Indiana B.&W. Ry. Co. v. Foster

• Decision Date: 21 September 1886
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court
• Parties: Indiana B. & W. Ry. Co. v. Foster.

107 Ind. 430

8 N.E. 264

Indiana B. & W. Ry. Co.

v.Foster.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

September 21, 1886.

Appeal from Warren circuit court.

E. W. Fairbanks and McCabe & Sons, for appellant.

Zollars, J.

It is alleged in appellee's complaint that, as the result of appellant's negligence, fire escaped from one of its trains passing over its road, in Warren county, ignited rubbish and inflammable material upon its right of way; that the fire spread to his land, and destroyed fences, growing pasture, and a quantity of hay. Appellant, by counsel, at the proper time, challenged the jurisdiction of the court, and now insists that the action should have been brought in the Fountain circuit court, and not in Warren county. For a plea to the jurisdiction of the court, and in abatement, appellant answered that it had no office for the transaction of business in Warren county, but had such an office in Fountain county; that it had no agent located in Warren county; that no summons was taken out to the sheriff of Warren county; and that the clerk, upon the order of appellee, issued a summons to the sheriff of Fountain county.

Appellant's contention rests upon the proposition that an action of this character must be brought in the county where the company has an office or agent; in other words, in a county where the company may be said to have a residence, as provided by section 312, Rev. St. 1881. We think, however, that the action is for an injury to real estate, within the meaning of section 307 of the Code, (Rev. St. 1881,) and was properly brought in Warren county, where the real estate is situated. The fire destroyed fences and growing pasture, and these were a part of the realty. Owens v. Lewis, 46 Ind. 489, and cases there cited. Their destruction, therefore, was an injury to the real estate. The hay destroyed in the stack was personal property. Conceding, for the present, without in any way indicating an opinion, that if its destruction had been the only loss by the fire, the Warren circuit court would not have had jurisdiction in an action for its loss, it does not follow at all that the joining of that claim with the claim for the injury to the real estate ousted the jurisdiction of that court. It is not questioned that the service was good, if the Warren circuit court had jurisdiction. Upon the foregoing we conclude that the court below did not err in sustaining the demurrer to appellant's plea in abatement.

The sufficiency of the...