not appeal the ALJ's order to the Workers' Compensation Board.
Meanwhile, in October 2000, plaintiff had filed this civil action, alleging, inter alia, claims for "deliberate" personal injury against S&G and for negligence against Deere. Extensive motions practice ensued, much of which pertained to S&G's invocation of immunity from civil liability by virtue of the "workers' compensation exclusivity" statute, ORS 656.018(1)(a).2 Ultimately, plaintiff filed the operative first amended complaint, alleging claims for negligence against both S&G and Deere. In that complaint, plaintiff sought to recover damages for the following alleged injuries:
In December 2002, S&G moved for summary judgment on three alternative grounds. First, the exception to workers' compensation exclusivity embodied in the "Smothers-fix" statute, ORS 656.019(1)(a), did not apply to plaintiff's negligence claims against S&G because the ALJ had rejected plaintiff's workers' compensation claim on grounds other than plaintiff's "fail[ure] to establish that a work-related incident was the major contributing cause of the worker's injury."3 Specifically, the ALJ had determined that plaintiff had failed to prove that (a) he had suffered any neurological or brain injury; and (b) any workplace exposure was a material cause, much less a major cause, of any injury. Second, ORS 656.019(1)(a) was further inapposite because the ALJ's order was not "final" within the meaning of that statute—that is, the statute applied only in circumstances in which the Workers' Compensation Board had determined the noncompensability of a claim. Third, under principles of either issue preclusion or claim preclusion, the ALJ's...
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