Lakewood Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., LLC v. Dep't of Pub. Health

• Decision Date: 02 November 2015
• Docket Number: No. 3–14–0899.,3–14–0899.
• Citation: 43 N.E.3d 203
• Parties: LAKEWOOD NURSING & REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. The DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH; The Director of the Department of Public Health; and Helen Sauvageau, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

43 N.E.3d 203

LAKEWOOD NURSING & REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.The DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH; The Director of the Department of Public Health; and Helen Sauvageau, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 3–14–0899.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

Nov. 2, 2015.

Holly Turner, Branson, Missouri, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Chicago (Carolyn E. Shapiro, Solicitor General, and Frank H. Bieszczat, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appelleesDirector of Department of Public Health and Department of Public Health.

OPINION

Justice SCHMIDTdelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1Plaintiff, Lakewood Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC(Lakewood), appeals the trial court's dismissal of its petition for administrative review as moot pursuant to section 2–619 of the Code of Civil Procedure(Code)(735 ILCS 5/2–619(West 2014) ).Because we find that the issues raised in Lakewood's petition for administrative review fall within the public interest and capable of repetition yet evading review exceptions to the mootness doctrine, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 2 FACTS

¶ 3 Lakewood filed a notice of its intent to involuntarily discharge Helen Sauvageau, a resident of its nursing home facility, on October 28, 2013, after Sauvageau failed to pay for her stay and nursing services.Sauvageau requested a hearing with the Illinois Department of Public Health(IDPH).Sauvageau then filed for Medicaid, which stayed the discharge proceedings.Sauvageau's request for Medicaid was denied due to her transfer of real estate from her name to her daughter's name.Lakewood received Sauvageau's Medicaid denial on January 15, 2014, and requested an immediate involuntary discharge hearing.IDPH scheduled the hearing for March 24, 2014.¹

¶ 4 The evidentiary hearing was held on March 24 before administrative law judge (ALJ)Joseph Harrington.Following the evidentiary hearing, Harrington issued a report finding that Sauvageau stipulated that she owed money to Lakewood.The report recommended that the notice of involuntary discharge be approved 30 days after the receipt of the final ruling.On May 6, 2014, John Abrell, the chief ALJ for IDPH, issued a final order adopting Harrington's recommendations, affirming the notice of involuntary transfer, and dismissing the action.

¶ 5 Lakewood filed a complaint for administrative review against IDPH, Director Lamar Hasbrouck, and Sauvageau seeking judicial review of the following issues: (1) the order of IDPH setting the matter for hearing more than 10 days after it received the hearing request; (2) the failure of IDPH to issue the final order within 14 days of the hearing; and (3) the portion of the final order requiring Lakewood to keep Sauvageau at the nursing facility for 30 days after receipt of the order, which Lakewood argued was beyond the statutory time limit.Lakewood contended that the actions of IDPH were contrary to and in excess of its powers under the Nursing Home Care Act (Act)( 210 ILCS 45/1–101 et seq.(West 2014)) and the related provisions of the Skilled Nursing and Intermediate Care Facilities Code (77 Ill. Adm.Code 300.110(1992) ).Lakewood also claimed that IDPH acted without jurisdiction.Lakewood further alleged that IDPH's actions unconstitutionally required Lakewood to provide services without compensation; interfered with the protected occupational business of Lakewood; interfered with Lakewood's contract rights; and constituted illegal rulemaking.Lakewood requested that the court: (1) reverse IDPH's final order insofar as it required Lakewood to keep Sauvageau beyond the expiration of the statutory time limit; and (2) declare unconstitutional IDPH's policies and practices of setting the hearing more than 10 days after it received the hearing request and issuing the final order more than 14 days after the evidentiary hearing.

¶ 6 On August 13, 2014, defendants IDPH and Hasbrouck (defendants) filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2–619(a)(9) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2–619(a)(9)(West 2014)).The motion argued that Lakewood's claims were moot because Sauvageau was no longer a resident at Lakewood's facility.Defendants contended that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case on administrative review pursuant to section 3–104 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/3–104(West 2014) ) because Lakewood's complaint for administrative review did not seek review of the final order but sought only declaratory relief regarding the timeliness of IDPH's actions.

