L&R Exploration Venture v. Grynberg

• Decision Date: 17 February 2011
• Docket Number: No. 09CA1985.,09CA1985.
• Citation: 271 P.3d 530
• Parties: L & R EXPLORATION VENTURE; Ann L. Bronfman; Judith L. Chiara; Peter Dixon, as Executor of the Estate of W. Palmer Dixon; Margaret L. Kempner; Thomas L. Kempner; Jerome A. Manning and John A. Levin, Trustees of the Carl M. Loeb Trust f/b/o Ann L. Bronfman; Jerome A. Manning and John A. Levin, Trustees of the Carl M. Loeb Trust f/b/o Judith L. Chiara; Jerome A. Manning and John A. Levin, Trustees of the Carl M. Loeb Trust f/b/o Deborah L. Brice; Jerome A. Manning and John A. Levin, Trustees of the Frances L. Loeb Trust f/b/o John L. Loeb, Jr.; Estate of Henry A. Loeb; John L. Loeb, Jr., John Rodgers, and Mal L. Barasch, as Trustees of the Virginia Bloomgarden Trust; Trof, Inc., formerly known as Marshall Petroleum; Larry C. Serr, as Trustee of the Robineau Trusts; John S. Rodgers and Mal L. Barasch, as Trustees of the Audrey Holly Trust, LLC; Columbia University Trust Administration, as Executor of the Estate of Daniel Silberberg; M.M. Wellman, as Trustee of the Mark J. Millard Trust; Frederick Lubcher and Ann B. Lesk, as Trustees of the Diana Von Muffling Trust, Charles Von Muffling Trust, and William Von Muffling Trust; John L. Loeb, Jr.; and John S. Rodgers, Plaintiffs–Appellees, v. Jack J. GRYNBERG, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

271 P.3d 530

L & R EXPLORATION VENTURE; Ann L. Bronfman; Judith L. Chiara; Peter Dixon, as Executor of the Estate of W. Palmer Dixon; Margaret L. Kempner; Thomas L. Kempner; Jerome A. Manning and John A. Levin, Trustees of the Carl M. Loeb Trust f/b/o Ann L. Bronfman; Jerome A. Manning and John A. Levin, Trustees of the Carl M. Loeb Trust f/b/o Judith L. Chiara; Jerome A. Manning and John A. Levin, Trustees of the Carl M. Loeb Trust f/b/o Deborah L. Brice; Jerome A. Manning and John A. Levin, Trustees of the Frances L. Loeb Trust f/b/o John L. Loeb, Jr.; Estate of Henry A. Loeb; John L. Loeb, Jr., John Rodgers, and Mal L. Barasch, as Trustees of the Virginia Bloomgarden Trust; Trof, Inc., formerly known as Marshall Petroleum; Larry C. Serr, as Trustee of the Robineau Trusts; John S. Rodgers and Mal L. Barasch, as Trustees of the Audrey Holly Trust, LLC; Columbia University Trust Administration, as Executor of the Estate of Daniel Silberberg; M.M. Wellman, as Trustee of the Mark J. Millard Trust; Frederick Lubcher and Ann B. Lesk, as Trustees of the Diana Von Muffling Trust, Charles Von Muffling Trust, and William Von Muffling Trust; John L. Loeb, Jr.; and John S. Rodgers, Plaintiffs–Appellees,

v.Jack J. GRYNBERG, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 09CA1985.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. III.

Jan. 6, 2011.As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Feb. 17, 2011.

Holland & Hart, LLP, Marcy G. Glenn, Christie L.R. McCall, Christina F. Gomez, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiffs–Appellees.

Brian E. Fitzgerald, Denver, Colorado; Michael W. Coriden, Evergreen, Colorado; Roger A. Jatko, Parker, Colorado, for Defendant–Appellant.

Opinion by Judge J. JONES.

Appellees, L & R Exploration Venture and its trustees (together, L & R Venture), domesticated a foreign judgment against appellant, Jack Grynberg, in Colorado district court under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (the Uniform Act), sections 13–53–101 to –108, C.R.S.2010. Mr. Grynberg appeals the district court's order denying his C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion for relief from the domesticated judgment.

Mr. Grynberg contends, as he did in his Rule 60(b) motion, that the domesticated judgment is void because L & R Venture did not file the foreign judgment in the county in which he resided at the time of the filing—that is, venue was improper—and did not file a properly authenticated copy of the foreign judgment. We conclude, however, that the Uniform Act unambiguously allows a party to file a foreign judgment in any court which would have had jurisdiction over the underlying action had it been filed in Colorado, and that it does not require, as a condition of enforceability, that the county in which it is filed be a proper venue under C.R.C.P. 98. We also conclude that Mr. Grynberg failed to establish any basis for setting aside the judgment under Rule 60(b)(5) based on the manner in which L & R Venture sought to establish that it had filed an authenticated copy of the foreign judgment. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order.

I. Background

In 2001, Mr. Grynberg sued L & R Venture in Colorado based on disputes arising from the parties' joint venture agreement. Soon thereafter, L & R Venture filed a petition in New York state court to stay the Colorado proceeding and to compel Mr. Grynberg to arbitrate the parties' disputes in New York. In response, Mr. Grynberg asserted that the New York court lacked personal jurisdiction over him and that the parties' disputes were not arbitrable. The New York court referred the personal jurisdiction issue to a special referee, who concluded that the New York court had personal jurisdiction over Mr. Grynberg.

