FISCHER & PORTER COMPANY v. Haskett
Decision Date | 07 August 1968 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 42087. |
Citation | 287 F. Supp. 831 |
Parties | FISCHER & PORTER COMPANY v. James F. HASKETT and Capital Controls Co., Inc. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Solomon, Tolson & Resnick, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.
David N. Bressler, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendants.
On February 14, 1967, the plaintiff, Fischer and Porter Company, instituted this action against the defendants James F. Haskett and Capital Controls Company, Inc. In its Declaratory Judgment Complaint the plaintiff requested a declaratory judgment that a patent, United States Patent Letters Number 3,220,430, obtained by the defendant Haskett and subsequently assigned to the defendant Capital Controls, was invalid, or, in the alternative, a judgment compelling the defendants to assign their entire interests in the patent to the plaintiff. The plaintiff also requested an injunction restraining the defendants from prosecuting any actions charging them with infringement of Patent No. 3,220,430. In their answer the defendants denied the plaintiff's allegations that the patent was invalid and that the invention was the property of the plaintiff. The defendants also counterclaimed on the basis that the plaintiff was infringing Patent No. 3,220,430.
Presently the defendants have made a motion pursuant to Rules 15(a) and 13(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for leave to file an amended answer and counterclaims. In their proposed amended answer the defendants seek to add two additional defenses to the plaintiff's complaint, i.e. a defense of laches and a defense of estoppel and/or waiver, and to correct a typographical error in paragraph two of their original counterclaim by changing the word "defendant" to "plaintiff". The defendants also seek to add four additional counterclaims to their answer:
(1) A "Second Counterclaim" which essentially charges the plaintiff with an attempt to monopolize the market for gas chlorinators, the product covered by the patent in question, in violation of the Federal anti-trust statutes;
(2) A "Third Counterclaim" which charges the plaintiff with acts of unfair competition;
(3) A "Fourth Counterclaim" which charges the plaintiff with abuse and/or misuse of civil process allegedly evidenced by the institution and prosecution of the current Declaratory Judgment action; and,
(4) The "Fifth Counterclaim" which charges the plaintiffs with violating the Pennsylvania Unfair Sales Act, 1941, August 11, P.L. 900, § 1 et seq., 73 P.S. § 211 et seq. The plaintiff has opposed the defendants' motion in its entirety. For reasons discussed below the Court has decided that it must deny the defendants' motion to amend to the extent that it seeks to add the "Fourth Counterclaim" which charges the plaintiff with abuse and/or misuse of process. All other amendments to the defendants' answer and counterclaims will be allowed.
See generally, Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962). As the Supreme Court emphasized in Foman, ibid, p. 182, 83 S.Ct. p. 230, leave to amend should be denied only when there is strong justification for not permitting the amendment:
"* * * undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. * * *."
Insofar as the defendants' motion seeks to amend their answer proper it is clear that the procedural policies reflected in Rule 15(a) and in Foman, supra, require this Court to grant the motion. The plaintiff has not established either that such amendment would prejudice him or that there exist any other compelling reasons for denying this aspect of the defendants' motion. The defendants' delay in asserting these additional defenses is not itself a sufficient basis for denying the motion to amend. See generally, Coopersmith Bros., Inc. v. Stefko Boulevard Shopping Center, Inc., 30 F.R.D. 1, 2 (E.D.Pa. 1962).
Although the Court agrees that it is improper to permit parties to institute and/or complicate litigation with general and vague anti-trust complaints, it is clear that the...
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