¶ 7 Lakewood filed a response to defendants' motion to dismiss.Lakewood reasserted its substantive position from its complaint that IDPH had no statutory authority to order that the notice of involuntary discharge be approved 30 days after receipt of the final order.Lakewood contended that, under the Act, IDPH only had the authority to review the propriety of the notice of involuntary discharge and IDPH exceeded its statutory authority by ordering the length of time that Lakewood was required to keep Sauvageau at its facility.Lakewood contended that section 3–413 of the Act(210 ILCS 45/3–413(West 2014) ), which provides that a resident subject to an involuntary discharge may not be required to leave the facility before the thirty-fourth day after receiving the notice of involuntary discharge or the tenth day after receipt of IDPH's decision, whichever is later, was a limitation on the facility.Lakewood argued that section 3–413 did not authorize IDPH to extend the time provided by statute at its discretion.Lakewood asserted that IDPH's extension of the time that Lakewood was required to keep Sauvageau caused Lakewood to lose money.

¶ 8 Lakewood further argued that this claim and its claims regarding the timing of the hearing and issuance of the final order were not moot and, even if the claims were moot, they fell within the following exceptions to the mootness doctrine: (1) public interest; (2) capable of repetition yet evading review; and (3) collateral consequences.Lakewood also argued that IDPH lost jurisdiction over the cause when it failed to hold the evidentiary hearing within the statutorily required 10–day window and failed to issue its ruling within 14 days of the hearing, and, consequently, the final order was void and could be collaterally attacked any time.

¶ 9 Lakewood attached to its response an e-mail purporting to be from Abrell responding to a question regarding the portion final of the order in Sauvageau's case stating that the notice of involuntary discharge was to be approved 30 days after receipt of the final order.In the e-mail, Abrell explained that section 3–413 of the Act(id. ) stated that the resident could not be required to leave the facility before the tenth day following the receipt of IDPH's decision but nothing in that section prohibited IDPH from extending the time.

¶ 10Defendants filed a reply to Lakewood's response, arguing that Lakewood's claims were moot and no exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied.Defendants also argued that the e-mail attached to Lakewood's response should not be considered by the court because it was not properly authenticated and constituted hearsay.

¶ 11 During arguments on the motions to dismiss, Lakewood's counsel argued that the only way Lakewood could get relief from IDPH's order—which Lakewood believed was in excess of IDPH's statutory authority—was to come to court because mandamus was not allowed under the administrative review law.

¶ 12 After hearing arguments, the trial court granted defendants' motion and dismissed the case with prejudice.

¶ 13 ANALYSIS

¶ 14 On appeal, Lakewood argues that the trial court erred in dismissing its complaint for administrative review as moot pursuant to section 2–619(a)(9) of the Code.Lakewood contends that its claim regarding the additional time it was required to keep Sauvageau after the final order was issued is not moot because, if Lakewood were successful on administrative review, it could seek restitution from IDPH for the additional time it was required to keep Sauvageau at its facility.Alternatively, Lakewood argues that even if we find the issue is moot, the following exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply to the claims raised in Lakewood's complaint: (1) public interest; (2) capable of repetition yet evading review; and (3) collateral consequences.We find that, although the issue is moot, the public interest and the capable of repetition yet evading review exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply.

¶ 15 Amotion to dismiss brought pursuant to section 2–619(a)(9) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2–619(a)(9)(West 2014)) admits the sufficiency of the complaint, but asserts that the claim brought against the defendant is barred by an affirmative matter that avoids the legal effect of or defeats the claim.Our review of the dismissal of Lakewood's complaint for administrative review under section 2–619 of the Code is de novo.

Lutkauskas v. Ricker,2015 IL 117090, ¶ 29, 390 Ill.Dec. 74, 28 N.E.3d 727.

¶ 16 I. Mootness

¶ 17 Initially, we consider whether Lakewood's claim that IDPH exceeded its statutory authority in ordering Lakewood to keep Sauvageau in its facility beyond 10 days after it issued the final order is moot.“An appeal is moot when it involves no actual controversy or the reviewing court cannot grant the complaining party effectual relief.”Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher,197 Ill.2d 514, 522–23, 259 Ill.Dec. 729, 759 N.E.2d 509(2001).“Courts of review will generally not consider moot or abstract questions because our jurisdiction is restricted to cases which present an actual controversy.”Id. at 523, 259 Ill.Dec. 729, 759 N.E.2d 509.

¶ 18 Here, the parties do not dispute that Sauvageau had left the Lakewood facility pursuant to IDPH's final order.Thus, the circuit court could not have granted Lakewood any effectual relief in the instant involuntary discharge action.

¶ 19 Further, Lakewood would not be able to seek...