The New York court granted L & R Venture's petition to stay the Colorado proceeding and to compel arbitration. Mr. Grynberg unsuccessfully appealed. See L & R Exploration Venture v. Grynberg, 22 A.D.3d 221, 804 N.Y.S.2d 286 (N.Y.App.Div.), appeal denied, 6 N.Y.3d 749, 810 N.Y.S.2d 413, 843 N.E.2d 1153 (2005).

An arbitration panel determined that the disputes were arbitrable. It then held hearings on the parties' substantive claims before deciding largely in L & R Venture's favor and awarding L & R Venture $3,067,783, plus interest.

Thereafter, L & R Venture moved to confirm the arbitration award in New York state court. In response, Mr. Grynberg cross-moved to partially vacate the award. The New York court granted L & R Venture's motion and denied Mr. Grynberg's cross-motion, confirming the arbitration panel's award in its entirety. The court ordered Mr. Grynberg to pay the outstanding amount of the award, $1,691,111.11, plus post-judgment interest. (Mr. Grynberg had paid a portion of the original award of $3,067,783.)

On June 10, 2009, L & R Venture sought to domesticate the New York judgment in Colorado by filing a copy of it in Arapahoe County District Court. See § 13–53–103, C.R.S.2010. L & R Venture submitted an affidavit with the foreign judgment attesting that counsel had mailed a notice of the filing to Mr. Grynberg. Though Mr. Grynberg apparently received that notice (he has never alleged otherwise), he did not object to the filing within the ten-day period in which enforcement of the judgment was stayed by operation of statute. See §§ 13–53–104(3), –105(2), C.R.S.2010. The district court sent Mr. Grynberg notice of the filing and the entry of judgment on June 18. See § 13–53–104(2). Mr. Grynberg subsequently moved for relief from the district court's domesticated judgment under Rule 60(b)(3) and (5). After additional briefing and a hearing, the district court denied the motion.

II. Venue

Mr. Grynberg contends that a party seeking to domesticate a foreign judgment in Colorado under the Uniform Act is required by section 13–53–103 itself to file the judgment in a venue proper under Rule 98, and that a failure to do so renders the domesticated judgment subject to attack as void under Rule 60(b)(3). Because he did not reside in Arapahoe County when L & R Venture filed the New York judgment in Arapahoe County District Court, he argues that venue was improper, and the district court therefore erred by denying his Rule 60(b)(3) motion. We are not persuaded.

A. Standard of Review and General Legal Principles

Rule 60(b)(3) allows a court to grant a party relief from a void judgment. Generally speaking, a judgment is void if the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter jurisdiction over the cause of action, or if it was entered in violation of a party's procedural due process rights to notice or to be heard. See Goodman Assocs., LLC v. WP Mountain Properties, LLC, 222 P.3d 310, 314 (Colo.2010); In re Water Rights of Columbine Ass'n, 993 P.2d 483, 488 (Colo.2000); SR Condominiums, LLC v. K.C. Constr., Inc., 176 P.3d 866, 869 (Colo.App.2007); Don J. Best Trust v. Cherry Creek Nat'l Bank, 792 P.2d 302, 304–05 (Colo.App.1990); see also United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 130 S.Ct. 1367, 1377, 176 L.Ed.2d 158 (2010). We review a district court's denial of relief from an allegedly void judgment de novo. Goodman, 222 P.3d at 314.

Mr. Grynberg's contention presents an issue of statutory interpretation. We also review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Foiles v. Whittman, 233 P.3d 697, 699 (Colo.2010); In re Marriage of Gallegos, 251 P.3d 1086, –––– (Colo.App.2010). Our primary tasks in interpreting a statute are to ascertain and give effect to the General Assembly's intent. Crandall v. City & County of Denver, 238 P.3d 659, 662 (Colo.2010); Premier Farm Credit, PCA v. W–Cattle, LLC, 155 P.3d 504, 513 (Colo.App.2006). To do this, we look first to the language of the statute, giving the words and phrases used therein their plain and ordinary meanings. Crandall, 238 P.3d at 662; Premier Farm Credit, 155 P.3d at 513. We also consider the statute as a whole to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Costilla County Conservancy Dist., 88 P.3d 1188, 1192 (Colo.2004); Premier Farm Credit, 155 P.3d at 513. If we determine that the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it as written, without resorting to interpretive rules of statutory construction. Crandall, 238 P.3d at 662; Premier Farm Credit, 155 P.3d at 513. However, if we determine that the statute is ambiguous in some material way, we may look to extrinsic evidence of intent, including prior law, legislative history, the consequences of a particular construction, and the goal of the statutory scheme. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 88 P.3d at 1193; Carruthers v. Carrier Access Corp., 251 P.3d 1199, –––– (Colo.App.2010); see § 2–4–203, C.R.S.2010.

B. Analysis

Section 13–53–103 states:

A copy of any foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with the act of congress or the laws of this state may be filed in the office of the clerk of any court of this state which would have had jurisdiction over the original action had it been commenced first in this state.

A judgment so filed has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of the court of this state in which filed and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner.

As best we can tell, Mr. Grynberg argues either that the statutory language implies a requirement of filing the foreign judgment in a court in which venue would have been proper if the underlying action had been commenced in Colorado, or that the reference to “jurisdiction” in the statute encompasses the concept of venue. Both arguments miss the mark.

We perceive no ambiguity in the statute's plain language. It does not contain any express or implied reference to venue. Rather, the plain language of the statute limits where a party may file a foreign judgment in Colorado based only on jurisdiction. See Specialty Rests. Corp. v. Nelson, 231 P.3d 393, 397 (Colo.2010) (“[W]e will not construe a statute in a manner that assumes the General Assembly made an...