Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Estate of Lawson
Citation | 175 So.3d 327 |
Decision Date | 28 August 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 1D14–4675.,1D14–4675. |
Parties | SHANDS TEACHING HOSPITAL AND CLINICS, INC., d/b/a Shands Vista, Petitioner, v. The ESTATE OF ASHLEY LAWSON, by and Through John Mark LAWSON, Personal Representative, Respondent. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
Christine Davis Graves of Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A., Tallahassee, for Petitioner.
Brandon S. Vesely and Nicole M. Ziegler of Keane, Reese, Vesely & Gerdes, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Respondent.
EN BANC
Shands Teaching Hospital and Clinics, Inc., d/b/a Shands Vista, an adult psychiatric hospital, seeks a writ of certiorari to quash an order denying its motion to dismiss a negligence action. Shands asserts that the Estate of Ashley Lawson failed to comply with mandatory presuit requirements under chapter 766, Florida Statutes (2014), before bringing a medical negligence claim cloaked in allegations of ordinary negligence. We have certiorari jurisdiction and conclude that because the claim arises from the services and care Shands was giving to a patient in a locked psychiatric unit, the complaint alleges medical negligence under section 766.106(1)(a), Florida Statutes. We thus grant the petition and quash the order.
The Estate filed a complaint against Shands on the heels of a tragic accident. In January 2013, more than two months after Ashley Lawson had been admitted with a psychiatric condition to the locked unit at Shands Vista for safety reasons, she apparently took an employee's unattended keys and badge and escaped the hospital. Ms. Lawson made her way onto a nearby interstate highway and into the path of a truck, which struck and killed her. The Estate subsequently sued Shands alleging ordinary negligence and disavowing medical negligence. Shands moved to dismiss, claiming that the complaint actually sounded in medical negligence and that the Estate hadn't complied with the mandatory presuit requirements of chapter 766. But the trial court denied Shands' motion. It concluded that the Estate's complaint was for ordinary negligence because of an allegation that Ms. Lawson was not receiving care or services when the breach occurred. Shands responded with a petition for writ of certiorari seeking relief from the order denying its motion to dismiss.
Certiorari review of the denial of a motion to dismiss is ordinarily unavailable. Baptist Med. Ctr. of Beaches, Inc. v. Rhodin, 40 So.3d 112, 114–15 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (citing Martin–Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So.2d 1097, 1099 (Fla.1987) ). But an exception applies to cases, like this one, where a defendant asserts that an order erroneously excuses a plaintiff from complying with chapter 766's presuit requirements. Id. Chapter 766 requires potential plaintiffs to investigate the merits of a claim and provide notice of intent to litigate before filing suit. Id. at 115. Where disputes arise regarding compliance with chapter 766's requirements, “[c]ertiorari review is proper to review the denial of a motion to dismiss.” Goldfarb v. Urciuoli, 858 So.2d 397, 398 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) ; see also Rhodin, 40 So.3d at 115 ; S. Baptist Hosp. of Fla., Inc. v. Ashe, 948 So.2d 889, 890 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).
For a court to grant certiorari relief from the denial of a motion to dismiss, a petitioner must establish three elements: (1) a departure from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the remainder of the case (3) that cannot be corrected on post-judgment appeal. Williams v. Oken, 62 So.3d 1129, 1132 (Fla.2011). As for elements (2) and (3), we have recognized that allowing noncomplying medical negligence litigation to proceed frustrates the purposes of the Medical Malpractice Reform Act and imposes material and irreparable harm to medical defendants. See Rhodin, 40 So.3d at 115 ; see also Holmes Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Dumigan, 151 So.3d 1282, 1284–85 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014). As for element (1), the legal merits prong of the test, we have said an order departs from the essential requirements of chapter 766 when a respondent fails to satisfy presuit requirements before bringing a medical negligence claim. Rhodin, 40 So.3d at 115–16.
The specific presuit issue here—whether the claim sounds in medical negligence (requiring presuit compliance), or ordinary negligence (no presuit requirements)—is a familiar one which courts have analyzed in familiar ways under the applicable statute. See, e.g., Rhodin, 40 So.3d at 115–16 ; Lakeland Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Pilgrim, 107 So.3d 505 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) ; S. Miami Hosp., Inc. v. Perez, 38 So.3d 809 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) ; Indian River Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Browne, 44 So.3d 237 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) ; Dumigan, 151 So.3d 1282. “[W]hether a claimant has satisfied threshold requirements [of chapter 766], warranting denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss, presents an issue of law.” Rhodin, 40 So.3d at 116 ; Dirga v. Butler, 39 So.3d 388, 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) ( ). Section 766.106(1)(a) defines a “ ‘[c]laim for medical negligence’ or ‘claim for medical malpractice’ [as] a claim, arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.” The task for the courts is to “decide from [the allegations] whether the claim arises ‘out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.’ ” Ashe, 948 So.2d at 890 ( ). See also J.B. v. Sacred Heart Hosp. of Pensacola, 635 So.2d 945, 949 (Fla.1994) ( ). If we conclude that the complaint sounds in ordinary negligence, we must deny the petition. See, e.g., Ashe, 948 So.2d at 891. But if the Estate's claim is for medical negligence, then “we must quash [the order].” Rhodin, 40 So.3d at 115.
The key allegations in the Estate's complaint state:
Shands argues that the trial court's order departed from the essential requirements of law by elevating conclusory “ordinary negligence” labels alleged in the complaint over patently conflicting fact allegations that amount to a medical negligence claim. The complaint alleges that Shands had a legal duty to confine Ms. Lawson within the locked unit, where she had been admitted because her psychiatric condition demanded the safety and security of a “locked unit.” Shands apparently provided this 24–7 confinement service to Ms. Lawson for some two and a half months before she, “[a]s a direct and proximate cause of [Shands'] breach of its duty, ... impulsively eloped.” Despite the Estate's disavowals of medical negligence, we agree with Shands because under § 766.106(1)(a), the harm alleged in the Complaint arose from Shands' duty (and failure) to confine Ms. Lawson inside the hospital, which was the very service that the locked unit existed to provide. Because the breach arose from Shands' provision, and ultimate failure, to keep Ms. Lawson confined within its locked unit, and was the service that Ms. Lawson's condition allegedly required, we conclude that the Estate's claim arises out of the medical care, treatment, and services provided to her for purposes of § 766.106(1)(a).
We recognize that the Estate alleged when the breach occurred. But simply labeling allegations as “ordinary negligence” is not dispositive. Omni Healthcare, Inc. v. Moser, 106 So.3d 474, 475 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). Courts must look beyond the legal labels urged by plaintiffs and “must[ ] apply the law to the well-pleaded factual allegations and decide the legal issue of whether the complaint sounds in simple or medical negligence.” Dr. Navarro's Vein Ctr. of Palm Beach, Inc. v. Miller, 22 So.3d 776, 778 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).
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