Winstrom v. C&M Conveyor, Inc.
| Decision Date | 17 October 2014 |
| Docket Number | File No. 1:13-CV-1271 |
| Parties | JAMES WINSTROM and VERONICA WINSTROM, Plaintiffs, v. C&M CONVEYOR, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
HON. ROBERT HOLMES BELL
This matter is before the Court on Defendant C&M Conveyor, Inc.'s motions for summary judgment against Plaintiffs James and Veronica Winstrom. (ECF Nos. 27, 44.) On November 21, 2013, Plaintiffs brought suit against Defendant alleging defective product design, breach of implied warranty, and loss of consortium after Plaintiff James Winstrom was seriously injured at his employer's manufacturing facility by a materials transfer car, which was designed, manufactured, and sold by Defendant. (ECF No. 1.) For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motions for summary judgment will be granted.
Plaintiff James Winstrom was employed in 2012 at Advance Packaging Corporation, which is in the business of designing and manufacturing corrugated box packaging. (Compl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 1.) Advance Packaging moved into its current facility on 40th Street, Southeast, in Grand Rapids, Michigan, in 2006 in part to improve its material handling processes. In this facility, stacks of sheets are discharged from the corrugated box processing machines onto the conveyor system, which transports the materials to various staging areas to await delivery to other machines. (ECF No. 32, Ex. 4 at 12.)
The conveyor system at the Advance Packaging facility includes automated transfer cars to transport corrugated material along designated conveyor routes between machinery. (Compl. ¶ 9, ECF No. 1.) C&M, headquartered in Indiana, manufactured and sold the conveyor system to Advance Packaging. C&M specially designed the conveyor system to accommodate the work flow from each piece of Advance Packaging's manufacturing equipment. C&M itself manufactures most of the heavy-duty roll conveyor equipment used in conveyor systems like the one at the Advance Packaging facility. (Dep. of Howard Carlson 9:14-24, ECF No. 34, Ex. 5.)
C&M also specially modified the transfer cars for Advance Packaging because Advance Packaging required a wide bed to hold the corrugated materials. (Id. 14:22-25.) Each transfer car weighs about 12,000 pounds. (Id. 115:8-10.) The automated transfer cars have a laser scanner which functions like eyes to sense obstacles in the car's path and stops the car. (Compl. ¶ 10, ECF No. 1.)
The transfer cars cannot function independently of the conveyor system, as explained by the transfer car engineer:
[I]t is not a component. It is a piece of the system. . . [Y]ou know, there's more involved than just this car, than just the car itself. It gets its controls from other parts of our system. That car can be operated as manual, but that is not its function. The function of that is to transport material back and forth through a computer system that we can—known as our CIMS system. And that is the overall controlling—control for this whole plant. It knows when it gets the material off the corrugator and when it needs to be put on a finishing machine way on the other side of the building.
(Dep. of Howard Carlson 88: 12-25, ECF No. 27, Ex. B.) The transfer cars themselves are "trapped" to their track; they cannot be driven around or moved independent of their tracks. The cars move by means of a central control panel and power system. (Dep. of Howard Carlson 90: 3-15, ECF No. 27, Ex. B.) Even when in manual mode, the cars receive power from an overheard collector bar system that feeds into the central control panel and a driver operates the system with a joystick. (Id. 90:9-15.) There is no battery or independent power source for the transfer cars, which renders them immobile outside of the conveyor system. (Id. 114: 13-25.) The cars are not available for purchase independent of a conveyor system. (Id. 13:18-25.)
The Computer-Integrated Inventory Management System ("CIMS") is a computer program that interfaces with Advance Packaging's machinery and in-house scheduling system in order to monitor and provide direction to each individual transfer car in the conveyor system. (ECF No. 32, Ex. 4 at 10.) The CIMS system sends pick-up and drop-off messages to a floor panel, which relays the directions to a transfer car through a radiofrequency modem. (Dep. of Jeff Endris 13:16-14:18, ECF No. 27, Ex. C.)
