Chicago, I.&L. Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of Indiana

Citation175 Ind. 630,95 N.E. 364
Decision Date23 May 1911
Docket NumberNo. 21,641.,21,641.
CourtSupreme Court of Indiana
PartiesCHICAGO, I. & L. RY. CO. v. RAILROAD COMMISSION OF INDIANA.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Superior Court, Marion County; Jno. L. McMaster, Judge.

Action by the Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville Railway Company against the Railroad Commission of Indiana. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.E. C. Field, H. R. Kurrie, and William L. Taylor, for appellant. Hanly McAdams & Artman and C. V. McAdams, for appellee.

MORRIS, J.

Certain shippers at Bloomington, Ind., filed with the State Railway Commission their petition against appellant and the Indianapolis Southern Railway Company, in which it was alleged that there is a physical connection between the lines of respondents in that city, and praying for an order requiring them to publish and file with the Commission just and reasonable rates for switching car load traffic between their lines and all the industries of the city, and that they be required to apply the same for two years to the movement of all traffic destined on either line at Bloomington from points in Indiana. Afterward on May 25, 1909, the petition was heard by the Commission, and it entered a finding and order in which it found respondent's switching tariffs unreasonable and discriminatory, as alleged in the petition and ordered respondents to issue, publish, and file with the Commission switching tariffs for the city of Bloomington, of $3 per car load for the movement of all commodities, which order was to be in effect for two years commencing June 11, 1909; the order was to apply to the movement of all commodities in car loads from respondents' interchange track, in the city, to the several points of loading and unloading of the several industries, located along the tracks and sidings of respondents, as indicated in their tariffs, and the order was also to apply for such time, to the movement of such traffic from all such industries, etc., to such interchange track. On June 14, 1909, appellant filed in the superior court of Marion county its complaint against the Commission, in which it was alleged that the above order was void, and praying that it be so declared, and that the appellee be enjoined from taking any action to enforce it. While this complaint was pending, the Commission issued an order supplemental to the one issued on May 25th, by which it was provided that neither of said respondents should be required, under the order, to furnish cars for outbound traffic loaded on their respective lines, destined over the line of the other company, but in such cases the line which was to perform the transportation should furnish empty cars to the switching line at the junction point, to be by it taken to the point of loading and returned to the junction point; and provided, also, that the carriers should not be required to perform such switching services in any case where such carrier can transport the freight to destination and point of delivery with reasonable dispatch, and at the same rate as the line offering the car, and at the time shall be prepared to perform the service. Appellant thereupon amended its complaint, setting out therein the above modification of the original order.

To this complaint the Commission filed an answer of general denial. There was a trial, and special finding of facts, and conclusions of law thereon by the court and judgment for defendant, from which this appeal is prosecuted. The errors assigned are based on the action of the court in overruling appellant's motion for a new trial, and on each of its conclusions of law stated. Among the many facts found, the following are the most important: Appellant for many years, before the bringing of the action, owned and operated a line of steam railroad extending from Michigan City through Bloomington to New Albany; also one from Hammond to Indianapolis, one from Orleans to French Lick Springs, one from Bedford to Linton, and from Wallace Junction to Linton, all in Indiana; that 75 per cent. of appellant's traffic moves in interstate commerce; that appellant's railway is crossed by many other railways in Indiana, and physical connections have been made at such crossings for the interchange of car load traffic; physical connection was made between respondents in the year 1905, since when car load traffic has been interchanged there. On April 28, 1909, appellant published and filed a switching tariff rate applicable to Bloomington Junction. At that time two industries were located on the Indianapolis Southern. Since January 1, 1907, there has been a car service rule in effect at Bloomington fixing a charge of $1 per day for detention of car in loading or unloading, over 48 hours. There were joint rates on coal in effect before the order of the Commission was made; there are on appellant's line, three coal mines which produce bituminous coal, and are served alone by appellant. There are coal mines on the Indianapolis Southern. There are also mines on the Vandalia Railroad in Indiana, which, in connection with the Indianapolis Southern carries coal from such mines to Bloomington on a joint rate with the Southern. That at no time has there been in effect any switching rate, whereby coal in car loads arriving at Bloomington, on the Southern, on its local rate, or on the joint rate with the Vandalia, could be switched from the junction point to industries on appellant's line at Bloomington, and no such coal has been switched; neither has any stone been switched. On appellant's line at Bloomington are located industries that used great quantities of coal in car load lots. The coal produced on the line of the Vandalia is somewhat superior, in quality, to that on appellant's line, but in the market and commercially the two kinds are substantially the same. That there are 15 siding and spur tracks connecting with appellant's main line at Bloomington. That 10 of these tracks are known as private tracks though maintained by appellant, and are used by appellant and industries located thereon solely for the purpose of serving the various mills, yards, and factories located thereon respectively. That the remaining five tracks are variously designated in railroad parlance as “team tracks,” “hauling tracks,” and “public tracks,” and are used in serving a few industries located thereon, and those who have no place of business on the tracks, and the public generally; that the several mills, yards, factories and other industries-twenty-eight in number-located on appellant's sidings are wholly dependent on appellant to deliver to and take from them car load traffic coming in, or departing, over the Southern railway. Appellant and the Indianapolis Southern are in active competition at Bloomington for traffic, and rates fixed by them are substantially the same. The court found that the switching rates ordered by the Commission were fair and reasonable. Under the assignment of error in overruling appellant's motion for a new trial it asserts that the lower court erred in failing to find that the facilities of appellant are insufficient to handle the business. The court made no finding on this matter.

The direct evidence on this subject was confined to two of appellant's witnesses, C. T. McHugh, trainmaster, and A. K. Helton, appellant's station agent at Bloomington. The former, among other things, testified that we have got all we can take care of with our present facilities-to take care of our own business; *** the conditions are badly congested.” Helton testified that appellant's facilities at Bloomington are not sufficient to handle the business of appellant, and have not been for three or four years. But he further testified that appellant did not use the tracks named in the tariff (private tracks) for storing purposes. We do not intend to disturb these tracks. The lack of facilities complained of by appellant is track room.”

[1] Appellee contends that the lower court did not err because the complaint is too vague and indefinite, and, strictly construed, it could not be held to relate to anything else than the arrangements for handling the business to and from the tracks, where it is to be loaded or unloaded. The part of the complaint relating to this subject is as follows: “The plaintiff also avers that, in constructing the facilities at Bloomington, it has only provided sufficient facilities to accommodate its own business, and it does not have facilities sufficient to handle the business of the Indianapolis Southern.” In the absence of a motion to make the complaint more definite and certain, in this particular, it is sufficient.

[2] In the second place appellee contends that the order of the Commission does not require the appellant to do anything except to desist from charging the old rate, and to substitute therefor the new rate, for switching; that the Commission found appellant at work, and merely fixed the price of its labor, and left it at work. This statement is not accurate. The court in its finding states that on April 28, 1909, plaintiff published and filed with the Commission its terminal tariff regulating the switching of car load traffic at the junction of Bloomington, and that at no time had in effect any switching charge tariff, or terminal rate, at Bloomington, whereby coal in car loads, arriving at Bloomington on the Indianapolis Southern railway, on its local fifty cent rate, or on the sixty cent rate with the Vandalia railway, could be switched, from the Junction point at Bloomington, to industries located on the line of the plaintiff company. There was no switching rate on stone. In the order of the Commission, which it is here sought to vacate, the Commission finds that “the rates complained of *** are unreasonable, excessive, and discriminatory. *** That the exception, by the respondents, from such traffic, and their operation, and application, of certain commodities in car loads, as shown by such tariffs, while...

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