Pacific Hide & Fur Depot v. Great Am. Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 23 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 12–36–BU–DLC.,CV 12–36–BU–DLC. |
| Citation | 23 F.Supp.3d 1208 |
| Parties | PACIFIC HIDE & FUR DEPOT, a Montana corporation, n/k/a Pacific Steel & Recycling, Plaintiff, v. GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, a Delaware corporation; and Resolute Management Inc., and National Indemnity Company, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Montana |
Kyle A. Gray, Michelle Millhollin Sullivan, Holland & Hart, Billings, MT, for Plaintiff.
Michael P. Hooks, Forsberg & Umlauf, PS, Seattle, WA, Robert M. Carlson, Corette Black Carlson & Mickelson, Butte, MT, Mark A. Rabinowitz, Daniel R. Johnson, Cozen O'Connor, Chicago, IL, Allan H. Baris, Moore, O'Connell & Refling, PC, Bozeman, MT, for Defendants.
This order resolves three motions currently pending in this case: (1) Defendant Great American Insurance Company's (“Great American”) motion for summary judgment; (2) Plaintiff Pacific Hide & Fur Depot's (“Pacific”) motion for summary judgment regarding the duty to defend; and (3) Pacific's motion for summary judgment on Great American's remaining defenses.
For the reasons detailed herein, Great American breached its duty to defend, and the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Pacific on that claim.
This is not the first case to come before the Court where an insurer has taken the high risk approach of denying a defense in the face of facts mandating one. Considering the long-established and judicially approved alternative approach, which is to defend the insured and file a declaratory judgment action to determine coverage, it is mystifying that an insurer would continue to deny a defense to its insured in the face of a coverage question, particularly where the consequences are clear under Montana law, and can result in a judgment many times greater than the modest cost of the usual defense. This case presents, again, a clear example of the risk associated with this approach.
From approximately 1956 to 1988, Pacific Hide leased a property in Bozeman, Montana that was part of what later became known as the CMC Bozeman Asbestos Site (“Site”). During that time, Pacific purchased numerous liability policies from Great American, which are the subject of this litigation.
In a letter dated January 2, 1996, the Montana Department of Environmental Quality (“MDEQ”) notified Pacific that it had been identified as a potentially liable party (“PLP”) under Montana's Comprehensive Environmental Cleanup and Responsibility Act (“CECRA”), Mont.Code Ann. § 75–10–705 et seq., based on releases or threatened releases of hazardous or deleterious substances at the Site.
In a letter dated September 23, 2003, MDEQ offered Pacific and the other entities that it had identified as PLPs the opportunity to conduct either an interim or permanent remediation at the Site. The letter stated, inter alia, that if Pacific chose not to conduct one of the remedial actions outlined therein, “DEQ may conduct the actions itself and recover its costs or it may issue an order or initiate a civil action requiring [Pacific] to perform the actions.” (Doc. 63–5.) Pacific exchanged several letters with MDEQ regarding its CECRA liability between September 23, and December 2, 2003, but did not conduct either remedial action.
In a letter dated March 25, 2004, counsel for Pacific notified Great American that Pacific had been identified as a PLP at the Site, and that the City of Bozeman may assert a cost contribution claim against it. Pacific attached a schedule of fourteen policies it allegedly purchased from Great American, and requested that Great American defend and indemnify it from all claims arising from the Site.
Over a year later, in a letter dated April 27, 2005, Great American denied Pacific's request for defense and indemnity. On August 7, 2007, Pacific executed a stipulated consent judgment under which it agreed to a 15% allocation of liability for the Site, to be paid to the City of Bozeman as the party that undertook the MDEQ-mandated site cleanup. On July 13, 2010, Pacific executed an “Agreement and Release” with the City and tendered a check for $650,000, the amount that Pacific and the City agreed constituted Pacific's 15% allocation.
Pacific filed a complaint against Great American and the other Defendants in the Montana Eighteenth Judicial District Court on May 2, 2012, alleging breach of contract and bad faith claims handling practices. Century and Central National filed a notice of removal on June 8, 2012; Great American joined the notice on the same day. Following the preliminary pretrial conference on September 11, 2012, the Court bifurcated this litigation, with Phase I to deal with Counts I–VI, the breach of contract and declaratory judgment claims, and Phase II to deal with the remaining Counts. On October 15, 2013, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Pacific on the issue of Great American's statute of limitations defense.
The Court now resolves the issue raised in Phase I: Whether Great American breached its duty to defend Pacific in the CECRA proceedings.
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ. P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). The movant's burden is satisfied when the documentary evidence produced by the parties permits only one conclusion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Where the moving party has met its initial burden, the party opposing the motion “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (internal quotation marks omitted).
This case presents two novel and interrelated questions of state law concerning the duty to defend that the Montana Supreme Court has yet to directly address, and that this Court must resolve before it can decide these motions on the merits. A federal court sitting in diversity applies the substantive law of the forum state to state law claims. Mason and Dixon Intermodal, Inc. v. Lapmaster Intern. LLC, 632 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir.2011). When an issue of state law arises and “the state's highest court has not adjudicated the issue, a federal court must make a reasonable determination of the result the highest state court would reach if it were deciding the case.” Med. Laboratory Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 306 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir.2002) (citations omitted). In doing so, the court must “look to existing state law without predicting potential changes in that law.” Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Intl., Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 939 (9th Cir.2001) (citation omitted). The court should also rely on persuasive authorities, including treatises and decisions from other jurisdictions, as guidance. Strother v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 865 (9th Cir.1996).
“The duty to defend is independent from and broader than the duty to indemnify created by the same contract.” Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co. v. Staples, 321 Mont. 99, 90 P.3d, 381, 385 (2004) (citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 150 Mont. 182, 433 P.2d 795, 799 (1967) ); Grindheim v. Safeco Ins. Co., 908 F.Supp. 794, 800 (D.Mont.1995). “The duty to defend arises when a complaint against an insured alleges facts, which if proven, would result in coverage.” Staples, 90 P.3d at 385. “Where a complaint alleges facts which represent a risk outside the coverage of the policy but also avers facts which, if proved, represent a risk covered, the insurer is under a duty to defend.” Id. (quoting Atcheson v. Safeco Ins. Co., 165 Mont. 239, 527 P.2d 549, 552 (1974) ). “When a court compares allegations of liability advanced in a complaint with policy language to determine whether the insurer's obligation to defend was ‘triggered,’ a court must liberally construe allegations in a complaint so that all doubts about the meaning of the allegations are resolved in favor of finding that the obligation to defend was activated.” Id. at 385 (citing Portal Pipe v. Stonewall, 256 Mont. 211, 845 P.2d 746, 749 (1993) ); Grindheim, 908 F.Supp. at 805. “Unless there exists an unequivocal demonstration that the claim against an insured does not fall within the insurance policy's coverage, an insurer has a duty to defend.” Staples, 90 P.3d at 385 (citing Insured Titles, Inc. v. McDonald, 275 Mont. 111, 911 P.2d 209, 212 (1996) ). “[I]f there is any dispute as to the facts relevant to coverage, those factual disputes must be resolved in favor of coverage.”Id. (citing Insured Titles, Inc., 911 P.2d at 212 ). When an insurer, instead of tendering a defense under a reservation of rights, unilaterally decides coverage issues in its own favor and refuses to defend, “the insurer proceeds at its own risk.” Id. at 386. When an insurer unjustifiably breaches its duty to defend, the insurer becomes liable for defense costs and judgments. Id. (citing Lee v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 320 Mont. 174, 86 P.3d 562, 565 (2004) ).
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