Plaintiff James Winstrom alleges that, on August 22, 2012, he was off-loading a stack of corrugated material from one conveyor to another when he was crushed by a transfer car. (Compl. ¶ 12-14, ECF No. 1.) Mr. Winstrom further alleges that, because of the absence of various safety precautions, the automated car did not provide adequate visible and audible warnings to Mr. Winstrom, nor stop automatically when it sensed his presence. (Compl. ¶ 19, ECF No. 1.)
On November 21, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a tort action against C&M, alleging defective product design, breach of implied warranty, and loss of consortium. (ECF No. 1.)
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require the Court to grant summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment the Court must look beyond the pleadings and assess the proof to determine whether there is a genuine need for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The Court "must construe the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Martin v. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 561 F.3d 439, 443 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Jones v. Potter, 488 F.3d 397, 403 (6th Cir. 2007)).
The first issue ripe for decision is the appropriate application of state law in this diversity suit. Indiana and Michigan have inconsistent statutes of repose for actions against contractors for improvements made to real property. Plaintiffs argue that Indiana's Statute of Repose should apply, which bars an action after ten years. Ind. Code § 32-30-1-5. Defendant moves for summary judgment under the Michigan Statute of Repose, which bars an action after six years. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5839.
This Court, sitting in diversity, applies the choice of law rules of Michigan. Klaxton v. Senator Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1942); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In Sutherland v. Kennington Truck Service, Ltd., the Michigan Supreme Court explained its choice of law analysis, presuming that Michigan substantive law will apply unless a "rational reason" to do otherwise exists:
In determining whether a rational reason to displace Michigan law exists, we undertake a two-step analysis. First, we must determine if any foreign state has an interest in having its law applied. If no state has such an interest, the presumption that Michigan law will apply cannot be overcome. If a foreign state does have an interest in having its law applied, we must then determine if Michigan's interests mandate that Michigan law be applied, despite the foreign interests.
562 N.W. 2d 466, 471 (Mich. 1997).
The Michigan choice of law analysis focuses on (1) the interests of Michigan and Indiana in applying its own product liability law, and (2) Michigan's interest in applying itsown law despite the interest of Indiana. See In re Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport, 750 F. Supp. 793, 801 (E.D. Mich. 1989). Michigan's interest in applying its law derives from its location as the site of injury, Plaintiff's residence, and the conveyor system installation and operation. Plaintiffs claim that Indiana has an interest in having its law applied because Defendant's principle place of business is in Indiana, and Indiana has interests in "ensuring predictability of results for its corporate citizens." (Pls.' Br. 11, ECF No. 31). Plaintiffs offer no case law or authority to support their contention that these are recognized interests of Indiana. Cases addressing the applicability of New Jersey and Minnesota law are irrelevant and distracting from the proper analysis under Michigan's choice of law rules. Invocations of generalized interests in 'certainty' and 'predictable results" "play little if any role in modern choice of law analysis under Michigan law." Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor, Co. 723 F.3d 690, 698-99 (6th Cir. 2013).
Moreover, Indiana itself would apply Michigan law in this case. Indiana historically employs lex loci delicti as its choice of law principle in adjudicating tort claims, suggesting that its interest in the outcome of this case does not outweigh Michigan's interest. See Simon v. United States, 805 N.E. 2d 798, 802 (Ind. 2004) (citing Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 515 N.E. 2d 1071, 1073 (Ind. 1987)); see also Muncie Power Prod., Inc. v. United Tech. Auto, Inc., 328 F.3d 870, 878 (6th Cir. 2003). The Court finds that Michigan's interest in applying its law outweighs Indiana's interest. Cf. Pina v. Chrysler Group, L.L.C., No. 14-10716 2014 WL 4112918, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 2014) ().
Finally, Plaintiffs plead their causes of action expressly under Michigan statutes and have filed numerous motions assuming the applicability of Michigan law. Their attempts to invoke Indiana law now are belated and disingenuous. For these reasons, Michigan law will apply to Plaintiffs' tort claims.
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