St. Louis, A.&T.H.R. Co. v. People ex rel. Wolf

• Decision Date: 21 February 1907
• Citation: 225 Ill. 418,80 N.E. 303
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: ST. LOUIS, A. & T. H. R. CO. v. PEOPLE ex rel. WOLF.

225 Ill. 418

80 N.E. 303

ST. LOUIS, A. & T. H. R. CO.

v.PEOPLE ex rel. WOLF.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 21, 1907.

Appeal from St. Clair County Court; J. B. Hay, Judge.

Application by the people, on relation of Philip Wolf, county collector of St. Clair county, for judgment against the St. Louis, Alton & Terre Haute Railroad Company for delinquent taxes. From the judgment, the railway company appeals. Reversed in part, and remanded.R. J. Kramer (John G. Drennan, of counsel), for appellant.

James A. Farmer, State's Atty. (August Barthel, of counsel), for appellee.

FARMER, J.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the county court of St. Clair county overruling certain objections of appellant to certain taxes and portions of taxes upon application being made for judgment by the county collector.

Appellant objected to all the town taxes in the towns of Centreville Station, St. Clair, Freeburg, Lenzburg, and Marissa. The objections to this tax were that the towns had levied gross sums for ‘town purposes' without defining the particular purposes for which the taxes were levied. The certificates of levy made by the town clerks of the said towns were offered in evidence and showed the levies to have been made in the manner stated in the objections. We held, in Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co. v. People, 205 Ill. 582, 69 N. E. 89, and Cincinnati, Indianapolis & Western Railway Co. v. People, 213 Ill. 197, 72 N. E. 774, that levies made in that manner are invalid, that the levy must be made for some town purpose for which the town meeting had authority to levy a tax, and that this must be shown by the certificate of levy. The court therefore erred in not sustaining appellant's objections to the town taxes for the towns mentioned.

Objections were also filed to a portion of the road and bridge taxes of the towns of St. Clair, Smithton, Freeburg, New Athens, Lenzburg, and Marissa. All these towns were under what is known as the ‘cash system,’ and the tax levied was the maximum rate. In each of said towns what is known as the state board of equalization valuation of the taxable property was less than the county board of review valuation. In extending the road and bridge tax in said towns the county clerk used the county board of review valuation instead of the state board of equalization valuation. We have held, in Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co. v. People, 223 Ill. 17, 79 N. E. 17, Chicago,Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. People, 213 Ill. 458, 72 N. E. 1105, and Wabash Railroad Co. v. People, 214 Ill. 568, 73 N. E. 749, that this is erroneous. In the first-mentioned case we held the amount of taxes that can be lawfully extended and collected, where the levy equals the maximum rate allowed by law, is to be ascertained by computing the tax at the rate determined upon, on the basis of the equalized value of the property as fixed by the state board of equalization. This will give the total amount of tax that may be lawfully extended. Then, for all taxes other than state taxes the rate per centum against each $100 is to be ascertained by dividing the amount of taxes that it has been ascertained can be lawfully extended by the valuation of property as fixed by the county board of review. This will give the rate per centum against each $100 of the county board of review valuation. Where that valuation is higher than the state board of equalization valuation, it would necessarily reduce the rate on each $100 of the county board valuation, but would produce the same amount of taxes that would have been produced by extending the tax at the higher rate against the valuation of the state board of equalization. The result that necessarily followed the action of the county clerk in extending the tax at the rate determined upon by the commissioners of highways against the county board of review valuation was to produce a greater amount of tax than was authorized by law. Appellant has paid the amount of tax that would have been produced by extending it at the proper rate against the proper valuation, and the objections are to the excess. These objections should have been sustained.

Appellant, in its brief and argument, discusses the validity of a levy of 15 cents on the $100 in addition to the 60 cents authorized by section 1o to be levied by the commissioners of highways in the town of New Athens. Hurd's Rev. St. 1905, c. 121, par. 13. The objection raised and discussed by counsel in appellant's brief does not appear, from its objections as abstracted, to have been raised in the county court. As abstracted the objection relating to the road and bridge tax of the town of New Athens raised only the same questions as were raised with reference to the other towns. The court should have sustained the objection to the excess of tax produced by computing it at the rate of 60 cents on the $100 of the valuation of property made by the county board of review. If, in fact, there was an additional levy of 15 cents on the $100 in said township, neither its validity not the ruling of the court thereon, if any ruling was made, is before us.

Objections were also filed to a portion of the county tax. The same questions were raised by the objections to the county tax as were raised by the objections we have before discussed with reference to the road and bridge tax. The same is also true of the objections to the school taxes of school district No. 9, Union, town 2 north, range 9 west, and of the tax levied for school purposes in school district No. 10, Union, town 2 north, range 10 west. All of these taxes equaled the maximum rate allowed by law. For the reasons above stated the objections to the excess of these...